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Summary of the thesis 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) instruments - as an indicator of credit risk - 
were one of the most prominent innovations in financial engineering. Very limited 
literature existed on the drivers of CDS spreads before the financial crisis due to the 
opacity of this market and its lack of transparency.  
 
First, this thesis investigates the drivers of CDS spread in the UK banking 
sector, by considering the role of the housing market, over the period of 2004-2011. I 
find that, in the long-run, house price dynamics were the main factor contributing to 
wider CDS spreads. In addition, I show that a rise in stock prices lead to higher 
availability of capital and therefore increased bank borrowing activities, which led to 
lower credit risk. Furthermore, findings show that with higher aggregate bank 
liquidity, banks tend to grant more loans to low-income consumers, thus increasing 
bank credit risk. In addition, in the short-run, I employ the Structural VAR by 
imposing short-run restrictions to identify the five shocks arising from the CDS 
spread, the house price index, the yield spread, the TED spread, and the 
FTSE100.  The SVAR findings indicate that a positive shock to house prices 
significantly increases the CDS spread in the medium-term, in the UK banking 
sector. In addition, apart from its own shock, the house price shock explains a big 
part of the variance (nearly 20%) in CDS spread. These results remained robust even 
after changing the ordering of the variables in the Structural VAR.  
  
Second, considering the bank- level factors across 30 countries and 115 
banks, I find most significant bank- level drivers of the CDS spread were asset 
quality, liquidity and the operations income ratio. As such, banks with better asset 
quality, high levels of liquidity and operations income ratio were subject to lower 
CDS spreads and credit risk. Furthermore, larger banks were found to be more risky 
than smaller banks. We have conducted the U-test and our results indicate the 
presence of a U-shape relationship between bank size and bank CDS spread. It 
should be noted that in order to ensure that our results are robust, we used several 
estimation frameworks, including the FE, RE and alternative Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) approaches, which all prove the existence of a U-shape 
relationship between the CDS spread and bank size.  In addition, we find a threshold 
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level of bank size, which shows that banks growing beyond this point are subject to 
wider CDS spreads. 
 
Finally, I consider the difference in financial systems at country-level and 
regulatory structures at bank- level, in a panel setting, over the period of 2004-2011. 
At country- level, my findings directly link financial deepening to higher credit risk, 
reflecting a sign of credit bubble. Besides, at bank- level, I confirm my previous 
findings whereby asset quality, liquidity and operations income remain significant 
drivers of the CDS spread.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of this thesis 
In the middle of summer 2007, the world economy was hit by the drastic 
collapse of the housing market. The burst of the housing bubble generated a long 
lasting crisis, which subsequently led many economies across the world to 
experience the worse financial meltdown since the great depression of 1929. The 
recent crisis not only affected the banking sector but also the entire global economy, 
resulting in millions of people losing their jobs, houses, and trust in the financial 
system as a whole. Although the housing bubble primarily started in the US, the 
shock quickly transmitted to the UK, Ireland, France, Spain, Portugal, Iceland and 
many other countries around the globe.  This predominantly shows the close linkage 
between banking systems across the world.  
 
The CDS market was introduced in mid-90s, but started growing 
exponentially in early 2000s, during credit boom. It reached its highest market share 
during the financial crisis. Theoretically, a Credit Default Swap (CDS) is very 
similar to an insurance contract, whereby the protection buyer pays a premium to the 
protection seller. In exchange, in case of a negative credit event, the protection seller 
is bound to make a physical or cash settlement to the protection buyer. As such, CDS 
instruments were considered to be one of the most prominent innovations of 
financial engineering.  
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The demand for such derivatives was brought by banks and financial 
institutions as a way to hedge and diversify risk. Thus, the market share of CDS 
contracts grew as a result of an increased demand for low-cost instruments that 
allowed investors to take credit exposures. Furthermore, given that CDS contracts 
are standardized relative to the underlying cash market, it greatly contributed to 
enhancing liquidity in financial markets. The way CDS contracts are designed served 
both investors and banks as it helped offsetting credit risk and narrow the credit 
spread. In addition, it provided market depth and the ability for financial institutions 
to trade in high numbers without necessarily suffering from the price impact. 
Furthermore, CDS contracts provided resilience as it improved the speed at which 
the market absorbed high trades.  
 
With all the advantages of CDS derivatives, soon following its introduction 
in the financial markets, both bankers as well as investors started misusing it. Instead 
of buying CDS contracts for hedging purposes, this instrument became more of a 
speculative toll. As such, investors started taking CDS contracts as an insurance on 
real estate they did not own (synthetic CDS contracts). This in turn created an issue 
of moral incentives, where investors were more interested in the underlying asset to 
default in order to get compensation from CDS protection. In addition, the CDS 
market suffered from a lack of transparency as it traded Over-the-Counter (OTC), 
where trades do not go through the clearing house.  
 
While one of the advantages of the CDS market is its ability to enhance 
liquidity, as the crisis revealed, the misuse of this derivative can often translate into 
the exact opposite result, thus causing a market squeeze. This tends to happen when 
14 
 
agents have the ability to exploit advantageous information in the cash market, 
through the trades conducted in the derivative market. In fact, due to the anonymous 
nature of trades in the derivative market, it becomes very difficult to capture the 
underlying condition of the cash market, as perceived by informed market 
participants, who may have the incentive to distort prices in the cash market, for the 
sake of personal benefits. This causes the market to destabilize and undermine the 
benefits of CDS trading.   
 
For a long time, financial regulators, central banks and governments ignored 
the importance and the significance of the CDS market. It is only with the beginning 
of the financial crisis, when a high number of investors and banks started defaulting 
on their obligations that both the importance and the danger embedded in the CDS 
trading came truly to light. In fact, with a staggering multi- trillion-market share, the 
financial system started fearing the worse.  
  
Many factors led to the recent financial meltdown, both at bank and country 
levels. These include the ability of banks to expand their leverage intakes during the 
credit expansion of 2000s, escape regulatory requirements and hold insufficient 
capital buffers to cope with a negative credit event. In addition, reckless lending to 
low-income consumers and holding insufficient levels of liquidity also strongly 
contributed to fueling the levels of credit risk.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize the change in the structure of the 
banking system as a whole and the type of activities financial institutions started 
engaging in since the beginning of the credit boom. In fact, while in the past, most 
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banks used to specialize in either commercial or investment banking, the trend had 
reversed in the last decade as most banks became more driven to larger scale 
investments. This led to the creation of universal banking, where instead of focusing 
on a particular segment of banking, financial institutions were now conducting both 
commercial and investment banking. As a result, many small and mid-size banks 
started growing in size as they went through mergers and acquisitions.  
 
On the one hand, the move to universal banking was perceived as positive 
move since financial institutions were expanding their business activities and 
granting more credit, which in turn boosted their revenues. Other advantages include 
banks’ ability to reduce their costs through economies of scale. However, the major 
disadvantage of universal banking arose from banks growing to a worrying extent, 
well beyond their optimal size. This endangered the stability of the entire financial 
system. As such, bigger banks became heavily involved in financial engineering 
activities, which very often involved the use of CDS instruments. After the slicing 
and dicing of plain vanilla instruments, banks with the participation of the Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and credit rating agencies, repackaged these instruments, 
creating highly structured and risky derivatives.  
 
Eight years have elapsed since the beginning of the chaotic crisis, yet policy 
makers, governments and central banks are still looking for answers and possible 
solutions to prevent defaults and another financial crisis to hit the system again.  
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1.2 Overview of the Credit Default Swap Market 
Since early 2000, there has been a huge development and innovation in the 
credit derivative market instruments, most specifically in the Credit Default Swap 
market.  A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract between two parties; where the 
investor purchasing the protection pays a premium to the party selling the CDS 
agreement, while in exchange, the protection seller pays compensation, which can be 
either a cash or physical settlement, to the policy holder, if a negative credit event 
occurs (Mengle (2007)). In most cases, the protection seller pays the buyer of the 
CDS contract the par value of the underlying asset such as a bond, while the 
protection buyer delivers the bond obligation to the seller. As such, it functions 
similarly to an insurance contract, where the premium represents a series of 
repayments, also referred to as the CDS spread (Lokken (2009)). The form of the 
redemption strictly depends on the terms and conditions stipulated in the original 
contract that both the holder and the seller of the CDS contract signed.  
 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) gives a clear 
outline of what constitutes a credit event that would lead to compensation of the 
CDS policy holder. These include the following: bankruptcy, restructuring, default in 
payments of the obligation, credit rating downgrade, repudiation or moratorium and 
obligation acceleration (Fabozzi (2009)). It should be noted that CDS contracts are 
typically traded as five-year contracts, although three seven and ten-year contracts can 
be also issued. 
 
The creation of Credit Default Swaps is attributed to JP Morgan. In 1994, the 
bank extended a credit line of $4.8 billion to Exxon, which was facing $ 5billion 
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damage charges following the 1989 Valdez oil spill. For this deal, JP Morgan 
contracted with the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
(Lanchester (2009)). Regular payments were made to the EBRD in order to hedge 
the $4.8 billion credit exposure. This meant that if a negative event occurred or 
Exxon defaulted, JP Morgan would get compensation from the EBRD (Lanchester 
(2009)). This first CDS deal benefited JP Morgan as it kept its long-time customer 
Exxon, without causing any damage to its credit lines (Tett (2009), (Lanchester 
(2009)). 
 
The real development of the CDS market started throughout the 90s. In 1999, 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) published a 
Standardized Master Agreement on CDS contracts. This was the first set of 
guidelines that was made available to banks and other financial participants on CDS 
trading practices. However, most of the initial rules outlined by ISDA were not very 
clear. As such, in 2003, the ISDA issued a more comprehensive version of the 
practices that primarily aimed at improving the understanding the definition of a 
credit derivative and its underlying rules. The new document outlined standardized 
practices that subsequently improved financial participants’ ability to trade in the 
credit derivative market. 
 
In the early 90s, trading in Credit Default Swaps was basic, involving single 
name CDS contracts. However, with the introduction of the CDS index in 2004, the 
CDS market started establishing itself, thus, becoming more complex. The 
development of the market was brought with the creation of the iTraxx index for the 
European region as a result of the merger of iBoxx and Trac-x indices (Bystrom 
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(2005)). In addition, another CDS index was also introduced focusing on the North 
America market. In case of default, single name CDS agreements and CDS index 
behaved differently. While simple CDS contracts end immediately, the CDS index 
contract does not terminate until the agreed expiry date; with only the reference 
entity that defaulted being removed (Calice and Ioannidis (2012)).  
 
Thus, the CDS index trading offered many advantages to financial 
institutions, including banks and hedge funds, as it helped them reduce their credit 
risk exposure by taking positions on baskets of reference entities. With the 
characteristic of high market liquidity and low bid/ask spreads, the CDS index 
market allowed financial institutions to be more efficient (Stulz (2009)). In addition, 
it also benefited investors as they now had a better access to different sectors, which 
made hedging more straightforward, compared to trading through multiple single 
name CDS contracts. In addition, the CDS index market provided more transparency 
and clearer set of rules, with superior degree of standardization (European Central 
Bank (2009)).  
 
According to ISDA, the CDS market grew dramatically from 2001, when the 
outstanding notional amount was $631.5 billion, to the last quarter of 2007, when the 
outstanding amount peaked at $62.2 trillion, an amount larger than world economic 
output of $55.8 trillion (ISDA (2010)). By the end of 2008, as a result of the severe 
financial crisis, this had nearly halved to $38.6 trillion (ISDA (2008)) and continued 
decreasing thereafter: at the end of the third quarter of 2009, the Depository Trust 
and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) estimated that the notional outstanding amount of 
CDS contracts averaged $28 trillion (Squam Lake Working Group on Financial 
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Regulation (2009)). As of December 2011, the gross notional amount of all CDS 
contracts remained high at $25.9 trillion, with the net notional amount for the same 
time period reaching $2.7 trillion (ISDA (2014)). 
 
Although the recent financial crisis caused dramatic distortions in the CDS 
market; after 2009, it still remained steady and positive. As such, over a seven year 
period, from 2001 to 2008, the CDS market generated approximately $60 trillion; 
with an estimated growth of $50 trillion. This implies that as of 2008, the CDS 
market outperformed the world economic output, which was $55.8 trillion (ISDA 
(2008)). At the end of the third quarter of 2009, the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) estimated that the notional outstanding amount of CDS 
contracts averaged $28 trillion (Squam Lake Working Group on Financial 
Regulation (2009)). 
 
Given that the CDS market represented a very high market share the global 
financial markets, the opaque structure and the complexity of its underlying 
reference entities raised high concerns across European Union countries as well as 
the US. In the light of the recent financial crisis, there was an imminent need to 
tighten the lax regulatory regime of the CDS market and an urge to enhance its 
transparency.   
 
One of the arguments against CDS trading was related to the fact that it 
traded on the Over the Counter (OTC) market; which meant that it did not go 
through a clearing house. It was therefore very hard to know with certainty the 
number of contracts exchanged throughout a particular period. In addition, CDS 
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trading was highly criticized by financial market participants as it raised issues 
regarding moral incentives in financial markets. In fact, before the recent financial 
crisis, any investor had the right to take a CDS contract without owning the 
underlying reference entity; thus, most investors hoped for the underlying asset to 
default in order to get compensation. As a result, in 2012, EU regulators imposed a 
ban on outright speculation of naked sovereign CDS instruments in order to prevent 
speculators trading CDS contracts without even owning the underlying security.  
 
1.2.1 Difference between a CDS and an Insurance Contract 
First and foremost, the holder of a CDS contract is under no obligation to 
own the underlying asset in order to enter into a CDS contract. One form of a 
synthetic CDS is the naked CDS contract that allows investors to hold a CDS 
without owning the underlying debt. This implies that any investor can take an 
exposure in a CDS without having a real insurable interest. On the other hand, with 
an insurance contract, the buyer of the policy must have an insurable interest for the 
contract to be binding on both parties. Second, unlike insurance agreements, with a 
CDS contract, the seller does not have to be regulated by the regulatory authority 
(such as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK) or any other regulatory 
body.  The third major distinction between a CDS and an insurance contract is that 
with a CDS contract, there is no obligation for the seller of the derivative to hold any 
capital reserves to guarantee the payment of the underlying claims. Furthermore, 
with a single name CDS contract, daily collateral must be posted in order to offset 
any fluctuations in the market-to-market value of the CDS. This is why CDS 
contracts are referred to as collateralized instruments. Thus, as the risk of default of 
the reference entity goes up, consequently the CDS spread widens and the seller of 
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the protection must post additional collateral in order to offset this increase in default 
risk. This in turn reduces counterparty credit risk, in case if a negative event occurs 
(Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation (2009)).  
 
With an insurance contract, the insurance company does not have to post 
additional collateral to offset an increase in default risk. Instead, it is typically 
required to hold a minimum amount of capital to be able to reimburse the insured 
party an indemnity. Furthermore, with a CDS contract, the holder of the protection 
can take a view not only on the specific event occurring, but also on the overall 
weakening or the improvement of a credit environment. This allows the investor to 
achieve a profit or eventually avoid a major loss without the occurrence of the 
negative credit event. As a result, any fluctuation in the credit default swap premia 
represents a source of income for the CDS holder. These are few of the many reasons 
that make credit default swap contracts more dynamic than insurance contracts that 
solely dependent on the occurrence /non-occurrence of a negative event (Squam 
Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation (2009)). 
 
1.3 Aim of this thesis 
The literature on CDS started developing in early 2000s, becoming popular 
only in the wake of the financial crisis. One of the reasons that explain limited 
previous research on CDS instruments is related to the unavailability of data, as it 
trades through the OTC market. In addition, CDS trading also lacked transparency. 
Therefore, previous research on this topic was very limited. In early 2000s, CDS 
spread was identified as the best proxy for credit risk. In fact, many researchers 
conducted comparative analysis between bond spread, equity spread and CDS 
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spreads and all concluded that the CDS spread proved to be the best indicator of 
credit risk (Houweling and Vorst (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), Hull et al. (2004), Zhu 
(2006), Norden and Weber (2004)).  
 
A stream of previous literature focused on uncovering the theoretical 
determinants driving credit risk, finding that the risk free rate, yield spread, business 
cycle and inflation had strong power to affect credit spreads (Bevan and Garzarelli 
(2000), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), In et al. (2003), Freidman and Kuttner 
(1998), Minton (1997), Stokes and Neuburger (1998)). In addition, Duffie et al. 
(2007) also showed that industrial growth was another useful factor that could 
potentially affect changes in credit risk. Very limited literature considered the impact 
of the housing market on credit risk in the banking sector. Before 2004, there was 
limited information on CDS trading. Given that most CDS contracts were written on 
structured mortgage products, the role of the housing market became increasingly 
important in driving CDS premiums. This aspect was not recognized in the literature 
until the recent financial crisis. For this reason, there has been limited literature 
linking the housing market to credit risk. Thus, it is this research gap that this thesis 
aims to investigate. 
 
The fourth chapter significantly contributes to the existing literature 
considering the housing market, among other factors as a driver of the CDS spread in 
the UK banking sector. Therefore, I focus on credit risk, by looking at different 
markets: the housing market, the money market and the stock market. The analysis 
cover the period of 2004-2011, which considers both the pre-crisis and crisis period. 
As such, I establish the transmission mechanism of the housing bubble that caused 
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the drastic increase in credit risk and unveil the close linkage that exists between 
these four different markets. I consider both the short-run and the long-run analysis 
employing various methodologies. Thus, the Johansen’s Cointegration analysis was 
employed to derive the long-run determinants of the CDS spread. In addition, I used 
the SVAR analysis in order to uncover the drivers of the CDS spread in the short-
run; by imposing specific shocks. 
 
Besides the theoretical determinants of the CDS spread, another stream of 
literature focused on identifying the bank-level drivers of credit risk. Both Carling et 
al. (2007) and Tang and Yan (2010) found that macroeconomic and financial ratios 
were indicative of changes in credit risk levels. In addition, a number of researchers 
used bond spread as a proxy for credit risk to reflect on bank level factors (Campbell 
and Taksler (2003) and Cremers et al. (2004)). The authors showed that the yield 
spread and volatility played a significant role in explaining bond spreads. 
Furthermore, Collin-Dufresene (2001) uncovered the significance of leverage and 
volatility along the yield spread as important drivers of bond spreads, while Benkert 
(2004) on the other hand used the CDS spread as a measure of credit risk and 
showed that it was inversely related with volatility measures. 
 
Previous literature also looked at the significance of leverage, amongst other 
bank level factors, affecting bond spreads and CDS spreads (Beltratti and Stulz 
(2011), Annaert et al. (2013) and Chiaramonte and Casu (2013)). Similarly, Christie 
(1982), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) used bank 
stocks as a leverage indicator, and showed that higher leverage yields to increased 
level of credit risk. In addition, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) studied the determinants 
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of the CDS spread and found that stocks price fluctuations can be understood in two 
different ways; it can be either an indication of a business cycle, or alternatively a 
decrease in the stock price can also lead to higher levels of leverage; if it is assumed 
that changes in both the level and value of debt are lower than variations in the 
equity value. 
 
Furthermore, previous literature also recognizes the importance of regulatory 
capital and liquidity as bank level drivers directly impact on credit risk (Antao and 
Lacerda (2011), Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), Saidenberg and Strahan, (1999) and 
Akhavein et al. (1997)). In addition, Fabozzi et al. (2007) and Hull et al. (2004) 
incorporated credit ratings to reflect on the importance of asset quality as a factor 
affecting credit risk. Other researchers used CAMEL indicators to address the 
importance of bank capital, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity 
characteristics (Curry et al. (2001), Evanoff and Wall (2001), Gropp et al. (2004), 
Oshinsky and Olin (2006) and DeYoung et al. (2001)). 
 
Although past literature looked at the bank- level determinants of credit risk, 
very limited literature investigated the impact of bank size on the CDS spread. As 
such, Völz and Wedow (2013) were amongst the very few authors that focused on 
bank size in the context of the CDS market, while exploring the factors affecting 
market discipline. In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) focused on the 
too-big-to-save or too-big-to-fail banks and found that large banks were more prone 
to risk. In an earlier research by Demsetz and Strahan (1997), the authors looked at 
bank size and the ability of bigger banks to reduce their default risk through 
diversification.  Furthermore, Rime (2005) looked at banks size in the context of 
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credit ratings, while Soussa (2000) considered the importance of bank size on 
financial stability and market discipline.  
 
Overall, the literature linking bank size to credit risk in the light of the recent 
financial crisis is still very limited, therefore in the fifth chapter of my thesis, I 
identify the drivers of the CDS spread, by considering not only bank- level factors 
(regulatory capital, leverage, bank liquidity, asset quality and operations income 
ratio) but I also incorporate a measure of bank size as a driver of credit risk. The data 
I employed in my thesis contributes to the previous research on CDS spread as it is 
extensive and unique in nature; allowing us to observe the behavior of both small 
and bigger banks, across 115 banks and 30 countries, over the period of 2004-2011. 
Using fixed effect, random effect (depending from the Hausman test) estimations 
and GMM analysis, I derive an optimal bank size. Thus, any bank exceeding that 
optimal threshold becomes risky and more prone to experience higher levels of CDS 
spread and vice versa.  
 
Another significant gap in the existing literature is about linking both the 
bank-and-country level indicators of CDS spread. Very few authors looked at the 
impact of CDS spread on systemic stability except Huang et al. (2009), Cont and 
Minca (2010), Markose et al. (2012) and Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013). In 
addition, no previous research linked financial profitability to other country level 
indicators of the CDS spread.  More broadly, financial profitability was studied in 
the context of credit risk, financial distress and bank failure by Ötker-Robe and 
Podpiera (2010), Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), Poghosyan and Cihak (2009), Kick 
and Koetter (2007) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000). Furthermore, although past 
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literature identified the factors contributing to the recent financial crisis, namely 
financial imbalances, large foreign funding inflows, lax monetary policy of low 
interest rates as well as financial innovation (Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and 
Taylor (2007, 2009), Jorda et al. (2011)), no previous research addressed how 
excessive credit supply led to higher CDS spread and the overall credit risk. 
 
In the sixth chapter of this thesis, I uncover how the differences in regulatory 
structures and financial systems lead some countries to experience higher levels of 
CDS spread and credit risk relative to others. Thus, my research will help regulatory 
authorities to better mitigate credit risk and prevent systemic default in the future. 
My findings also shed light into the close linkage between various sectors and the 
most plausible way to prevent another financial crisis.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
Research Question 1:  
The first research question relates to ‘What are the factors driving credit risk 
in the UK banking sector’ with special reference to the housing market. 
 
Research Question 2: 
What are the bank- level drivers of CDS spreads? Do bigger banks face higher 
credit risk relative to smaller banks?  
 
Research Question 3: 
Does the difference in financial systems and regulatory structures matter in 
explaining cross-country bank CDS spreads?  
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1.5 Data and Methodology 
1.5a Data 
The data used in this thesis come from published secondary sources, mainly 
from: Thomson Reuters Datastream, Bankscope and the World Bank databases. 
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis use CDS spread in the UK banking sector. 
The data sample considers the period over 2004-2011, using the 5-year CDS spread 
index (the most liquid type of instruments). In addition, all of the CDS determinants 
considered in the model (UK House price Index, the TED spread, the yield spread 
and the FTSE 100) are monthly data, ranging over the period of 2004-2011. All the 
data were obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
The fifth chapter, of this thesis looks at 30 countries and 115 banks, over the 
period of 2004-2011. The data for the CDS spread for each bank represents a mid-
spread. Furthermore, I use the 5-years bank CDS spread as it is the most liquid type 
of index. Individual CDS spread data for each bank was retrieved from Thomson 
Reuters Datasteream. More details about the data are given in the data chapter. The 
aim of the fifth chapter is to reflect on the bank- level drivers of the CDS spread 
namely regulatory capital, leverage, liquidity, asset quality, operation income ratio 
and bank size. All the bank- level indicators are annual, ranging over the period of 
2004-2011. The data was retrieved from Bankscope and published by BureauVan 
Dijkand. 
 
In order to address the differences in financial systems, four additional 
country- level indicators are used in the panel analysis namely: financial stability, 
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financial deepening financial access and financial profitability. The panel analyses 
are conducted using annual frequency data. This dataset is compiled from the Global 
Financial Development Database (GDFF) available at the World Bank website: 
http://go.worldbank.org/AWACYAMMM0). 
 
1.5b Methodology 
In the fourth chapter of my thesis, I employ two distinct empirical 
methodologies in order to determine the drivers of the CDS spread in the UK 
banking sector, particularly focusing on the role played by the housing market. As 
such, for the long-run analysis, I use the Johansen’s Cointegration analysis, while I 
conduct the Structural VAR approach by imposing specific shocks (i.e. housing 
bubble, among other shocks) in order to investigate the determinants of the CDS 
spread in the short-run.  
 
In the fifth chapter, I look at the drivers of the CDS spread by considering the 
bank- level factors along the housing market.  Thus, rather than focusing only on one 
country, I conduct cross-bank and cross-country analysis, over 30 countries and 115 
banks, in a panel setting. As such, I employ fixed (FE) methodology in order to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity across banks, and also I use the random 
effect (RE) in my analysis (depending from the outcome from the Hausman test). In 
addition, given that the number of banks in my sample is higher than the number of 
countries, I employ the GMM analysis in order to uncover the drivers of the CDS 
spread and to overcome any existing endogeneity between the variables employed in 
my analyses. 
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In the sixth chapter of my thesis, I look at both bank- level and country- level 
determinants of CDS spread, in a panel setting, over the period of 2004-2011. I 
employ the OLS, Fixed Effect and Random Effect methods. In addition, I also use 
the GMM method in order to overcome the issue of endogeneity between the 
variables used in the analysis. Another reason that makes the GMM model an 
appropriate method is related to the number of banks being higher than the number 
of countries in the data sample. 
 
1.6 Findings 
This thesis unveils a number of important findings related to the drivers of 
the CDS spread and credit risk over the period of 2004-2011, both at bank and 
country-levels. 
 
The empirical findings from the fourth chapter show that the housing market 
is strongly related to the credit market. As such, I find that the housing bubble 
directly contributed to the drastic increase in the credit risk, which translated into 
wider CDS spreads.  My results show evidence that before the financial crisis, as 
house prices were high, even if mortgage holders defaulted in their payments, banks 
had the ability to recover their initial loan value and even make a profit since over 
the period of 2004-2007, the real estate market was continuously booming. However, 
my findings also indicate that with the beginning of the recent financial crisis, this 
trend reversed because of the drastic fall in house prices. As such, as consumers 
started defaulting not being able to repay their mortgage obligations, when banks 
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tried to resell the properties in the secondary market, they were worth considerably 
less than before. Given the scale of the housing bubble, the situation deteriorated 
affecting not only bank risk but also the entire financial system.  
 
The findings from the fifth chapter of this thesis unveil the bank-level drivers 
of the CDS spread and the credit risk variations across 30 countries and 115 banks. 
My results show that liquidity, asset quality and the level of operation income are 
important bank- level determinants of credit risk over the period of 2004-2011. In 
fact, I find that banks with higher liquidity levels were better able to cope with the 
recent financial crisis and avoid bank runs as they had enough liquidity to sustain 
cash shortages. Furthermore, banks that had better asset quality proved to be subject 
to less risk and narrower CDS spread, while banks that had higher level of bad loans 
suffered more in the wake of the recent crisis as they were unable to cope with the 
high level of defaults. Finally, banks with higher levels of operational income ratio 
have more revenue to withstand a negative credit event such as the recent financial 
crisis and therefore faced lower CDS spread as compared to banks with lower levels 
of operations income ratio that found themselves in a more vulnerable situation.  
 
In addition, my results indicate the presence of a U-shape relationship 
between the CDS spread and bank size, which proves to be significant after using 
FE, RE and GMM estimations. As such, I find that smaller banks were subject to 
lower credit risk as compared to bigger banks that grew beyond their optimal size 
and experienced wider CDS spreads. In addition, I also derive an optimal bank size 
whereby any bank growing beyond that point becomes riskier and starts facing high 
credit risk. 
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In the sixth chapter, I look at both country and bank-level drivers of credit 
risk, over the period of 2004-2011, in a panel setting. At bank-level, I reassert my 
previous findings from the chapter five, confirming the significance of liquidity, 
asset quality and operations income as factors driving CDS spreads and credit risk. 
The most significant findings of the sixth chapter relates to the country- level 
indicators of credit risk. I find that excessive credit supply has directly caused the 
credit bubble that later translated into global financial crisis. I show that excessive 
credit supply enables banks to expand their lending activities to low-income 
consumers that were unable to repay their debts in the wake of the financial crisis. 
My findings also show that the financial system became unstable as a result of the 
recent financial crisis, which was largely due to greater level of financial deepening 
driving credit bubble and leading to higher credit risk.  
 
1.7 Organization of this thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
In chapter 2, I will describe the data used in this thesis. As such, two types of 
data have been used in this thesis: the aggregate data used in the analysis for the UK 
banking sector and the bank- level data used for the analysis across 30 countries and 
115 banks. The bank-level data consists of both bank- level characteristics and 
country-level characteristics. 
 
In chapter 3, I will provide a detailed overview of the literature on the CDS 
spread and credit risk. More specifically I will start by looking at the literature that 
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focused on the theoretical determinants of the CDS spread. I will then analyse the 
literature that recognized the importance of bank- level determinants of the CDS 
spread. Moreover, I will analyse the previous research that looked at the 
phenomenon of the too-big-to-fail and the too-big too save. Finally, I will analyse 
the literature that considered the importance of the country- level determinants in 
driving credit risk. The literature review will also consider the more recent research 
that linked the CDS spread to the recent financial crisis. 
 
In chapter 4, I focus on the aggregate macroeconomic drivers of the CDS 
spread in the UK banking sector, focusing on both the short and long-run factors 
affecting credit risk. The fourth chapter starts with an introduction, followed by 
section 4.2.1, where I conduct numerous unit root tests. In section, 4.2.1a, I explain 
the results from the unit root tests. In section 4.2.2, I conduct the cointegration test to 
establish the long-term drivers of the CDS spread in the UK banking sector. In 
section 4.3 I focus on the short-term analysis using the structural VAR model and by 
imposing specific shocks. In section 4.4, I present the conclusion. 
 
In chapter 5, my research focuses on the drivers of the CDS spread, but now 
looking at the bank- level factors and the effect of bank size on credit risk. In the first 
section, I start by introducing the aim of conducting bank- level analysis on the CDS 
spread. In section 2, focus on explaining the methodology, while in section 3; I 
present the unit-root test for the panel analysis and explain the empirical results. I 
also conduct additional robustness checks to prove the strength of the obtained 
results. In addition, I establish the U-shape relationship between bank CDS spread 
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and bank-size and derive the optimal bank size. In section 4, I conclude with the 
most significant bank level drivers of the CDS spread and the effect of bank size on 
credit risk. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the bank and country level drivers of the CDS spread. 
The chapter starts with an introduction in section 1. It is followed by the 
methodology in section 2. In section 3, I present the empirical results and conduct 
the necessary robustness checks. In section 4, I present the conclusion on the most 
important country and bank level drivers of the CDS spread. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 of this thesis concludes reflecting the factors that have the 
strongest power in affecting CDS spreads, over the period of 2004-2011, considering 
both bank and country level indicators. In addition, I will highlight the important 
policy recommendations and some limitations of this research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
The literature chapter of this thesis first looks at the fundamental 
determinants of credit risk and CDS spreads. Second, the literature discusses the 
bank level determinants of CDS spreads, with a particular focus on: leverage, 
liquidity, asset quality and profitability. In addition, I present the literature on bank 
size and credit risk, with specific emphasis on the phenomenon of the too-big-to-fail 
and the too-big-to-save, which will help understanding and investigating the impact 
of bank size on credit risk. Finally, this chapter reviews the country level 
determinants of CDS spread and credit risk. 
. 
2.0 Determinants of the CDS spread 
In the wake of recent financial crisis, Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) attracted 
a lot of attention from governments, regulators and central banks due to its large 
market size and the subsequent impact it had on financial institutions such as the 
American International Group (AIG), Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns, among 
others. Despite the very large and rapidly growing size of the CDS market, in the run 
up to the financial crisis, existing literature on this derivative was very limited. In 
fact, it was hindered by the limited amount of data available and the lack of 
transparency of the credit derivative market. As such, CDS contracts were mainly 
traded in the over the counter (OTC) market and not all trades are recorded.  
 
Understanding the determinants of credit spreads is crucial for financial 
regulators, traders, and policy makers, given the high growth in the credit derivative 
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market over the last decade. A large body of literature has focused on analyzing 
credit defaults and investigating the reasons why the CDS spread is considered to be 
a better proxy for default risk compared to bond spreads. In fact, earlier research 
relied on bond spreads in order to get an approximation of the level of credit default 
risk. Authors including Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Hull et al. (2004) 
demonstrate that the CDS spreads are related to the credit spread implicit in bond 
prices. Bhanot (2001) highlights problems associated with bond spreads as indicators 
of corporate risk, discussing the lack of reliability of the Moody’s index as a 
corporate default indicator. 
  
There are a number of reasons that make the CDS spread a better proxy for 
default risk. Authors including Hull et al. (2004), Zhu (2006), Das and Hanouna 
(2006), and Ericsson et al. (2009) find that CDS premiums are a better measure of 
credit risk compared to bond spreads. One of the reasons is related to the fact that 
CDSs are directly quoted in premiums. One of the downsides of using bond spreads 
as a measure of credit risk is the assumption related to the risk free benchmark yield 
curve (Houweling et al. (2005)). In addition, Blanco et al. (2005) indicate that price 
discovery tends to occur in the CDS market ahead of the bond market. There are a 
number of factors that make the bond market less responsive to macroeconomic and 
financial factors.  For example, Sarig and Warga (1989) and Chen et al (2007), find 
that bond spreads tend to react sharply to liquidity as well as credit risk. In addition, 
bond spreads tend to respond to changes in tax rates, time to maturity and the 
performance of alternative assets such as equities.  
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An attractive aspect of the CDS premium is the speed with which it reacts to 
changes in the credit quality and ratings of the underlying asset, see for example, 
Blanco et al. (2005), Hull et al. (2004) and Zhu (2006). Research conducted by 
Norden and Weber (2004), indicates that ratings of bonds with long maturities are 
typically affected by the changes in the CDS spread.  Although the credit default 
swap premium can be affected by changes in bond spreads, studies conducted  by 
Anderson and Anderson (2000), Delianedis and Geske (2001) and Huang (2003) 
show that expected default losses account for only a small fraction of observed credit 
spreads. In fact, Amato and Remolona (2003) refer to this phenomenon as the credit 
spread puzzle.  
 
The literature on Credit Default Swap spread and its determinants is 
relatively new. In fact, it started developing only in early 2000s. One of the reasons 
that explain the limited research in the field relates to the lack of availability of data. 
As previously mentioned, CDS is an Over the Counter (OTC) instrument. This 
implies that it is less transparent than other instruments that are traded through the 
clearing houses. Nonetheless, CDS became very popular in the light of the credit 
boom of early 2000s as investors were using it as a result of the increased 
securitization activities. In addition, it became very topical in the light of the recent 
financial crisis as it was often used for speculative purposes.  
 
In the next section we will look at the literature that focused on the 
theoretical determinants of the CDS spread. 
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2.1 Theoretical Determinants of the CDS spread 
The pre-crisis literature focused mainly on the macroeconomic and financial 
determinants of the CDS spreads. As such, Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) Duffie 
and Singleton (1997), Duffee (1998), Lekkos and Milas (2001) and In et al. (2003) 
find that the risk free rates and their term structure are important determinants of the 
credit spread. In a similar vein, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Friedman and 
Kuttner (1992), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Stokes and Neuburger (1998), 
Bevan and Garzarelli (2000), Neal et al. (2000), Fehle (2003) and In and Fang 
(2003), Carling et al. (2007) and Duffie and Singleton (2007) find that both the yield 
spread and the risk free rate are significant in explaining the CDS spread.   
  
The literature on CDS spread determinants recognizes the significance of the 
theoretical variables. More specifically, authors including Fama (1984) and Estrella 
Hardouvelis  (1991), Duffie and Singleton (1997), Duffee (1998), Lekkos and Milas 
(2001), In and Fang (2003), Bystrom (2008), Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Naifar 
(2010) find that both the risk free rate as well as the yield spread are important 
determinants of the CDS spread. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) find that interest rates 
are very important in predicting default risk. Furthermore, Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) show a negative relationship between the probability of default and the level 
of interest rates. The rationale behind this finding is that when interest rates rise, the 
risk neutral drift of firm tends to increase, resulting in a lower probability and a 
narrower spread. In addition, Neal et al. (2000) and Bevan and Garzarelli (2000) 
both confirm this negative relationship in the short-run. However, in the long-run, 
the authors argue that the relationship between the CDS spread and interest rates 
changes into a positive one.  
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Research by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Fehle (2003) and In and Fang 
(2003) and Kobor et al. (2005) all find a negative relationship between the credit 
spread, interest rate and the yield curve. In fact, in times of economic recession, 
interest rates are typically low. An improvement in the state of the economy is 
usually associated with a steeper yield curve. Similarly, Friedman and Kuttner 
(1998) find that the business cycle impacts on the aggregate economy and investors’ 
behavior, thus affecting the number of defaults and credit risk. Minton (1997) on the 
other hand finds that the yield curve has a positive relationship with the swap spread. 
 
In addition, Stokes and Neuburger (1998) find that inflation is another factor 
that greatly affects credit default risk through its impact on input and output prices. 
This implies that if a firm is facing higher costs as a result of inflation, the firm 
might find it hard to carry on with its daily business obligations and achieve the 
targeted profit. If inflation reaches extreme levels, this may lead the company to 
default on its obligations, thus increasing default risk. Furthermore, in a research 
conducted by Duffie et al. (2007), the authors found that macroeconomic variables 
and industrial production growth tend to be good indicators for predicting and 
understanding the future fluctuations of credit risk.  
 
Having analysed the literature that focuses on the theoretical determinants of 
the CDS spread, in the next section we will identify the literature that recognizes the 
importance of credit ratings, volatility and financial determinants as factors affecting 
the CDS spread. 
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2.2 Financial Determinants, Volatility and Credit Ratings as 
determinants of CDS spread 
Past literature also incorporates financial ratios such as leverage and implied 
volatility and finds that these variables have a significant power in explaining CDS 
premiums (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Cremers et 
al (2004) and Benkert (2004)). 
Different researchers highlight the importance of financial variables in 
explaining the credit risk. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) analysed bond spread as a 
measure of credit risk and found that financial leverage, volatility and the yield 
spread have significant power in explaining bond spread. Similarly, Carling et al. 
(2007) and Tang and Yang (2010) find that both financial ratios and macroeconomic 
factors help explain default risk.  Furthermore, in a research conducted by Campbell 
and Taksler (2003), the authors used company bond spreads and find that volatility 
explains bond spreads.  In a similar vein, Benkert (2004) use various volatility 
measures to analyze the CDS spread, and finds the presence of a negative 
relationship. Moreover, Cremers et al. (2004) also confirmed the importance of 
volatility in explaining bond spreads as a proxy for credit risk. 
 
Another stream of research has focused on analyzing whether credit ratings 
matter in explaining CDS premiums. Research conducted by Hull et al. (2004), 
Cossin et al. (2002), Fabozzi et al. (2007) and Karagozoglu and Jacobs (2010) and 
Alper et al. (2012) have all confirmed the importance of credit ratings in explaining 
CDS premiums. In addition, credit rating proved to be important in the pricing for 
sovereign CDS spread (Alper et al. (2012)). 
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In the light of the above literature, for the UK banking sector, we investigate both the 
macroeconomic and financial determinants of CDS spread in the UK banking sector 
by considering house prices, the yield spread, TED (difference between the three-
month UK T-Bill and the three-month LIBOR rates) and the FTSE 100 index.  
In the next section, we will investigate the literature that recognized the importance 
of the bank-level determinants of the CDS spread. 
 
2.3 Bank Level Determinants 
Regulatory Capital 
The recent financial crisis brought into light the inadequate regulatory 
structure and the lax supervisory regime under which banks were operating. 
Regulatory authorities and central banks agreed that there was an imminent need to 
take action and insure that banks had enough capital to sustain a negative credit 
event and avoid another crisis. Therefore, the previous Basel 2 Agreement was 
replaced by the more detailed and focused Basel 3 Accord, which provides a stricter 
definition of capital and en-globs both the micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
elements (Rossignolo et al. (2013)). 
 
A number of authors investigated the impact of regulatory capital and capital 
buffers on credit risk (Antao and Lacerda (2011) and Chiaramonte and Casu (2013)). 
Previous literature states that traditionally banks held capital as a buffer against the 
risk of insolvency, and high level of liquid assets in order to protect themselves 
against unexpected, high volume bank withdrawals by depositors (Saidenberg and 
Strahan, (1999)). However, through the increased use of securitization in the years 
leading to the financial crisis, and the high reliance on the new techniques of risk 
41 
 
management, many financial institutions escaped such regulatory requirements by 
shifting their debt to off balance sheet items. This allowed them to hold less capital 
to increase their lending activities, at the same time complying with the necessary 
regulatory requirements (Gorton and Haubrich (1990)).  
 
In a research conducted by Akhavein et al. (1997), findings indicate that 
systemically important banks were able to decrease their capital exposure and 
increase their lending operations after undergoing a merger. In addition, Demsetz 
and Strahan (1997) found that large banks have the capacity to engage in riskier 
lending activities, keeping at the same time a low level of capital. In a similar vein, 
Froot et al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) analyzed lending practices for both 
financial and non-financial institutions and found that vigorous risk management 
enabled banks to conduct risky and illiquid investments and escape regulatory 
requirements; thus, holding insufficient capital buffers during an unexpected crisis.  
 
Previous literature questioned whether banks were well capitalized before 
and after the financial crisis. Ambrose et al. (2005) argue that the level of capital 
held by banks that trade securitized derivatives was too high. The paper referred to 
the trading of mortgage-backed securities, which according to their findings, 
experienced lower levels of default when compared to loans kept in bank portfolios. 
The authors therefore suggested that regulation should be more “light touch”, with  
more relaxed capital requirements for structured derivative trading. However, since 
this research was conducted before the financial crisis, after the 2007-2009 financial 
crises, there has been a clear consensus to increase bank regulatory requirements.  
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In a more recent research, Roesch and Scheule (2012) analysed capital 
adequacy of US banks that conducted securitization. The authors found that before 
2007, the level of regulatory capital held by banks was insufficient to secure all the 
underlying risks of structured derivative trading and sustain a shock such as the 
recent financial crisis. There is also evidence that suggests that the credit rating of 
these derivatives gave rise to capital arbitrage, which in turn helped banks to hold 
less regulatory capital and experience high levels of default. In a similar vein, 
Kretzschmar et al. (2010) also agreed that banks were undercapitalized before the 
financial crisis. The authors criticized the Basel 2 Capital Accord generally, and 
more specifically the Pillar 2 of the Accord, as it was deemed to be an insufficient 
capital buffer given the real risks faced by banks. In addition, Tian and al. (2013) 
also analyzed bank capital and the risk of contagion during bailouts and established 
that high levels of minimum regulatory capital did not necessarily imply that banks 
could avoid contagion. Instead the authors argue that financial institutions should 
hold a conservation capital buffer, as suggested in the Basel 3 Capital Accord, in 
order to reduce such risk.  
 
Previous literature also looks at various advanced models that banks used in 
order to optimize their capital structure by responding to different types of pressures 
from shareholders, debt holders and price fluctuations in the market (Flannery 
(1994), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), and Myers and Rajan (1998)). However, the 
recent financial crisis proved that the previous Basel 1 and Basel 2 Capital Accords 
were strongly criticized as it did not ensure the soundness of the regulatory financial 
system (Antao and Lacerda (2011)). Thus, in 2013, Basel 3 was introduced to 
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strengthen the weak financial institutions’ capital requirements, decreasing leverage 
intakes and raising liquidity levels. 
 
Furthermore, a stream of literature analyzed the determinants of bank capital 
buffers and analyzed its relationship with business cycle. As such, Terhi and Milne 
(2008) focused on an unbalanced panel of 486 EU banks, using annual balance sheet 
data, between 1997 and 2004. They found that capital buffers of large banks as well 
as commercial and savings banks were negatively related to the business cycle. 
However, smaller banks and co-operative banks’ capital buffer was found to be 
positively related to the business cycle. In a more recent research, Terhi and Milne 
(2011) analyzed US banks’ capital buffers in relation to risk adjustment. Their 
results indicate that banks that are well capitalized adjust their capital buffer and risk 
positively, while this relationship proves to be negative for banks that have lower 
capital buffer. 
 
Hypothesis: Strong capital buffers decrease credit risk and narrow the CDS spread. 
The hypothesis is that regulatory capital is negatively related to the CDS 
spread. In fact, as banks have stronger capital buffers, in times of crisis, they are 
better equipped to sustain a shock, repay their outstanding liabilities and keep the 
bank in a stable condition, whereas a financial institution that has a low level of 
capital is very likely to go bankrupt if the financial system is hit by a crisis, 
especially with risk-averse investors losing confidence in the system and capital 
markets becoming reluctant to lend.  
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Leverage 
Past literature acknowledges the importance of financial variables driving 
credit risk, including: leverage, regulatory capital, asset quality and liquidity. 
Leverage was at the epicenter of debates among regulators, being deemed as one of 
the main factors contributing to the recent crisis. A number of authors incorporated 
leverage among other bank level factors driving credit risk, using CDS spread and 
bond spread (Beltratti and Stulz (2011), Annaert et al. (2013) and Chiaramonte and 
Casu (2013)). 
 
Before 2007, banks and other financial institutions heavily relied on 
borrowing from capital markets, beyond their real borrowing capacity, with debt to 
equity ratios exceeding 20 times their allowance for many large EU banks. These 
highly leveraged banks were granting loans to low income consumers. Therefore, in 
case of a bank run, there was a high likelihood of bankruptcy, with the situation 
potentially deteriorating and causing contagion, followed by a systemic collapse of 
the entire financial system (Antao and Lacerda (2011)).  In the wake of summer 
2007, most investors defaulted on their obligations, drastically increasing CDS 
spreads and credit risk (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011)).  
 
Recent literature examined the impact of common factors and found that 
leverage was a powerful driver of the CDS spread and credit risk (Aunon-Nerin et al. 
(2002), Ericsson et al. (2009)). In Ericsson et al. (2009), CDS spreads were used in 
both levels and first-differences and they demonstrate that their model was able to 
explain 23% of CDS spread fluctuations. When CDS spread was used in levels, the 
explanatory power augmented to 70%. The main variables that were found to drive 
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the CDS spread were leverage and volatility. Similarly, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) 
also incorporated leverage, and other variables, such as credit ratings, market 
capitalization and the price fluctuations in the stock market, with results indicating 
that all of these factors were strong determinants of credit spread. Furthermore, 
authors including Christie (1982), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008) used bank stocks as a proxy for leverage, and found that higher levels 
of debt was positively associated with credit risk.  
 
More recently, Galil et al. (2013), looked at 718 US firms over the period of 
2002-2013 and found that among other fundamental variables leverage (defined as 
the book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and the market 
value of equity) significantly explained fluctuations in the CDS spread.  
 
Similarly, Annaert et al. (2013) looked at 31 listed EU banks and showed that 
leverage strongly affects the CDS spread. In another research conducted by Eom et 
al. (2004), leverage also proved to have the ability to explain changes in credit 
spread, but with limitations. In fact, bonds (as a proxy for credit risk) that were 
considered less risky were underestimated by the structural models, while the risky 
bonds were overestimated. Other authors including Christie (1982), Collin-Dufresne 
et al. (2001) as well as Alexander and Kaeck (2008) proxied leverage using bank 
stock returns. Their findings indicate that negative stock returns have a positive 
impact on leverage. Thus, there is a positive relationship between leverage and credit 
spreads. In addition, recent literature proves that financial institutions in developing 
countries were more risk averse and had lowers levels of debt. Therefore, developing 
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countries were found to better able to resist the financial crisis when compared to 
developed countries (Beltratti and Stulz (2011)). 
 
Another stream of literature linked leverage, pro- cyclicality and the risk it 
poses on global economy. In a research conducted by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), 
pro-cyclical leverage was found to have a strong power to amplify risk in the 
financial markets; thus negatively affecting the global economy. In addition, Fostel 
and Geanakoplos (2008) focused on emerging markets and showed that leverage 
cycles have the tendency to translate into contagion, causing a flight to collateral and 
creating volatility in financial markets.  
 
In a similar vein, Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) demonstrate from their 
findings that leverage is countercyclical for non-financial US institutions, and pro-
cyclical for investment banks. Pro-cyclical leverage has the ability to negatively 
impact on the business cycle, thus causing systemic instability. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
(2011) show evidence that investment banks tremendously expended their leverage 
intakes through capital markets, and utilized their strong market power to attract 
additional funds. The presence of deposit insurance –played another significant role 
during the process 
 
Hypothesis: Higher leveraged banks face increased credit risk and wider CDS 
spreads. 
In this chapter, we assume that leverage and credit default risk are positively 
associated. As such, when a bank starts heavily borrowing, the level of capitalization 
becomes lower, while its leverage capacity starts exceeding its ability to repay 
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investors. In addition, the financial institution becomes vulnerable to shocks and may 
easily go bust if there is a crisis. Over the period of 2007-2008, many banks were 
downgraded due to their excessive leverage intakes, which further hampered their 
ability to attract additional external funding, finally resulting in their collapse.  
 
Liquidity 
The drastic squeeze in the liquidity levels that followed the 2007-2008 
financial crisis led to a dramatic decrease in the bank lending activities in the 
developed economies. In the UK, Northern Rock was one of the first causalities of a 
bank run that required government intervention and bailout.  
 
A stream of literature started developing in the last decade linking liquidity to 
credit risk. While certain researchers, including Longstaff et al. (2005) and Blanco et 
al. (2005), argued that the CDS spread reflected only credit risk, a new stream of 
literature argues that irrespective of market conditions, liquidity risk is more 
important in explaining the CDS spread than firm level credit risk (Corò et al. 
(2013)). Furthermore, Arakelyan et al. (2011) analyzed market-wide liquidity in 
credit default swap spreads and found that: 1) CDS spreads with a low-grade credit 
rating tend to be very sensitive to a shock in aggregate liquidity, when compared to 
good credit quality CDS spreads. 2) By employing a two-factor intensity model, 
there is evidence that the CDS spread incorporates an important liquidity risk 
premium.  In a similar vein, Campbell and Taksler (2003) also considered aggregate 
liquidity in order to model credit spreads. 
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Moreover, Tang and Yan (2007) conducted a panel regression analysis and 
found evidence that liquidity had a significant power in explaining the variations in 
the CDS spread. Their results suggest that on average, both liquidity and liquidity 
risk account for approximately 20% of CDS spread fluctuations. Similarly, 
Bongaerts et al. (2011) emphasized the significance of liquidity effects for the 
pricing of CDS instruments. Other authors that also recognized the importance of 
liquidity as a driver of credit risk include Acharya and Johnson (2007), Pires et al. 
(2011) and Chen et al. (2007)). Furthermore, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) found 
that liquidity was a significant driver of the CDS spread only during the recent 
financial crisis, while in the pre-crisis period, liquidity turned out to be insignificant.  
The relationship linking both the CDS spread and liquidity indicators is therefore 
time dependent. It can be positive if the bank experiences a shortage in liquidity; due 
limited number of deposits, the risk of default increases, pushing up the overall level 
of CDS spread. The CDS spread and liquidity can also be positively related when for 
a set level of deposits, the number of loans is relatively high. Thus, the market may 
react positively, especially commercial financial institutions which consider loan 
issuance as their main source of revenue (Chiaramonte and Casu (2013)).  
Furthermore, in a research conducted by Buhler and Trapp (2008), the authors 
looked at credit and liquidity risk in both bond and CDS markets, using a reduce 
form credit risk model. They uncover surprising findings which indicate that the 
CDS market is more liquid when the level of default risk is high.  
 
Furthermore, Diamond and Rajan (2005) looked at liquidity shortages in the 
context of banking crises and shows that bank failures typically lower liquidity 
levels; thus reducing the already short liquidity reserves. This subsequently causes 
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the level of credit default risk to go up and resulted in a contagion and collapse of the 
entire financial system. The authors explained that banks go bankrupt either because 
they become insolvent or because they suffer from an aggregate shortage of 
liquidity, which in turn makes them insolvent. As such, illiquidity may cause the 
failure of systemically important banks, which in turn can lead to the collapse of the 
entire financial system.  
 
In another research by Calice et al. (2009), the authors looked at  liquidity 
spill-overs in sovereign bond and CDS markets and found that for EU countries; 
including Greece, Ireland and Portugal, liquidity of the sovereign CDS market have a 
strong time dependent impact on sovereign bond spreads. In a similar vein, De Soc io 
(2013) looked at liquidity and credit risk in the Euro- interbank market. The author 
decomposed credit and liquidity components of the Euribor spread, by using CDS of 
various financial institutions. Their findings indicate that before August 2007 credit 
risk went up.  In October 2008, the situation reversed with liquidity risk becoming 
the main driver of the Euribor spread. 
 
Similarly, Qiu and Yu (2012) looked at the determinants of liquidity 
provisions in the OTC market for credit default swaps.  Focusing on fluctuations of 
CDS liquidity across 732 firms, over the period of 2001-2008, the authors find that 
big companies and corporations near the investment-grade tend to have the highest 
liquidity levels. In addition, Berger and Bouwman (2010) related liquidity to 
monetary policy and show that during normal economic climate, there is a decrease 
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in liquidity created by small banks. Their findings also indicate that liquidity creation 
is high before financial crises.  
 
Hypothesis: Higher liquidity decreases credit risk and CDS spread 
We assume that liquidity and the CDS spread are negatively related. The 
higher the liquidity level, the better the bank’s ability to deal with large withdrawals 
and possible bank runs. During the recent financial crisis, banks faced huge liquidity 
shortage, with frozen capital markets; this meant that there was no other source of 
liquidity to comply with investors’ demand. Banks with stronger liquidity levels 
were able to sustain themselves, keeping at the same time their credit risk and CDS 
spread levels at moderate levels. 
 
Asset Quality 
Previous literature incorporated asset quality as a driver of credit risk using 
the CAMEL indicators approach. In a research conducted by Ötker-Robe and 
Podpiera (2010), the authors looked at the fundamental determinants of credit default 
risk for large and complex EU financial institutions. Three distinct ratios were used 
in order to reflect the quality of assets, namely: Loan- loss Provisions to Total Loans, 
Share of Non-performing Loans in Total Loans and Loan-Loss Reserves Ratio. Their 
findings show that asset quality did not make a substantial difference in the pricing 
of CDS instruments. The non-significance of asset quality was attributed to the 
period of analysis that covered only the beginning of the crisis. In addition, the 
authors argue that one of the measures of asset quality (such as:  non-performing 
loans) referred to credit risk with a lag. Furthermore, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) 
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also investigated the drivers of the CDS spread by incorporating asset quality among 
other bank level determinants. The authors used two ratios to reflect asset quality: 
the ratio of Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans and Unreserved Impaired Loans over 
Equity. Findings conclude that before the financial crisis, financial markets were not 
concerned with the low quality of bank assets. Similarly, Kick and Koetter (2007) 
also used the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets as an indicator of asset 
quality to determine the drivers of bank risk taking activities.  
 
Asset quality can be also reflected using credit ratings of the underlying asset on 
which CDS contracts are written on. From the previous literature, a number of 
authors have identified credit ratings as an important driver of credit risk (Hull et al.  
(2004), Fabozzi et al. (2007) and Karagozoglu and Jacobs (2010)). As such, high 
credit ratings would be indicative of a better asset quality of the underlying 
instrument, while a lower credit rating would reflect a riskier asset. Before the 
financial crisis, securitization activities allowed banks to sell toxic instruments that 
had a high credit rating. With the bursting of the housing bubble and the beginning 
of the crisis, most of these securitized instruments on which CDS contracts were 
written on defaulted, increasing the CDS spread and credit risk. 
 
Bank size effect and the notion of too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save: 
Before summer 2007, financial institutions and banks were expanding and 
growing in size, given the favorable economic climate. In fact, credit expansion 
occurred on the back of low interest rates and exceptionally low funding costs. This 
allowed bigger banks to benefit and make very high profits. In addition, high foreign 
funding inflow was another factor that greatly contributed to banks’ incentive to 
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grow in size. In fact, many small banks in Europe and across the Atlantic drastically 
expanded. For instance, the Icelandic banking system liabilities surpassed its GDP 
level by 9 times in the last quarter of 2007 (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013)).  
 
In a similar vein, the Swiss and the UK banking systems were also expanding 
beyond the recognized norm, surpassing the size of their GDP by 6.3 and 5.5 times, 
respectively (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013)). In addition, other banks in 
France, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and Netherlands had liabilities ratios, twice the 
size of their country’s GDP (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013)). According to 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013), at least 30 banks across the world were 
identified to have liabilities being double their countries’ GDP, with 12 banks having 
a liability of over $1 trillion. These figures explicitly illustrate how banks and 
financial institutions were recklessly expanding before the recent financial crisis.  
 
Bank size has been recently analyzed in the context of the CDS market (Völz 
and Wedow (2013)). The authors focused on investigating whether bank size reduces 
market discipline and found that on average market discipline exists in the CDS 
market. Nevertheless, the prices of CDS instruments were found to be affected in 
banks that were considered to be too-big-to-fail. In fact, a 1 percent rise in the bank 
size proved to narrow the CDS spread for the same bank by approximately 2 basis 
points. Although at a first glance this number may not appear substantial, banks that 
are already systemically important may merge, thus becoming ever bigger and 
narrowing the CDS spread on a much larger scale. This would automatically affect 
the overall banking system, as a narrower CDS spread would typically send the 
signal of a more stable bank when it is very likely that the CDS spread is narrower 
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because of the more substantial size of the bank itself. In addition, the authors looked 
at the too-big-to-be-rescued phenomenon and found that certain banks may attain a 
limit in their size where it becomes too hard for the government to intervene, in case 
of a negative credit event or crisis, and offer bailout packages due to the very high 
number of depositors that expect to be repaid and compensated. 
 
Another stream of literature documented how bank size may impact on 
financial institutions’ incentives to undertake risky investments and consequently 
affect its credit rating. In fact, both Sousa (2000) as well as Rime (2005) looked at 
banks’ size and its credit rating and found that large banks, that reached the threshold 
of being considered too-big-to-fall, enjoyed a considerably better credit rating and 
could therefore benefit from a cheaper cost of funding compared to smaller banks. 
Similarly, Gómez-González and Kiefer (2009) also demonstrated that large banks 
have the tendency to experience less risk as they have the ability to diversify their 
assets in a more efficient way compared to smaller banks. They also have the 
capability to lower their costs through the economies of scale. In addition, large 
banks usually have more experience as they have been in business for a long time.   
 
Similar conclusions were derived by Demsetz and Strahan (1997) that have 
also confirmed the ability of being bigger to better diversify their investments and 
therefore hedge their exposures and reduce the overall risk of default. The authors 
show from their research that large bank could increase their debt intakes and lend 
more to investors, keeping at the same time their risk record at moderate levels. 
Along the same vein, Mishkin (2006) focused in his research on the too-big-to-fail 
phenomenon and the reaction of large banks to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation Act (FDICIA) that was introduced in the early 90s. He found that the 
issues associated with the too-big-to-fail significantly diminished after the 
introduction of FDICIA.  
 
However, another stream of literature contradicts findings of Mishkin (2006). 
In fact, both Boyd and Gertler (1993) as well as Ennis and Malek (2005) argue that 
FDICIA gave large US banks more incentives to invest in risky projects as they had 
the safety net that the government will not let them down in case it faced financial 
difficulties, due to their potential impact on the overall systemic stability. In 
addition, banks that pursued the goal of joining the too-big-to-fail circle were found 
to go beyond their optimal size by taking over other smaller banks. This resulted in 
higher returns and narrower credit spreads, but at the same time, causing a bad 
allocation of resources (Penas and Unal (2004) and Kane (2000)). 
 
Along the same lines, in a recent research conducted by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2013), large banks were found to be more prone to risk. Looking at how 
bank size and government deficit may impact on the CDS spread and the value of 
banks’ stock, the authors focused on whether the too-big-to-save or too-big-to-fail 
banks did exist in the real financial world. The CDS spread in this research was used 
as an indicator of the approximate credit losses on banks’ liabilities. Their findings 
indicate that there is a negative relationship between both the absolute (log of assets) 
and the systemic bank size (liabilities to GDP) with their corresponding book-to-
market value.  This in turn implies that when the already systemically important 
bank further expends, it may become too-large-to-be-rescued; thus, exposing itself 
to more credit risk. 
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Furthermore, bank size has been recently analyzed in the context of capital 
buffers. García-Suaza et al. (2012) focused on a panel of Columbian banks over the 
period of 1996-2010, and found that large banks behaved differently from small 
banks. While large banks typically experience a better ability to obtain funding from 
capital markets, they have the tendency to keep their capital buffers low during credit 
booms, without necessarily exposing themselves to excessive risk. However, smaller 
banks were observed to have more barriers accessing financial markets, and were 
therefore facing increased costs when trying to rebuild their capital buffers. 
Moreover, Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) also analyzed bank size in relation to 
capital buffers and bank risk incentives. Looking at the Basel 2 Capital Accord, the 
authors show that smaller banks are subject to higher risk taking activities if they are 
allowed to choose between the IRB approach and the standardized approach to 
satisfy capital requirements. In fact, smaller financial institutions tend to compete 
with larger banks that have the advantages of increased competition in financial 
markets. This may result in higher aggregate risk-taking activities.  
 
Moreover, in a research conducted by Brown and Dinç (2011), bank failure 
was analyzed in twenty-one emerging countries in the 90s. By designing a specific 
risk hazard model, the authors show that if there are high numbers of banks with 
excessive level of leverage, it is less likely that the government would let the 
problem bank collapse in case it required financial assistance to survive; this is also 
referred to as too-many-too-fail.  In another paper by Steever (2005), bank size, 
credit as well as market risk were analyzed in the context of the equity market. After 
focusing on the relationship between firm size and equity risk for commercial banks, 
the authors found that smaller banks have the tendency to issue loans which are 
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deemed to be safer than the ones issued by bigger banks. However, because smaller 
banks are unable to diversify their risk exposures as efficiently as bigger banks, 
equity risk is almost the same for small and big banks. 
 
Hypothesis: Bank size is positively associated with the CDS spread and credit risk. 
In light of the recent financial crisis, the functioning of financial markets has 
dramatically shifted. As suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013), big 
banks are now more prone to risk, given that they engage in bigger scale and riskier 
investments as compared to smaller banks. This chapter therefore assumes that 
before the financial crisis, larger banks faced reduced CDS spreads as they had the 
conviction to belong to the category of the too-big-to-fail banks. However, during 
the recent financial crisis, this phenomenon proved to be only limited to the very few 
big financial institutions that had the highest power to affect the public sector. 
 
Having reviewed the literature that focuses on the bank- level determinants of 
the CDS spread, we will now investigate what are the country- level factors that drive 
credit risk. 
 
2.4 Country Level Determinants 
Financial Deepening 
The period of early 2000s was marked by an economic boom with easy 
credit, high mortgage lending and excessive foreign funding inflow. Financial 
institutions made it very easy for low income borrowers to obtain loans and 
mortgages. Furthermore, capital markets were readily providing cash to banks. In 
summer 2007, the credit expansion era came to an end as the world economy entered 
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a long lasting and deep recession. Thus, the credit bubble, measured here by the level 
of financial deepening, probably made investors to default; pushing the CDS spread 
levels to historic high levels, as show in Figure 3.3.  
 
Previous literature identified a number of factors that acted as a ground for 
the economic boom and helped the rise of easy credit provision. Among these factors 
there is: the policy of low interest rates, high foreign funding inflow, financial 
innovation and financial imbalances (Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Taylor (2007, 
2009), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), Obstfeld (2010), Ferguson and Schularick 
(2011), King (2010)). Evidence suggests that credit supply is high during economic 
expansions and low during economic downturns (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Holmström and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Diamond and Rajan 
(2005)). As it was observed in the early 2000s, credit growth was elevated, while 
interest rates were depressed (Jorda et al. (2011)). Milcheva (2013) addresses in her 
research whether the house price appreciation was transmitted from the monetary 
channel or through the exogenous fluctuation in the supply chain of credit. She found 
that the rising level of credit was a contributing factor to the increased demand and 
rising house prices. In the wake of summer 2007, real estate prices crashed, while the 
level of defaults 
 
In a similar vein, Peek and Rosengren (2003) analysed the effect of bank 
credit supply on the economy and found that during the Japanese crisis in the early 
1990’s, firms that were performing poorly were more likely to get additional bank 
loans. This is similar to the period before 2007 as weak banks were easily borrowing 
credit without having to demonstrate they were eligible for it. This significantly 
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contributed to the already high levels of default. Similarly, Rajkamal et al. (2013) 
looked at the effects of credit supply on the frozen EU interbank market. Using an 
extensive dataset on Portuguese loans, the authors showed that smaller banks 
experienced a higher reduction in the supply of credit. Since capital markets lend 
more to bigger banks as they are more established, smaller banks were therefore 
more exposed to default and credit risk.  
 
Financial Stability 
           The imposing size of the CDS market and its opaque nature raised co ncerns 
among governments, regulators and central banks on the possible impact it may have 
on the stability of the overall financial system. As of June 2001, the outstanding 
notional amount of credit derivatives was slightly over $631 billion. Over a 7 years 
period (2001-2008), the CDS market generated approximately $60 trillion. This 
increase in the CDS market outperformed the world economic output, which 
averaged $55.8 trillion (ISDA 2008 Report).  
 
The significant size of the CDS market was not the only reason which raised 
fear about financial stability; there was also the misuse of such derivatives. Because 
of speculative CDS trading, the market was no longer able to reflect the real on-
going economic climate in financial markets. Thus, speculators took advantage of 
the situation by purchasing CDS contracts sold by weak banks, expecting them to 
default to get a repayment (Cont (2010)). As a precautionary measure, European 
regulators intervened and recently imposed a ban on outright speculation of naked  
sovereign CDS instruments. 
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Recent literature recognized the strong impact the CDS market has on 
financial fragility. According to Markosea et al. (2012), the size of both derivative 
and CDS markets was way too large to internalize the resulting failures from the 
deeply connected financial institutions. Similarly, Nijskens and Wagner (2011) 
blame banks and financial institutions that were involved in credit risk transfer for 
the recent financial crisis. The authors found that although individual banks that  
conduct credit risk transfer may appear to be less risky when considered 
individually, altogether they pose a greater risk to financial stability. 
 
With the beginning of the financial crisis, many countries experienced 
excessively high levels of CDS spreads, which brought to light the danger of 
defaults, domino effect and contagion between countries (Cont (2010), Cont and 
Minca (2010)). In Greece, CDS spread figures grew from $7.4 billion in 2009 to a 
remarkable 9.2 billion in 2010 (Cont (2010)). The state of panic and financial 
instability made it impossible for banks to borrow from the frozen capital markets 
(Terzi and Uluçay (2011)).  
 
A new stream of literature developed, considering the CDS spread as a good 
proxy for systemic stability. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) looked at the 
period before and during the financial crisis and find that at a macro level, the best 
measure of systemic risk is the first principal component of a portfolio of CDS 
spread. At individual bank level, the multivariate densities computed from the CDS 
spreads were the best indicator of systemic risk. Similarly, Huang et al. (2009) used 
CDS spreads and the equity prices to derive an indicator of systemic risk. Using 12 
banks, the authors computed the probability of default from the CDS spread and the 
60 
 
subsequent asset return correlations. An analogous technique to estimate systemic 
risk using CDS spreads was employed by Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005) and 
Avesani et al. (2006). The authors considered the system of banks as a portfolio, and 
used the default probability from the CDS and equity markets as an indicator of 
systemic risk. Similarly, Trapp and Wewel (2013) used 550 banks, including 
financials and non-financials to analyze systemic risk in both the EU and US regions 
and establish whether it arose from common shocks or contagion.  
 
Financial Access 
In the wake of the recent crisis, frozen capital markets lead to a reduced 
investors’ and firms’ ability to access banks and basic financial services. The extent 
to which financial systems channel savings to parties which have the best ability to 
maximize investment prospects is very important for economic recovery. Thus, a 
better access to financial institutions helps to ensure the borrowers’ credit 
worthiness. This in turn minimizes the risk of default and reduces the overall credit 
risk.  
 
Past literature indicates that a well-established financial system has a positive 
impact on economic development. Hence, there is a close connection between a 
developed financial system and the degree of financial access and outreach to banks. 
The benefits of a developed financial system with good access will reduce 
symmetries and ensure the harmonization of markets. Other benefits include: 
transaction cost reduction, credit check controls and ensuring that both the lender 
and the borrower get the necessary protection when a contract is established (Levine 
(2005)). Similarly, Beck et al. (2008) state that the following basic services should 
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be provided to ensure good outreach: savings, payments, and risk-management 
instruments to participants, aim for financing positive growth projects. This is 
particularly important for smaller companies, start-ups and investors who have 
lucrative business ideas that require funding (Galor and Zeira (1993)). In a research 
conducted by Beck et al. (2007), financial outreach was analyzed using cross-
country analysis to investigate the extent to which investors, households and firms 
were able to utilize banking services. By building indicators for financial penetration 
across 99 countries, the authors show that state owned firms have a lower outreach, 
unlike more concentrated financial institutions. In addition, countries with more 
ATMs, bank branches and loan services have fewer financing barriers.   
 
In a more recent research by Beck et al. (2008), the authors focused on 209 
banks in 62 countries and found that (a) account and loan balances, account fees and 
documentation requirements were all inversely related to financial access; (b) 
financial factors such as efficiency of credit information sharing, the rights of 
creditors and contract enforcements were all strongly correlated with financial access 
barriers. In addition, when competition is high in the financial system, market based 
supervisions is associated with better access. Thus, privately owned and foreign 
financial institutions offer more flexibility to depositors, which in turn improve the 
level of outreach.  
 
Profitability 
The existing literature linking banks’ earnings to credit risk started  
developing only recently. In fact, most of the past literature used earning indicators 
in relation to bank failures rather than incorporating it as a driver of credit risk.  
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In a research conducted by Ötker-Robe and Podpiera (2010), the authors 
analyzed 29 EU large financial institutions, over the period of 2004 to 2009 to 
uncover the drivers of CDS spreads. Using the CAMEL indicators (Capital, Asset 
Quality, Management Quality, Earnings Potential and Liquidity), it was found that 
riskier business activities raise the CDS spread, reduce operating costs, improve 
revenues and lower the ROA. More specifically, a 1% increase in the ROA ratio 
would lead to a 21.7 basis point reduction in the CDS spread. In the same vein, 
Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) analysed whether the CDS spread can be considered 
as a good proxy for banks efficiency. Using pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis data, the 
authors found that the ROE tends to increase probability of default. In the same vein, 
Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) used CAMEL indicators in order to analyse European 
banks in distress over the period of early 1990s to 2008. Findings show that on 
average, banks that are in distress tend to experience lower levels of earnings. Thus, 
banks with a better capitalization are more likely to have greater earnings. This in 
turn reduces their overall lower level of default and narrows their CDS spreads. In 
addition, Kick and Koetter (2007) also incorporated earnings ratios among other 
CAMEL indicators to uncover the factors driving financial distress in the German 
banking system over the period of 1995 to 2004. They find that banks in distress 
have lower level of earnings. Similarly, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) found that 
banks that have lower profitability ratio are subject to higher probability of failure. 
 
Although the literature on credit risk and the CDS spread has only started 
emerging in the early, its importance significantly grew in the financial markets, 
especially after the recent financial crisis where many researchers blamed it for 
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increasing speculation and endangering the entire financial system. Therefore, in the 
next section, we will investigate the literature that linked CDS instruments to the 
recent financial crisis. 
 
 
2.5 Literature on CDS spreads in the light of recent financial crisis  
A number of recent studies have focused on the impact of the  recent financial 
crises as well as the sovereign crisis on CDS spread (Li et al (2010), Wang and 
Moore (2010), Chen et al (2011), Terzi and Ulucay (2011), Dionne et al. (2011), 
Eichengreen et al. (2012), Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) and Arora et al. (2012)). 
 
In a research conducted by Apergis and Mamatzakis (2014), the authors 
investigated dynamics of selected euro-area sovereign bonds by employing a factor 
augmenting vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model using five year CDS (Corporate 
CDS premium (iTraxx)). Their findings indicate that liquidity, credit risk and flight  
to quality drive both spreads and CDS of five years maturity over swaps for Greece 
and Ireland in recent years.  
 
Among other recent authors that link the CDS spread to the financial crisis 
were Eichengreen et al. (2012), who focus on how the subprime crisis affected the 
CDS premium in the banking sector. Their research demonstrates the importance of 
common macroeconomic factors in determining the CDS premium in both normal 
and recessionary conditions. They also find that common macroeconomic factors, 
that have a strong influence on the CDS premium in normal times, tend to have less 
explanatory power during the credit crisis. The authors relate these findings to the 
change in investors’ behavior. It appears that investors became more concerned with 
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the performance of sub-prime mortgage securities they had invested in than the risk 
of a general economic recession.  
 
The research by Chen et al. (2011) analyses the behavior of the CDS indices 
in three different sectors: banking, financial services and insurance during normal 
and stress periods. The authors analyze whether the short and long run adjustments 
in the equilibrium of the CDS spread in these sectors was symmetric or asymmetric, 
in both tranquil and stress periods.  They found that profitable arbitrage opportunities 
exist only in the banking CDS index, which is very responsive to credit events.  In 
addition, their results indicate that arbitrage profit is more likely to be achieved 
following the occurrence of a negative shock. The authors find that in the long run, 
the insurance CDS index does not seem to adjust; while in the short run, all 
individual spreads in the insurance sector contribute to the equilibrium.  
 
In a research conducted by Li and Mizrach (2010), the authors also analyze 
the CDS premium in the context of the recent financial crisis. Their research 
compares different models of Bear Sterns CDSs using a Markov Monte Carlo 
algorithm. The findings show that CKLS with GARCH volatility and exponential 
power distribution errors were the most appropriate model. Furthermore, the authors 
show evidence that level effects, volatility clustering as well as jumps were crucial 
elements of the credit default swap premiums. Their research unveils one very 
surprising finding, in the four months before the collapse of Bearn Sterns, the CDS 
premium was almost equal to the risk free rate. As such, the CDS premiums did not 
signal the forthcoming bankruptcy or the global banking and financial crisis. 
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Moreover, Wang and Moore (2010) use the multivariate GARCH model to 
conduct a dynamic correlation analysis to establish how the credit default swap 
premiums of emerging markets are integrated with the US market during the 
financial crisis. Their results indicate that Lehman Brothers’ shock significantly 
strengthened the integration especially in developed markets. The authors explain 
that the drastic fall in the US financial interest rates resulted in a high correlation 
between the US and developed countries markets; meaning that when the financial 
crisis reached its highest level, the CDS market was mainly affected by 
developments in the United States.  
 
In addition, Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) focused on aggregate credit 
default swap premiums. Their research uses the European ITraxx CDS index to 
analyze the factors that determine the premium. They found that prior to and 
following the outbreak of the financial crisis, the CDS premium was determined by 
stock returns and implied volatility of the S&P 500 stock index. In addition, before 
and during the recent crisis, global financial variables were also found to have an 
explanatory power. Another interesting observation was that liquidity factors only 
mattered for financial institutions, but were irrelevant to non-financial firms.  
 
In a similar vein, Dionne et al. (2011) used a Markov-switching risk-free 
term structure model to investigate that factors that caused the yield spread and 
default risk to rise. They used default probabilities implied by credit default 
swap premiums for different classes of bond ratings, the risk-free rate, and risky 
zero-coupon bond yields. The authors used variables such as inflation, consumptions 
and the yields of risk free securities to calibrate their analysis. They find that 
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between the late 1980s and 2008 macroeconomic factors were the main determinants 
of the sudden jump in CDS premiums. The credit default swap market has also been 
analyzed in relation to counterparty credit risk. As such, Arora et al. (2012) show 
that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. Their results show that 
credit default swap premiums are more expensive when the credit risk of the 
protection seller is low.   
 
Having reviewed the literature on CDS and credit risk, both at bank- level and 
country- level, in the next section we will focus on the first research question that this 
thesis addresses.  More specifically, we will look at the determinants of UK bank 
CDS spread and investigate the role by the housing market, over the period of 2004-
2011. 
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Chapter 3 
Data  
 
In chapter 3, I will explain the type and sources of data used in this thesis. As 
such, two types of data have been employed for the purpose of our analysis. I have 
first conducted the aggregate- level analysis for the UK Banking sector (time-series 
analysis). I have then used bank- level analysis across 30 countries and 115 banks 
(panel-analysis). It should be noted that two types of characteristics were used for the 
purpose of bank-level analysis, namely: bank- level characteristics which consist of 
bank accounting ratio and country- level characteristics. Let us first explain the 
aggregate analysis for the UK banking sector. 
 
3.0 Aggregate analysis for the UK Banking sector  
In this section of the thesis we will first start by presenting the dependent and 
the set of independent variables used for the time-series analysis, which focuses on 
the UK banking sector. These are defined as follows: 
 
UK Bank CDS  
The CDS spread represents the CDS Premium Mid for the entire UK banking 
sector. It should be noted that the sector indices is equally weighted and corresponds 
to the average of ‘CDS premium bid’ and ‘CDS premium offered’. The rate is 
expressed in basis points (bp). We use the monthly 5-Year Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) Index as a proxy for credit risk. The index includes the aggregate banking 
sector in the UK. We use log of CDS spread in our analysis.  The data include 
indices with a five-year maturity because they are the most liquid type of CDS. 
68 
 
The data is monthly and covers the period ranging from January 2004 to 
April 2011. This time period is of great interest as it enables us to shed light on the 
behavior of the CDS spread before and during the financial crisis,  including the 
period when the credit market was booming. CDS data were obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, the world’s largest financial statistical database, and published 
by the Credit Market Analysis (CMA) Group. The CDS banking sector data were 
first launched by the CMA group in 2004.  
 
For the purposes of the time series analysis, we examine the CDS premium 
for the UK banking sector against four financial explanatory variables. A number of 
authors have identified the importance of theoretical variables as drivers of credit 
risk (Fama (1984), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
Duffie and Singleton (1997), Duffee (1998), Lekkos and Milas (2001), Fehle (2003), 
In and Fang (2003), Fang (2003). Kobor et al. (2005), Bystrom (2008), Alexander 
and Kaeck (2008), Das et al., (2009), Naifar (2010) and Dionne et al. (2011)). We 
therefore include both the Yield Spread and the TED Spread as theoretical 
determinants of the CDS spread. In addition, previous research identified the 
relevance of financial variables as drivers of credit risk (Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), and Benkert (2004)); we therefore incorporate 
the FTSE100 to reflect the state of the UK financial market.  Moreover, in order to 
reflect the underlying economic factors, we include the UK House Price Index .  
 
Figure 1.2 shows that before July 2007 when the crisis began, the CDS 
spread was very low. The reason why the level of the CDS spread was not high prior 
to the financial crisis was due to the low perception of credit default risk in the 
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financial system. However, in July 2007, the CDS spread started to increase 
dramatically increase. This dramatic and sudden increase in the CDS spread was a 
reflection of the subprime mortgage crisis that affected the financial markets. In fact, 
the period between July 2007 and March 2009 was marked by the bankruptcy of 
large investment banks, including AIG, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Sterns among 
other major banks that threatened the stability of the overall financial system.  
 
In February 2011, although the level of credit risk started to gradually 
decrease as a result of the slow economic recovery, its level was still high relative to 
the period preceding the financial crisis. This reflects the vulnerability of the 
financial system to external shocks. 
 
The variables that have been identified in the literature in explaining CDS 
spread determinants are as follows: 
 
UK House Price index 
The UK house price Index is obtained from Datastream Thompson Reuters 
and published by Nationwide Anglia Building Society under the reference 
‘Nationwide House Price Index’, which is a monthly average and denominated in 
British Pounds (£).  It is seasonally adjusted and ranges from January 2004 to April 
2011.  Again we use a log transformation for the empirical tests. Given that houses 
are not similar, a simple average of all house prices in a specific sample would lead 
to misleading inferences. For this reason, Nationwide adopts a statistical method, 
which uses the constantly varying sample of mortgage approvals to produce a 
consistent index, capturing price fluctuations on a regular basis.  
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From figure 1.2, it can be clearly observed that during the period before 
October 2007, the UK house price index was gradually increasing. However, with 
the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis, the house price index drastically fell. 
Although, the house price index started to marginally increase again, the index never 
came back to its previous peak level that was recorded before the financial crisis.  
 
Before the financial crisis, consumers borrowed heavily due to the low 
interest rates that in turn were partly a result of foreign inflows. This created a 
massive credit expansion and easy borrowing to low-income consumers, leading to a 
housing boom in the economy. In fact, most of the borrowers had very low c redit 
ratings and were still able to obtain mortgages. Furthermore, given the increased 
securitization activities in the financial system, banks were not very concerned about 
the quality of borrowers. Due to the sophisticated financial engineering practices and 
securitization activities, banks that were granting mortgages were repackaging these 
mortgage obligations into synthetic structured products such as Mortgage Backed 
Securities (MBS), Retail Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) or Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) among other more complex structured products. The 
repackaging process of mortgages and other instruments were achieved with the help 
of credit rating agencies and Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), which effectively 
trenched the MBS and RMBs, reselling them to other parties who were better 
equipped to handle risk. This has allowed a better risk diversification while resulting 
in low lending standards. Given the easy borrowing in the financial market, the 
demand for real estate purchases dramatically increased, pushing up house prices. As 
a result, borrowings increased and savings decreased. This has in turn led to a 
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housing boom, followed by a surplus of unsold houses driving the real estate prices 
down. This period corresponds to the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis.  
        
 At the beginning of 2007, sub-prime mortgage borrowers started heavily 
defaulting on their mortgage obligations, and given that house prices were already 
decreasing, banks were no longer able to recover their loans by reselling the 
properties. It should be noted that financial institutions were not the only parties who 
suffered from the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Primary borrowers who defaulted were 
also in distress as a result of losing their primary residence. In addition, there was 
another class of borrowers who were taking mortgage loans to later resell it into the 
secondary market when real estate prices were higher, with the aim to achieve a 
profit (also referred to as re-mortgaging activities). Following the crisis, these 
borrowers were now holding negative equity. This has caused a further increase in 
the number of defaults and houses for sale.  Thus, all securitized products were 
drastically falling in value, with most of the mezzanine tranches defaulting first. In 
addition, the CDS spread on Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) was extremely 
high, leading to an overall increase in the CDS spread. The high CDS spread was a 
reflection of the rising default risk in the financial system. The transmission channel 
leading to the credit crisis is explained in a Flow Chart in Figure 1.1. 
 
UK Yield Spread 
The UK 3-month Treasury Bill is obtained from Datastream Thompson-
Reuters database. It is the middle market-closing rate (i.e. the mean of bid and offer) 
as recorded by the Bank of England in the late afternoon. Also the 30-year UK 
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Treasury bond yield has been obtained from Datastream. It represents the UK 
Government 30-year benchmark bid yield, denominated in the UK Sterling currency.  
The yield-spread variable is calculated as the yield of a 30-year UK Treasury bond 
minus 3-month UK Treasury bill. The data frequency for both variables is monthly, 
ranging from January 2004 to April 2011. The yield spread is defined as follows: 
 
                                                               
 
In Figure 1.2, the yield spread can be compared over two different time 
periods: the period preceding the financial crisis (January 2004 until August 2007), 
and the period following the financial crisis (August 2007 to April 2011). In the first 
period, before the crisis emerged, the yield curve was downward sloping, and 
progressively decreasing. However, from the beginning of the financial crisis, the 
direction of the yield curve has changed, becoming upward sloping. The yield spread 
can increase either as a result of higher yields being offered on long-term bonds 
(yield on the 30 year Treasury bond) or due to the decrease in short term yields 
(yield on 3-month Treasury bills).  
 
The yield on the long-term bond can increase following perception of higher 
credit risk in the government sector resulting from a large fiscal deficit. The higher 
Sovereign credit risk can get transmitted to the private sector, given the 
government’s borrowing requirement from financial markets. In addition, inflation 
rate is another factor that could influence the shape of the yield curve. A higher 
public sector borrowing requirement and inflation risk would lead to an increase in 
the yield of the long-term bond. Furthermore, it can be observed from figure 1.2 that 
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the yield curve steepened at the beginning of the credit crisis, while from March 
2009 onwards, the yield curve started to flatten, reflecting the beginning of an 
economic recovery.  
 
UK TED Spread 
The liquidity spread is represented by TED. The acronym is formed from T-
Bill and ED – the ticker symbol for the Eurodollar futures contract. Instead of the 
Eurodollar, we use the LIBOR rate. The series were obtained from Datastream.  It is 
monthly, ranging from January 2004 to April 2011.  
 
The UK TED spread is defined as follows: 
                                         
 
Figure 1.2 indicates the fluctuation of the liquidity spread over the period of 
January 2004 - April 2011, in the UK money market. Following the financial crisis, 
liquidity in the financial markets started to decline considerably. The dramatic 
collapse in liquidity was recorded around September 2008, when capital markets 
froze and investors started withdrawing their funds from financial institutions, 
eventually causing bank runs. 
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UK FTSE 100 Index 
The FTSE-100 index was chosen as a benchmark for the UK stock prices. 
The FTSE-100 is a share index of the 100 most highly capitalized UK companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. The data was obtained from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream, at monthly frequency, ranging from January 2004 to April 2011.  
 
Before the recent financial crisis, the FTSE-100 index was gradually 
increasing, reflecting a constantly improving economic performance of the UK 100 
most capitalized companies (see Figure 1.2). After August 2007, with the beginning 
of the financial crisis, the FTSE-100 index started to drastically fall, signaling 
deteriorating market conditions. Given that most of the financial institutions are 
interlinked, defaults in one financial institution may spill over to other banks, 
companies and sectors. This was exactly what happened in the recent financial crisis.  
With the beginning of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, major investment banks 
collapsed, and investors lost confidence in the financial system and started heavily 
withdrawing their funds. This has caused bank runs (for example, in the case of 
Northern Rock) and the drying up of liquidity in the financial sector. Many banks 
went bankrupt as they faced liquidity crisis and were unable to repay their debt 
obligations, resulting in a global financial crisis affecting not only the housing and 
financial sectors, but also causing distress in other sectors as reflected in rising 
unemployment rates.  
 
Having explained our dependent and set of explanatory variables for the 
aggregate analysis of the UK banking sector, in the next section we will discuss the 
data used for the bank-level analysis. 
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3.1 Bank-level analysis across 30 countries 
There are two types of data considered in the bank-level analysis of this 
thesis, namely: the bank- level characteristics and the country- level characteristics. 
The panel data is yearly, ranging across 30 countries and 115 banks, over the period 
of 2004-2011. 
 
3.1.1 Bank-level Characteristics 
We use annual data for a panel of 30 countries and 115 banks, over the period of 
2004- 2011, for which a variety of bank characteristics is used. The list of banks and 
countries used in the analysis is presented at the end of this chapter in table 0.1 and 
table 0.2. In addition, table 2.1 outlines the summary of the source of the bank- level 
data as well as expected sign of the coefficients. Furthermore, table 2.2 summarises 
the hypothesis of the bank-level data. 
 
Bank CDS spread: The index includes 115 banks in 30 countries, over the 
period of 2004-2011. The data was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and 
published by the Credit Market Analysis (CMA) Group. The CDS banking sector 
data were first launched by the CMA group in 2004. This dataset is unique as it 
allows us to uncover the behavior of CDS before and after the financial crisis, 
including the period of economic expansion. We use the yearly 5-Year Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) Index as a proxy for credit risk as it is considered to be the 
most liquid type of CDS index. We use log of CDS prices in our analysis. The CDS 
spread is expressed in basis points.  
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Graphes 2.1-2.6 shows the relationship of the CDS spread with respect to 
leverage, regulatory capital, asset quality, liquidity operations income ratio and bank 
size, over the period of 2004 to 2011, for the entire sample of 30 countries and 115 
banks. Although the level of bank CDS spread varied across different countries, the 
trend of these fluctuations was similar. In fact, before 2007, bank CDS spread levels 
were very low, reflecting low the level of default and credit risk. This entire trend 
reversed with the beginning of the financial crisis. The pattern of low bank CDS 
spread before the crisis, which drastically increased after the crisis, was observed for 
the rest of developed and emerging countries across the sample. 
 
All the bank- level explanatory variables used to reflect bank characteristics 
were retrieved from Bankscope and published by Bureau Van Dijk. As such, the set 
of bank- level explanatory variables, that reflect bank characteristics, simply 
represent accounting ratios that have been previously used in past literature as a 
proxy for CDS and credit spreads. We have followed the approach used by  tker-
Robe and Podpiera (2010), Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), Fabozzi et al. (2007), Hull 
et al. (2004), Collin Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taks ler (2003) and 
Benkert (2004). 
 
 Leverage: ratio of long-term debt to common equity. It is denominated in 
the local currency and expressed as a fraction. 
 Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital, which is computed as the difference 
between Total Capital and Tier 1 Capital. 
 Asset Quality: ratio of Impaired Loans to Equity. 
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 Bank Liquidity: ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Deposits and Borrowings.  
 Operations Income Ratio: EBITA / Average Assets 
 ln(Bank Size): Natural Logarithm of Bank Total Assets  
 Bank Size Sq: Squared term of the Natural Logarithm of Bank Total 
Assets  
Having given the definition of each bank- level indicator used in the panel 
analysis, we will now describe in more detail the trends in each of the variables over 
the period of 2004-2011. 
 
Leverage 
The credit expansion in early 2000, securitization activities and the increased 
use of structured products allowed banks to increase their lending activities, which 
eventually translated into a credit bubble. Most importantly, banks were able to 
increase their lending to low-income consumers thanks to their ability to borrow 
more from other banks and capital markets. Abnormally high leverage ratios were 
already observed before the financial crisis. Regulators paid little attention to the 
level of debt, as banks were not disclosing their real leverage exposures. Instead, 
they used off-balance sheet securitization to escape regulatory requirements.  
 
We observe that the highest leverage multipliers are usually associated with 
banks in developed countries, which were known to be less conservative with their 
financial regulatory approach. On the other hand, the more conservative banks in 
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emerging countries enjoyed considerably smaller levels of leverage, due to their 
more conservative approach to risk and tighter financial regulation.  
 
Graph 2.1 shows that the long-term debt to common equity ratio and the CDS 
spread across a panel of 30 countries is positively correlated. This implies that the 
higher the leverage ratio, the higher the CDS spread, and the greater the overall 
credit risk. 
 
Regulatory Capital 
From graph 2.2, it can be observed that over the period of 2004 to 2011, 
regulatory capital and the bank CDS spread were inversely related. In fact, the Tier 2 
capital varied across countries and institutions. Countries with tighter regulatory 
regimes requested banks and financial institutions to hold more capital aside as a 
cushion to absorb losses in case if there was a negative event. However, countries 
with more lax regulatory regimes allowed their banks to hold less capital aside. 
Banks typically preferred have lower capital buffers as it allowed them to undertake 
more investments. However, in the light of the crisis, banks in developed countries 
that were known to be more risky were faced with stricter regulatory rules. It should 
be noted that the higher the tier 2 capital, and the stricter is the regulatory capital 
regime, the narrower is the CDS spread and smaller is credit risk. Basel 3 was 
introduced on the 1st of January 2013 in response to the failure of the previous 
financial regulatory regime. Its main objective was to strengthen capital 
requirements, by lowering leverage, increasing liquidity levels and introducing a new 
minimum risk based capital ratios.  
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Asset Quality  
Impaired Loans over Equity reflects the quality of assets, over the period of 
2004-2011. A typical example of a bank that experienced a high level of bad loans 
was the UK bank Northern Rock which had to be rescued and bailed out by the Bank 
of England as it was on the verge of collapse, or the German IKB Deutsche 
Industrial Bank which experienced very high ratios of impaired loans to equity. As 
such, graph 2.3 clearly demonstrates that the higher the value of impaired loans over 
equity and the wider is the CDS spread. This implies a deteriorating quality of the 
underlying instrument and a rising credit risk.  
 
Bank Liquidity 
Bank liquidity is defined as the ratio of Liquid Assets / Deposits and 
Borrowings. The data was obtained Banckscope. 
 
Over the period of 2004 to 2011, the liquidity ratio varied highly across 
banks. From our data sample, it appears that Russian and Malaysian banks had high 
levels of liquidity as compared to other banks in developed countries. The exception 
was few strong UK banks, such as Barclays and HSBC which despite the financial 
crisis, in 2007, still sustained high liquidity ratios. 
 
Graph 2.4 points a negative relationship between the ratio of liquid assets to 
total deposits and borrowings and the CDS spread. Higher liquidity ratios signal a 
rather safe and stable bank, which is able to provide cash to its investors and sustain 
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itself in times of crisis and dry capital markets. This implies that high liquidity is 
expected to be negatively related to CDS spread and credit risk. 
 
Operating Income Ratio 
Operating income ratio is defined as the ratio of EBITA / Average Assets. 
The data was obtained Banckscope. It is annual, covering 115 banks and 30 
countries. 
Graph 2.5 shows that there is a negative relationship between bank CDS 
spread and bank- level of operations, across a sample of 30 countries and 115 banks, 
over the period of 2004-2011. As such, there is an expectation that banks that 
achieve high level of revenue, gain higher income and therefore generate more 
return. Therefore, in times of financial crisis, they have more income to sustain 
themselves and avoid the high reliance on capital and money markets.  
 
Bank Size 
Graphs 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 demonstrate the nature of the relationship linking 
bank size and the CDS spread over the sample period 2004-2011. In graph 2.6, on 
average, there appears to be a negative relationship between credit risk and bank 
size. Thus, as banks grow in size, the CDS spread narrows. Before  the crisis, there 
was a fundamental believe amongst banks that the government will never let a big 
institution fail due to the possible contagion it may generate in the financial markets. 
However, it should be noted that graph 2.6 does not account for institutions that 
surpass the optimal size. As such, after conducting our ana lysis, we demonstrate in 
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graphs 2.7 and 2.8 that there is a U-shape relationship between bank size and credit 
risk. Therefore, bigger banks were subject to higher CDS spreads and increased 
credit risk, while smaller banks experienced relatively lower CDS spreads and were 
considered to be safer. Any financial institution growing beyond that threshold 
becomes subject to higher credit risk. 
 
Having identified the bank- level characteristics, we will now proceed and 
identify the country-level characteristics used in our panel analysis.  
 
3.1.2 Country-level characteristics 
We use annual data for a panel of 30 countries, over the period of 2004- 2011, 
for which a variety of country- level characteristics is used. The list of the countries 
used in the analysis is presented at the end of this chapter. The variables used to 
reflect the country-level characteristics in a panel setting are explained as follows: 
 
House Price Index: we use a log transformation of the house price index. 
The data is denominated in the local currency and expressed in basis points.  The 
data is yearly, covering 30 countries, over the period of 2004-2011. It was retrieved 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream and published by Oxford Economics.  
 
The housing market has fluctuated steadily over the period of 2004-2011, 
across the 30 countries. Some countries such as the UK and the US experienced 
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drastic changes in the housing market before and during the financial crisis. More 
specifically, it has been observed that the housing market goes through cycles of 
booms and busts. As such, during the credit boom we note that many developed 
economies experienced a high expansion in the housing market. Typically, after a 
peak, the housing market starts to drastically fall, bringing the rate of defaults to very 
high levels. Given the high reliability of developed economies on the mortgage-
backed securitization, there is higher likelihood that such types of countries will be 
more affected by drastic changes in the housing market. Therefore, any changes in 
the real estate market, is very likely to affect the level of the CDS spread and credit 
risk.  
 
The variables that are used in this thesis to reflect the financial system are all 
at aggregate level, and are represented by: Financial Deepening, Financial Stability, 
Profitability and Financial Access. These data were all retrieved from the Global 
Financial Development Database (GFDD) of the World Bank (available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/AWACYAMMM0). However, the raw data used to compel 
the Global Financial Development Database came from different sources, which are 
outlined below for each variable as follows: 
 
Financial Stability  
The data was retrieved from the GFDD at the following World Bank website 
(available at: http://go.worldbank.org/AWACYAMMM0). Raw data came from two 
different sources: Bankscope and Bloomberg. 
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 Financial Stability 1: Bank Z-score: Ratio of defaulting loans 
(payments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to 
total gross loans (total value of loan portfolio). The loan amount 
recorded as nonperforming includes the gross value of the loan as 
recorded on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is overdue. 
The source of the raw data is from Bankscope. 
 Financial Stability 2: Volatility of stock price index: It is the 360-
day standard deviation of the return on the national stock market 
index. The source of the raw data is from Bloomberg. 
 
The Bank Z score is also referred to distance to default reflects the level of 
stability of a bank. Figure 3.1 illustrates a negative relationship between the CDS 
spread and the bank Z score, across the 30 countries considered in our sample, over 
the period of 2004-2011. This implies that a more stable financial institution would 
have a higher the Bank Z score, a lower probability of going insolvent, and a lower 
CDS spread. Thus, the Bank Z score is inversely related to the probability that the 
value of bank’s assets becomes lower than the value of its debt. In fact, the Z score 
measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to 
deplete equity. Similarly, Financial Stability 2 (Volatility of stock price index), 
reflects the volatility of stock prices in each of the 30 countries considered in our 
sample. As such, we observe that many developed economies such as the UK, US, 
France, Spain and Italy experienced very high volatility levels since 2007, as a result 
of the financial crisis which eventually led to financial instability. The relationship 
linking Financial Stability with the CDS spread is expressed in figure 3.1. 
84 
 
Financial Deepening 
The data was retrieved from the GFDD at the following World Bank website 
(available at: http://go.worldbank.org/AWACYAMMM0). Raw data came from 
three different sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, and World Bank GDP estimates. 
 
 Financial Deepening 1: Deposit money bank assets to 
GDP (%): Total assets held by deposit money banks as a 
share of GDP. Assets include claims on domestic real non-
financial sector, which includes central, state and local 
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises and private 
sector. Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks 
and other financial institutions that accept transferable 
deposits, such as demand deposits. The raw data came 
from the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, and World Bank GDP estimates. 
 
 Financial Deepening 2: Financial system deposits to 
GDP (%): It represents demand, time and saving deposits 
in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as 
a share of GDP. The raw data came from the International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and 
World Bank GDP estimates. 
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The higher the ratio of deposit money bank assets  and the better the banks’ 
ability to generate credit (Financial Deepening 1). The same applies for the ratio of 
financial system deposits to GDP (%) (Financial Deepening 1). We observe that the 
period before the financial crisis was a period of high credit expansion, where low-
income consumers were able to get loans and buy houses. The level of credit rose to 
drastic levels, leading to major credit imbalances in the financial system. This 
subsequently gave rise to a credit bubble, which late transformed into the global 
financial crisis. The relationship linking Financial Deepening with the CDS spread is 
demonstrated in graph 3.1. 
 
Financial Access 
The number of bank branches per 100,000 adults represents the number of 
commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults. The data is from commercial banks-
bank survey and has been published by International Monetary Fund and the 
Financial Access Survey. For each country, it is calculated as: (the number of  
institutions + number of branches)*100,000/adult population in the reporting 
country. The data was retrieved from the GFDD at the following World Bank 
website (available at: http://go.worldbank.org/AWACYAMMM0). 
 
As such, Financial Access reflects the extent to which investors and the 
public generally speaking can access banks. A financial system that functions 
efficiently would strike to enhance and ensure that investors have easy access to 
86 
 
financial institutions. The relationship linking Financial Stability with the CDS 
spread is expressed in figure 3.1. 
 
Profitability 
The country- level data was retrieved from the GFDD at the following World 
Bank website (available at: http://go.worldbank.org/AWACYAMMM0). In addition, 
raw data was retrieved from Bankscope and was calculated from underlying bank-
by-bank unconsolidated data.  
 Profitability 1: Overhead costs to total assets (%): 
Operating expenses of a bank as a share of the value of all 
assets held. Total assets include total earning assets, cash and 
due from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, 
other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax assets, 
discontinued operations and other assets. raw data was 
retrieved from Bankscope. 
 
 Profitability 2: Return on equity (%): Commercial banks’ 
net income to yearly averaged equity. Both the numerator 
and denominator are first aggregated on the country level 
before division. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the CDS spread and the level of profitability (country-
level) are negatively related. When banks have a high level of return, it would 
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typically attract more investors as the bank enhances its marketab ility and positions 
itself as a strong financial institution in the markets. Thus, as long as a bank invests 
in safe assets, it would usually have a better availability of funds compared to other 
institutions; thus, it becomes financially stronger. Higher net interest margin would 
typically decrease the probability of default, narrow the CDS spread and decrease the 
level of credit risk.  
 
Having explained all the data used in our analysis, we will now proceed to 
the next chapter and analyse the literature review and hypothesis developed in this 
thesis. In subsequent chapters, all the data related analysis will be undertaken. 
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Table 0.1: List of Banks  
List of Banks 
ABN Amro Bank 
ABU DHABI COMR BK 
AKBANK TURK ANONIM 
ALFA-BANK (OJSC) 
ALPHA BANK A.E. 
AOZORA BANK, LTD 
Alliance and Leicester Commercial Bank 
BAWAG P.S.K 
BAYERISCHE LANDESBK 
BCP FINANCE BK 
BNP Paribas 
Banca Intesa 
Banca Italese 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Banca Popolare Di Milano 
Banco BPI 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
Banco Comr Portugues 
Banco Espirito Santo SA 
Banco Pastor SA 
Banco Popolare Italiana 
Banco Popular  
Banco Santander SA 
Banco de Sabadell SA 
Bank of America Corporation 
Bank of China Limited 
Bank of India 
Bank of Moscow 
Bankinter 
Barclays 
CAIXA D'ESTL DE CATA 
CAIXA PNOS DE BARCA 
CATHAY UNITED BK CO LTD 
CDA DE VLNCIA CASTLN 
CDA DEL MEDITERRANEO 
CDA Y MP DE MADRID 
CIMB BANK BERHAD 
CITIGROUP INC. 
CREDIT LYONNAIS 
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP 
Caixa Geral De Depositos 
Capital One Financial Corp 
China Development Bank (China DEV Bank) 
Commerzbank 
Credit Agricole 
DANSKE BANK A/S 
DBS BANK LTD 
DEV BK OF JAPAN INC 
DNB NOR BANK ASA 
DZ Bank 
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Deutsche Bank 
Dexia 
EFG Eurobank Ergas 
EMIRATES NBD (PJSC) 
ERSTE GROUP BANK AG 
Export-Import Bank of China 
Fortis Bank 
GAZPROMBANK (OJSC) 
HANA BANK 
HBOS 
HSBC Holdings PLC 
ICICI Bank limited 
IDBI Bank LTD 
IKB Deutsche Industrial Bank 
IND & COM BK OF CHIN 
INDL BK OF KOREA 
ING Bank  
Irish Life and Permanent Plc 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
JSC BK CENTERCREDIT 
KBC Group 
KOOKMIN BANK 
KOREA EXCHANGE BANK 
LANDESBANK BERLIN AG 
LB BADENWUERTTEMBERG 
LB HESSTHRGN GIRO 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 
MIZUHO CORP BANK LTD 
MORGAN STANLEY 
Malayan Banking Berhad 
Mediobanca 
NAT BK OF ABU DHABI 
NAT BK OF GREECE SA 
NATIONAL AUS BK 
NORD-LB - GIRO 
NORDEA BANK AB 
Nationwide Building Society 
Natixis 
Northern Rock PLC 
OS CHINESE BKG CORP LTD 
RAIF ZNTRLBK OSTER AG  
RHB Bank Berhad 
Rabobank Nederland 
Rosselkhosbank 
SHINHAN BANK 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSK BNKN 
SNS Bank 
Sberbank of Russia 
Societe Generale 
State Bank of India 
THE BTMBI UFJ LTD 
THE CO-OP BANK PLC 
THE EXPT-IMPT BK OF KOA 
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GP 
THE KOREA DEV BANK 
90 
 
THE RBS GROUP PLC 
TURKIYE IS BANKASI 
UBS AG 
Unicredito Italiano 
Unione Di Banche Italia (UBI Banka) 
VTB Bank 
WESTLB AG 
WESTPAC BANKING CORP 
WOORI BANK 
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Table 0.2: List of countries 
List of Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cayman Islands 
China 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
India 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Turkey 
UAE 
UK 
US  
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Chapter 4 
Determinants of Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads: 
The role of the housing sector 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis relates credit spreads (CDS prices) in the UK banking 
sector with the performance of the housing sector. Using data on banking sector CDS 
spreads for the period January 2004 to April 2011, we analyze the impact of the house price 
index, the liquidity premium (TED), the yield spread and the FTSE 100 index on CDS 
spreads. Each of these variables represents four different sectors, namely the credit market, 
the housing market, the money market and the stock market. We find evidence that house 
price dynamics and the yield spread are the key driving factors behind the increase in credit 
spreads as reflected in CDS prices.  In addition, we employ a structural VAR model to 
investigate the short-run determinants of the CDS spread. The obtained results support our 
pervious findings, suggesting that the CDS spread is highly affected by variations in the 
house price index, which is influenced by the yield spread and the liquidity premium. As 
such, a positive shock to the CDS spread reduces house prices, suggesting that an increase 
in the CDS premium causes financial institutions and banks to lend less, reducing the 
demand for housing and consequently putting downward pressure on house prices. 
Although, the remaining variables in the model did not have a direct impact on CDS, 
indirectly they influenced the CDS premium via their impact on house prices. By 
undertaking a variance decomposition analysis, we show that the house price shock explains 
nearly 20% of the long-run forecast-error variance of the CDS premium while shocks in the 
other variables each explain less than 10% of this forecast-error variance.  
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4.1 Introduction 
A great deal has been written about the financial crisis that started in the 
summer of 2007. The credit crisis initially began with a housing bubble in the US, 
but because of contagion, it spread from the housing market to affect worldwide 
financial system. The growth of the credit default swap market coincided with the 
rapid growth of securitization activities in mortgage backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations. During the period 2002-07, the US economy 
witnessed an economic expansion driven by low interest rates and a housing 
construction and price boom. Financial innovation enabled banking and other 
financial institutions to expand their lending capacities and offer mortgage contracts 
to low-income consumers who were ultimately unable to honor their debt 
obligations. As such, that period witnessed low quality underwriting standards and a 
higher than normal default rate on home mortgages (see Taylor (2009); Klomp 
(2010)).  Banks transferred junk loans, subprime and other mortgages into Special 
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and then sold these assets as Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities (RMBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). In the case of 
CDOs, the senior, mezzanine and junior tranches had differing yields determined by 
the credit ratings. 
 
Therefore, financial engineering as well as securitization allowed banks and 
other financial institutions to expand their lending while at the same time satisfying 
regulatory capital requirements. The subsequent mortgage crisis that commenced in 
the summer of 2007 led to turmoil in the mortgage markets. Large banking 
corporations and other financial institutions were obliged to write off losses on many 
of the structured derivatives and securitized assets on their balance sheet.   
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The fourth chapter of this dissertation studies the relationship between housing 
prices in the UK and credit spreads in the UK Banking sector. The sudden and sharp 
decline in the house prices in the aftermath of the crisis has direct implications for 
the credit default swap (hereafter CDS spread) of financial institutions. In fact, there 
are several reasons to believe that house prices have a direct impact on credit risk. 
Firstly, the recent financial crisis in large part resulted from the bursting of the 
housing bubble.  During the period of credit expansion between 2000 and 2006, 
credit underwriting standards of mortgage securities were associated with lax 
supervision by financial authorities (Taylor et al. (2009)). With the continuous rise in 
house prices and the increasing securitization activities, mortgage lending expanded 
substantially. As long as the real estate prices increased, lending to lower quality 
borrowers did not pose a problem for financial institutions as they could always 
resell houses at a higher price in the secondary market. However, in summer 2007, 
when residential prices drastically plummeted and mortgage rates substantially 
increased, with borrowers’ personal income growth reaching its lowest level, sub-
prime mortgages fell in value and resulted in huge financial losses. This caused a rise 
in both the overall credit risk of the lending institutions and their CDS spread.  In the 
UK, the CDS spread in the banking sector increased from an average of only 9 basis 
points in early July 2007 to over 220 basis points in March 2008. Given the close 
linkage between the housing market and the credit market, there is a priori strong 
evidence to suggest that changes house prices affected CDS premiums. 
 
The CDS spread is usually interpreted as the price of the credit default risk of 
the underlying asset (Ötker-Robe and Podpiera (2010)). A CDS contract is similar to 
an insurance contract, meaning that the buyer of the contract, also referred to as the 
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protection buyer, makes a series of payments, i.e. the spread, to the protection seller 
of the CDS. In case a credit event occurs, such as a default, a restructuring or 
bankruptcy of the financial institution involved, the protection buyer is entitled to 
receive a pay-off from the protection seller.  The payment is usually equal to the par 
value of the underlying asset, typically a bond. If no credit event occurs, the 
protection seller receives quarterly premium payments (also referred to as the CDS 
spread) from the protection buyer. 
 
It should be noted that during the credit expansion, there was a large growth 
in Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts that were used by banks and financial 
institutions as a form of insurance against the occurrence of a credit event. Hedging 
is not the only use of CDS instruments. Banks and hedge funds also use such 
contracts for speculative purposes. The holder of a CDS contract has no obligation to 
own the underlying instrument. This characteristic makes it different from insurance 
contracts in which the holder of the contract is required to have an “insurable 
interest”. In addition to mitigating the concentration of credit risk at banks and 
financial institutions, CDS contracts allow institutions providing credit to actively 
diversify their exposures and increase their lending capacities. Furthermore, CDS 
contracts helped financial institutions issuing debt to decrease their cost of capital by 
reducing the level of risk for investors holding bond instruments. 
 
As a result, the CDS premium represents a reliable proxy for credit risk. It 
can be interpreted as the price of insuring against a credit event (e.g. default) in the 
underlying asset. The buyer of the CDS contract makes a series of premium 
payments to the protection seller. If there is a credit event such as a default, 
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restructuring or bankruptcy, the protection seller is bound by law to pay the holder of 
the CDS contract the par value of the underlying security upon receipt of the security 
from the protection buyer. If no credit event occurs, the protection seller receives 
quarterly premium payments from the protection buyer (1). 
 
The literature on credit risk, more specifically the CDS spread, focuses on 
analyzing the key structural determinants of CDS spreads.  These include the risk 
free rate and the yield spread, but not the underlying economic factors such as the 
housing market.1 The risk-free rate and the yield spread are significant factors in 
explaining the CDS spread (Naifar (2010), Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Duffie and 
Singleton (1999), Bevan and Garzarelli (2000), Lekkos and Milas (2001), and In et 
al. (2003)). Other researchers including Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and 
Taksler (2003), and Benkert (2004) analyze the CDS spread by focusing on firm 
level data and incorporate financial variables and volatility.  Recent research studies 
the impact of credit ratings on the CDS spreads and demonstrates that it is important 
in determining the spread at the firm-level (Hull et al. (2004), Fabozzi et al. (2007)).  
 
With the financial crisis, it became clear that credit risk is not only related to 
interest rates, yield spread and financial leverage, but most defaults that occurred 
during the crisis were driven by an underlying factor that is closely rated to the house 
prices. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, we analyze the impact of the housing 
                                                 
1 See for example Hammoudeh and Sari (2011) for sectoral CDS focusing on the 
financial sectors and examining the linkage of such sectoral CDS with interest rates 
and stock market only. 
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market on the CDS spread in the UK banking sector, along with other factors such as 
money market yield spreads and the stock market index in the UK. 
 
This thesis employs the Johansen’s method in order to establish the key 
determinants of the CDS spread in the long run. We then employ the structural VAR 
model in order to analyze the short-term determinants of the CDS spread. The 
findings suggest that the house price dynamics are a key-driving factor behind the 
recent collapse of corporate CDS market influencing credit risk. The Johansen’s 
method indicates the presence of a negative relationship between house prices and 
the CDS spread. This finding implies that the banking sector, credit market and the 
housing market are strongly related. Thus, financial distress in the housing market is 
highly likely to get transmitted to the credit market and impact related markets. 
Furthermore, we find a negative relationship between the CDS spread and the yield 
spread in the long run, implying that as investors demand higher yield to compensate 
for bearing extra risk, it could reflect lower likelihood of credit default in future.  
These results remained unchanged and consistent even after changing the ordering of 
the variables in the VAR. 
 
The remaining part of the fourth chapter of this dissertation is structured as 
follows. Section 4.2 divided into 2 subsections with section 4.2.1 focusing on the 
various unit root tests conducted on the time series analysis, while in 4.2.1a we 
discuss in detail the results obtained from the unit root test. In section 4.2.2, we 
conduct the cointegration analyses using the Johansen’s method in order to establish 
the long-run relationship between our variables.  In sector 4.3 we focus on the short 
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term effects by applying the structural VAR to analyze the short term impact of 
house prices on the credit default swap premium, and imposing specific shocks. 
Section 4.4concludes the fourth chapter. 
 
4.2 Methods and Results 
4.2.1 Unit Root tests: 
In this section, we discuss the methods used in both the short-run and long-
run analysis on the drivers of the CDS in the UK banking sector as a whole.  Our 
first objective is to establish if a long-run relationship exists between CDS spread, 
house price index, yield spread, TED and stock prices. Each of these variables 
represents different markets, namely the credit, housing, money and stock markets. 
In order to identify a long-run relation, it is essential to first test each of the variables 
for stationarity. Stationarity test is therefore used to assess whether a unit root exists 
in the series under consideration.  
 
There are various tests that exist to identify the presence of a unit root, 
including the benchmark Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. However, it should 
be noted that the sample period we are considering includes a highly sensitive 
period, as it covers both the period before the crisis and the crisis period (2004-
2011). Therefore, it is essential to conduct robust stationarity tests that will account 
for the occurrence of the structural breaks as a result of the crisis.  
 
Testing for the presence of a unit root in series is a crucial condition to 
establish whether there exists a cointergating relationship between our variables. 
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Originally, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test was considered to be the 
benchmark test for stationarity. However, Perron (1989) showed that failing to allow 
for an existing break may lead to wrong inferences and to a bias that may cause 
researchers to reject a false unit root null hypothesis. In order to overcome this issue, 
Perron (1997) offered a solution to allow for a known or exogenous structural break 
in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests.  
 
Following this development, several authors including, Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) and Perron (1997) proposed determining the break point in an endogenous 
manner from the data. As such, in a research conducted by Lumsdaine and Papell 
(1997), the authors extended the Zivot and Andrews (1992) model to allow for the 
occurrence of two structural breaks. However, it should also be noted that these 
endogenous tests were subject to criticism for the way they treated the existence of 
breaks under the null hypothesis. As such, given that in the previously mentioned 
models, the breaks were absent under the null hypothesis of unit root, there may be a 
tendency for these tests to suggest evidence of stationarity with breaks (Lee and 
Strazicich (2003)).  Therefore, in a research conducted by Lee and Strazicich (2003), 
the authors came up with a test that proposed a two break minimum Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) unit root test, where the alternative hypothesis explicitly implied 
that the series was trend stationary. In addition, in a research conducted by Ben-
David et al (2003), the authors showed that not allowing for multiple breaks may 
lead to the non-rejection of the null of unit root by these tests that only allow for one 
break. Zivot and Andrews (1992) model developed a test that allows for one 
structural break, allowing for breaks in level and trend. In a later research by 
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), the authors showed that having only one endogenous 
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break might prove to be insufficient as it could lead to loss of information. In 
addition, Maddala and Kim (2003) found that allowing for the possibility of two 
endogenous breaks gives additional evidence against the unit root hypothesis.  
 
Other researchers that built tests with multiple breaks were Clemente, Montañés and 
Reyes (1998) who based their analysis on Perron and Vogelsang (1992), by allowing 
for two breaks. As such, both the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes and the Perron and 
Vogelsang unit root tests modeled the additive outlier (AO) scheme and the 
innovational outlier (IO) schemes. In addition, Ohara (1999) further extended the 
Zivot and Andrews approach by using sequential t-tests; thus examining the scenario 
of having m breaks along with an unknown break dates. The findings of these 
researches indicate that allowing for multiple trend breaks was crucial for the 
consistency of results. The particularity of these previously mentioned endogenous 
tests that allow for the occurrence of one or several breaks is that under the null 
hypothesis, the assumption states that there is no structural break. Therefore, the 
critical values are derived according to this assumption. 
 
Another important unit root test that has been developed by Lee and 
Strazicich (2003), also referred to as the minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit 
root test, has addressed the issue of identifying the structural breaks in an 
endogenous way. This made a significant contribution to the existing literature on 
unit root test that allows for structural breaks, as it solved the issue of 
misinterpretation of results that could result in spurious regressions. It should be 
noted that the method proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) follows the approach 
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developed by Perron (1989) that allowed for the occurrence of exogenous structural 
breaks, with a subsequent change in both level and trend. The test developed by Lee 
and Strazicich (2003) allowed for two endogenous breaks under the null and 
alternative hypothesis. This solved the issue of incorrectly rejecting the null 
hypothesis of unit root. 
 
Having discussed both the traditional unit root tests and the ones that allow 
for the occurrence of one or more, endogenous or exogenous, structural break, in the 
next section of this thesis, besides using the traditional unit root test (ADF and the 
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock-DF-GLS, KPSS tests), we will also conduct different 
stationarity tests that allow for the presence of one of more structural breaks.  
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the fluctuations of the CDS, House Price Index, Yield 
Spread and the FTSE 100 index over the period of 2004-2011. Simply analyzing the 
figure is not a sufficient way to assess whether our data is stationary or not, i.e. 
whether all of the variables do or do not have a constant mean, a constant variance 
and constant auto-covariances for each given lag. Section 2.4 will look at the 
different stationarity tests, the traditional ones and the ones that allow for one or 
more structural breaks in the data. 
 
4.2.1a Unit Root Tests results 
In this chapter, seven unit root tests have been conducted on the CDS spread, 
house price index, yield curve, TED spread (liquidity index) and the FTSE100. We 
have used both standard unit root tests and additional tests that allow for the 
occurrence of one or more structural breaks. More specifically, these tests are: the 
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Augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF), the GLS, Phillips-Perron Test, Kwiatowski 
Phillips Shmidt Shin (KPSS), Zivot-Andrews, Lumsdaine-Papell, and the Lee-
Strazicich tests. The results from these tests are summarized in table 1.1.    
 
The ADF is a test of the unit root null hypothesis where the test regression 
contains a constant and no deterministic components. The DFGLS and KPSS tests 
are known as Dickey-Fuller test with Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DFGLS detrending, 
and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin tests respectively. It should be 
noted that the DFGLS test involves estimating the standard ADF test equation with 
the GLS de-trended data as opposed to the original series. In this chapter, all the 
stationarity tests contain a constant and no deterministic components. Moreover, we 
have conducted the KPSS test that differs from other unit root tests in the sense that 
the time series is assumed to be trend-stationary under the null. Furthermore, besides 
the traditional unit root tests, three additional stationarity tests have been used that 
allow for the occurrence of one or more structural breaks. These tests are: Zivot-
Andrews (ZA) test that allows for structural break in both intercept and trend, 
Lumsdaine-Papell and Lee-Strazicich tests. It should be noted that the Zivot and 
Andrews unit root test is performed by allowing a break at an unknown point in 
either the intercept, the linear trend or in both. The test is based upon the recursive 
estimation of a test regression. The test statistic is interpreted as the minimum t-
statistic of the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable. 
 
The second column of table 1.1 illustrates the outcome of the unit root test for 
[ln(CDS), ln(House Price Index), Yield Spread, TED and ln(FTSE 100)] using the 
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ADF test. The results indicate that at 1% level, all the variables [ln(CDS), ln(House 
Price Index), Yield Spread, TED and ln(FTSE 100)] contain a unit root and are 
therefore, according to this specific test (ADF test), non-stationary.  
 
The third column of the table 1.1 shows the outcome of the Elliott-Rothenberg-
Stock DF-GLS test – which is considered to be a more powerful test relative to the 
ADF test. The results confirm the existence of a unit root (or non-stationarity) in the 
variables. The fourth and fifth column of table 1.1 illustrates the results obtained 
from the Phillips Perron test, which similar to the previously conducted ADF and the 
DF GLS tests indicate that all of [ln(CDS), ln(House Price Index), Yield Spread, 
TED and ln(FTSE 100)] are non-stationary. Inthe fifth column of table 1.1, the 
Kwiatowski Phillips Shmidt Shin (KPSS) tests indicate that lnCDS spread and the 
yield spread are non-stationary, implying that these two variables contain a unit root, 
while the TED spread, lnFTSE100, and the house price index turn out to be all 
stationary. The mixed evidence in the stationarity results from the traditional unit 
root tests lead us to conduct the stronger and more reliable stationarity tests that 
allow for the occurrence of one structural break. Therefore, we employ the Zivot and 
Andrews test, the Lumsdaine and Papell, and the Lee-Strazicich test that allows for 
the occurrence of two structural breaks.  
 
It should be noted that the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test reflects only one 
structural break in each variable. However, there is always a possibility that the 
series were subject to multiple structural breaks. This follows the recent events that 
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occurred in the global financial system. In fact, the severe financial crisis strongly 
affected not only the credit risk in the banking sector but also the housing market, by 
causing structural breaks in the data. At first, there was the housing bubble which 
later translated into global financial crisis. This means that considering only one 
endogenous break can turn out to be insufficient and it could therefore lead to a loss 
of information especially when there is more than one break.  
 
In Ben-David et al (2003), the authors found that “just as failure to allow one 
break can cause non-rejection of the null of unit root by the Augmented Dickey –
Fuller test, failure to allow for two breaks, if they exist, can cause non-rejection of 
the unit root null by the tests which only incorporate one break”. Thus, Lumsdaine 
and Papell (1997) introduced a test to capture two structural breaks. As such, the 
authors found that unit root test that take into consideration two structural breaks (if 
significant) tend to be more powerful than the tests that allow for only one structural 
break. Moreover, we also consider the minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root 
test proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) which does not only determine 
endogenously the structural breaks but also avoids issues of bias and spurious 
rejections. In fact, Lee and Strazicich (2003) procedure is considered to be very 
reliable and powerful as it allows for two endogenous breaks both under the null and 
the alternative hypothesis. The results of the Zivot and Andrews, the Lumsdaine and 
Papell and the Lee-Strazicich tests are summarized in the last three columns of table 
1.1. 
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The outcome from the Zivot and Andrews test is summarized in column 6 of 
table 1.1. As such, once we allow for a break in the variables, ln(CDS), ln(House 
price Index), and the Yield Spread turn out to be stationary. Both ln(CDS) and the 
Yield Spread are significant at 1% level. It is therefore possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root.  The structural break in ln(CDS) occured in 
August 2008, while the break point for the yield spread was in October 2008. This 
coincides which the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the deterioration of the 
conditions of the banking sector. Similarly, ln(House Price Index) is significant at a 
5% level. Therefore it is possible to reject the null hypotheses and consider ln(House 
Price Index) as stationary. The structural break point in the housing market was in 
March 2008. This corresponds to the period when the CDS spread peaked at 220 
basis points, as compared to its pre-crisis value of July 2007, when it averaged 9 
basis points. It should be noted that this contradicts the results from ADF, DF GLS, 
Phillips Perron and KPSS tests which stated that all of the variables in the model 
were non-stationary. The two variables that still contain a unit root, even after 
allowing for a structural break, are ln(FTSE 100) and TED. However, once the 
Zivot-Andrews unit root for ln(FTSE 100) and the TED spread is conducted in first 
differences, both variables became stationary, being significant at 1% level, as 
shown in table 1.2.  
 
Table 1.2 shows the results of the unit root tests once all the variables are 
taken in first differences. According to both the ADF and DF GLS tests, expressed in 
columns 2 and 3 of table 1.2, after considering ln(CDS), Yield Spread, TED and 
ln(FTSE 100) in first differences, the results indicate that the series become 
stationary (significant at 1% level). Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
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root and conclude that the data is stationary. The only variable that remains non-
stationary is ln(House Price Index). This is very likely to be a result of the structural 
shift that occurred during the recent financial crisis. In addition, when the more 
powerful stationarity tests were undertaken, both Phillips Perron and the KPSS tests 
showed that the ln(House price index) along with the ln(CDS), Yield Spread, TED 
and ln(FTSE 100) were all stationary at 1% level. 
 
As previously mentioned, the non-stationarity of the ln(House price index) 
(according to the ADF and DF GLS tests) even after taking the variable in first 
difference, relates to the data sample we are analyzing which includes a period of 
severe financial crisis (2007-2009). In fact, the non-stationarity of this variable is 
driven by the structural break(s) that occurred during the financial crisis. Therefore, 
it is of a paramount importance to consider the outcome of the unit root tests that 
allow for structural breaks, namely:  Zivot-Andrews, Lumsdaine-Papell and Lee-
Strazicich tests.Allowing for a single structural break in the level and trend of each 
series, we follow the procedure of Zivot and Andrews (1992), in order to estimate 
one endogenous break under the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. Most series 
turn out to be stationary when applying the ZA test with break at least at 10% level 
of significance for the sample period. We also consider Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
who extended the Zivot and Andrews (1992) model to accommodate two 
endogenous breaks under the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. However, these 
endogenous tests did not consider breaks under the null hypothesis of unit root and 
hence there may be a tendency for these tests to suggest evidence of stationarity with 
breaks (Lee and Strazicich, 2003). We therefore consider the Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) unit root test developed by Lee-Strazicich, with two endogenous breaks under 
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the null and the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The results of Lee-Strazicich 
test with two endogenously determined structural breaks indicate the rejection of the 
null of unit root of all variables.  
 
Given that there is evidence that at least two variables in our model are non-
stationary depending on the tests considered, this gives rise to the possibility of 
existence of a cointegrating relationship between our variables. Therefore, in the 
next section, we conduct the Johansen cointegration test. 
 
4.2.2 Cointegration Tests 
In this section we are using the Johansen’s cointegration test (Johansen, 
1991) in order to identify the existence of any cointegrating relationship. The 
Johansen method approach is used to investigate which of our variables has better 
predictive power to explain the behavior of the CDS spread. This method helps to 
uncover whether a long run relationship exists between the variables, whereas in 
order to analyze the short run effects, we conduct the structural VAR analysis.  
 
Before conducting this test, we first need to establish the optimal number of 
lags to be used in our model. For this purpose, we use the VAR Lag Order Selection 
Criteria. The results are presented in table 1.3. 
 
From table 1.3, the Sequential Modified LR test Statistic, Final prediction 
error, Akaike and Hannan-Quinn information criteria all indicate that the optimal lag 
length for our VAR model is 3 lags.  We estimate a VAR model with 3 lags as found 
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to be optimal by the VAR Lag Selection Criteria (as shown in table 1.3). The 
Johansen test provides evidence that there exists one cointegrating relation using a 
linear model (with intercept and trend).  In table 1.4, the trace test statistics indicates 
the existence of one cointegrating equation at 5% significance level. Given that the 
null r=0 is rejected at a 5% significance level, implies that there is one meaningful 
long-run relation between ln(CDS), ln(House Price Index), Yield Spread, TED 
Spread and ln(FTSE 100 index). 
The normalized cointegrating equation can be written as follows: 
 
 
                                                                         T 
 Eq  (3)      
                                          [2.8437]          [ 4.1418]         [ 1.7687]                 [ 2.5709]            [5.5326] 
 
 
 
Where CDS: the Credit Default Swap Spread, HP: House Price Index, YS: Yield 
Spread TED: spread, FTSE: FTSE-100 Index, T: Time trend. It should be noted that 
the CDS spread, the house price index, and the FTSE-100 index are all taken in 
natural logarithms.   
 
In Equation (3), figures in brackets represent the t-values. All the key variables 
[ln(House Price Index), Yield Spread, ln(FTSE100), TED and the Time Trend] 
included in the normalized cointegrating relation are statistically significant and the 
signs of the coefficients turned out to be as expected a priori.  The long-run 
relationship equation can be explained as follows. First, an increase (decrease) in the 
house price index by 1 percent is associated with a decrease (increase) in the CDS 
spread by about up to       percent in the sample period.  Furthermore, an increase 
(decrease) in the yield spread by 1 percent is associated with a 2.56 per cent decrease 
(increase) in the CDS spread. Moreover, an increase (decrease) in the TED spread by 
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1 percent is associated with a 2.61 per cent decrease (increase) in the CDS spread.  
Also, we note that an increase (decrease) in the ln(FTSE100) by 1 percent is 
associated with a      per cent decrease (increase) in the CDS spread. Finally, a 
significant time trend suggests an increase in the CDS spread over the sample period.  
 
From equation (3), it can be clearly observed that there is a negative 
relationship between the CDS spread and the house price index as expected. CDS 
contracts work as insurance contracts. The CDS spread is the price that the 
protection buyer pays to the protection seller in order to benefit from a guarantee that 
in case of a default, the holder of the CDS will be covered against a default. Thus, as 
risk increases, the premium on the CDS contract also rises in order to reflect the 
higher risk. Banks and other financial institutions that were issuing CDS contracts 
backed on mortgages priced their CDS contracts based on house prices. In fact, when 
house prices were high, even if a lender defaulted on his/her payment, it was 
relatively easy for the bank to recover the initial cost of the property given the 
continuous upward trend in house prices. Thus, the CDS spread was narrow 
reflecting a low default risk. However by the end of 2006, with the beginning of the 
housing bubble when house prices started to collapse, the number of defaults 
suddenly went up. This was reflected in a much larger CDS spreads. In equation (3), 
the long run equation confirms this negative relationship between the CDS spread 
and the house price index.     
 
An additional observation from Equation (3) is the negative relationship 
between the yield spread and the CDS spread. As it was previously mentioned in the 
literature review, the steepness of the yield curve indicates future economic activity. 
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Thus, the steeper the yield curve, the higher is the expected future interest rate. In 
fact, in times of a recession or when firms start defaulting, interest rates tend to be 
very low, while the CDS spread tends to increase given the higher credit risk. The 
higher credit risk directly impacts the CDS spread as it is now more expensive for 
investors to benefit from a protection against default. This is reflected in a rising 
CDS spread. Therefore, there should be a negative relationship between the yield 
curve and the CDS spread. This negative relationship between the slope of the term 
structure, yield spread and the swap spreads was empirically supported by Fehle 
(2003), In et al. (2003), Fama (1984) and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991).  
 
Another line of thinking that supports this negative relationship between 
swap spreads and the slope of the risk free term structure was found by Friedman 
and Kuttner (1992). The authors explain that the slope of the risk-free term structure 
was found to be pro-cyclical while the credit spreads could be counter-cyclical. For 
this reason there should be a negative relationship between swap spreads and the 
slope of the risk-free term structure. Also Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) find that as 
interest rates increase, there could be lower probability of default, and thus a 
narrowing of the credit spread. In addition, we observe that in the long-run, liquidity 
spread (TED spread) should be negatively related to CDS spread; implying that as 
liquidity increases, banks have a better ability to sustain a negative credit event. 
Therefore, the level of CDS spread and credit risk should decrease. Moreover, 
equation (3) indicates that in the long-run, the FTSE100 is also negatively related to 
the CDS spread. This means that as the performance of the stock index improves, the 
level of credit risk should decrease, while the CDS spread should be narrower. The 
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transmission channel leading to the credit crisis is summarized in figure 1.1 of this 
chapter. 
Having derived the long-run relationship between the UK bank CDS spread 
and the UK House Price Index, Yield Spread, TED and the FTSE-100 Index, in the 
next section we will analyse the short-run relationship between our variables using 
the structural VAR analysis. Regardless of the order of integration, Sims et al. 
(1990) showed that the OLS estimates of a VAR model in levels are still consistent. 
Given the mixed results across tests with regard to the stationary properties of the 
variables, we estimate different recursive VAR models. The optimal lag selection is 
found to be 3 for the VAR model (see Table 1). 
 
4.3 Structural VAR Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the structural VAR model (SVAR) that was 
employed to analyze the short run effects of changes in house prices.  
 
Having tested the variables for stationarity, it is possible to formulate a 
structural VAR with the stationary variables so as to analyse the dynamic relations 
between the variables. It is first important to establish the optimal number of lags to 
be used in our model. For this purpose, we use the VAR Lag Order Selection 
Criteria. The results are presented in table 1.3. 
 
From table 1.3 it is clear that the Sequential Modified LR test Statistic, Final 
prediction error, Akaike information criterion as well as the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion all indicate that the optimal lag length for a VAR model is 3 
lags. Hence we estimate a VAR model with 3 lags. We now proceed to analyze the 
significance of these CDS determinants in the short run. For this purpose, a structural 
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VAR method is implemented by exploring the degree of interdependence between 
the CDS spread and the house price index, yield spread, TED Spread (liquidity), and 
the FTSE 100 index.  
 
The short run analysis is achieved by undertaking impulse response based 
shock analysis via a vector auto-regression (VAR). The main purpose of structural 
VAR (SVAR) estimation is to obtain orthogonalisation of the error terms for the 
impulse response analysis. The restricted structural VAR model defines the 
relationship between the VAR residuals, that is, the unexpected shocks, and the 
structural shocks, which are exogenous and uncorrelated with each other. This can be 
defined as follows: 
 
, with:  
 
Where: is the vector of structural shocks, while A and B are the matrices that 
define the linear relationship between the structural shocks and the VAR residuals
.The following recursive structure is imposed to identify the different shocks: 
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etd is from the TED equation, eyd is the residual from the yield spread equation, eft 
from the FTSE equation, ehp from the house price equation, and ecd from the CDS 
spread equation.  This is the assumed ordering of the variables in this model with a 
recursive sequencing of the contemporaneous restrictions. This recursive structure 
t tAe Bu IuuE tt ]'[
tu
te
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means that the first variable in the ordering is not affected by shocks to the other 
variables, but shocks to the first variable affect the other ones; the second variable 
affects the third and fourth ones, but it is not affected contemporaneously by them, 
and so on. 
 
The SVAR was formulated with the following ordering of the endogenous 
variables: TED spread, Yield Spread, ln (FTSE 100), ln (House Price Index), and 
ln(CDS spread). The reason behind this specific ordering stems from the theoretical 
ordering of the variables that should run from the more exogenous to the less 
exogenous variable. In fact, both the liquidity spread and the yield spread are likely 
to be determined by the monetary policy and the state of the economy prevailing 
during the specific period. However, the FTSE 100 index and house price index are 
less exogenous than the TED spread and the yield spread which are consequently 
placed later in the ordering. The CDS spread is assumed to be affected by all of the 
previously included variables and is therefore placed last in the ordering.  
 
This SVAR model with the above recursive identification strategy enables us 
to perform an analysis of unexpected shocks, interpreting the shocks in economic 
terms which will not be possible in a simple VAR model. Our SVAR model includ es 
5 variables. We only impose short-run restrictions as our objective is to identify the 
five shocks discussed earlier.  
 
Figures 1.3-1.7 shows the responses from the structural VAR model with the 
change in ordering in Fig.1.8. From figure 1.7 it is clear that the response of CDS 
spread to a one standard deviation positive shock in House price index is positive 
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and significant, making the house price channel as a key factor in explaining CDS 
premiums. Also following a positive shock to credit risk, house price tends to 
decline. The house price variation also appears to be driven by the yield spread and 
the liquidity premium (TED spread) as shown in Figure 1.6. Overall, our results 
indicate that there is negative relationship between CDS spread and house prices, 
with credit risk driving house prices in the short run.  
 
We examine the effect of a house price shock whether it drives short-run 
credit risk in the UK. We observe a higher level of credit risk in the medium term 
following a positive house price shock, as people have easy access to the mortgage 
market through low interest rates and low cost of borrowing, raising house prices and 
higher credit risk as in Figure 1.6. However if a shock originates in the loan market 
as reflected in a shock to the CDS, such a shock gives rise to lower house prices as in 
Figure 1.7 as the level of borrowing is decreased due to higher credit risk. We also 
checked for robustness by changing the ordering of variables with CDS being the 
first in the ordering as opposed to being the last in the variable ordering. However 
the results remained robust (see Figure 1.8). Moreover the generalized impulse 
responses tend to be insensitive to variable ordering. Therefore the results we have 
show that positive house price shocks drive credit risk in the medium run remained 
robust, and shocks to credit risk contribute to lowering house prices as it happened in 
the aftermath of the recent credit crisis. 
 
A positive shock to FTSE index on the other hand lowers bank CDS, long-
term yield and TED spreads (Fig.1.5), while a shock to the yield spread has a 
significant positive impact on CDS spread (Fig.1.4). The negative relationship 
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between the CDS spread and the FTSE 100 index suggests that as FTSE fell during 
the crisis, much of its market capitalization made up of bank stocks would be 
indicative of stress in the banking sector thereby raising the bank CDS. While, also 
in the short-run, a shock to TED spread increases bank CDS (Fig.1.3), a one standard 
deviation shock in house price index also increases bank CDS, making the house 
price channel as a key factor in explaining CDS premiums (see Fig.1.6). The result 
that CDS spread responds positively to a shock in the housing market which remains 
robust even if we alter the ordering of variables (see Fig. 1.8, last column, first row).  
 
In addition, a positive shock to the CDS spread lowers house prices, because 
when the overall risk perception in the CDS market increases, financial institutions 
and banks tend to lend less to borrowers, thereby reducing demand for housing and 
consequently house prices decline, equity index goes downwards, long-term bond 
yield increases and TED spread increases. The literature on the relationship between 
the TED spread and the CDS spread is mixed. This is quite apparent from Fig.1.7 
that TED spread initially increases following a shock to the CDS spread and in the 
medium term, TED spread narrows as short rate declines. The liquidity factors tend 
to get embedded in the CDS spread, showing a direct relationship between the two at 
the aggregate level, whereas the story can be different at individual bank level. 
 
We explore this issue further by means of variance decomposition analysis as 
shown in table 1.5 that shows that the house price shock explains nearly 20% of the 
long-run forecast-error variance of the credit default swap premium. By contrast, the 
other shocks each explain under 10% of this forecast-error variance. Table 1.5 also 
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reveals that the own innovations of CDS spread explain about 60% of the variation 
in credit risk. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Credit Default Swap premiums are amongst the most transparent and reliable 
indicators of credit risk. With the commencement of the financial crisis, serious 
concerns were raised with regard to the underlying trading incentives and the impact 
of such instruments on financial stability, especially following the collapse of 
American International Group. With the drastic house price decrease, many 
borrowers started heavily defaulting, which has increased the CDS premium. The 
fourth chapter of this dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on credit 
default swaps and credit risk by one of the first multivariate analyses of the factors 
affecting the CDS spread and the overall credit risk. This is the first research to our 
knowledge that conducts Structural VAR analysis to link the housing market to the 
credit market in the light of the recent financial crisis. 
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis analyses the factors that determine CDS 
spreads in the UK banking sector. In particular we analyze the impact of the house 
price index, the liquidity premium (TED), the yield spread and the FTSE 100 index. 
As such, the Johansen’s Co-integration was used as the long-run method, while the 
structural VAR was used for the short-run analysis.   
 
We find evidence that house price dynamics are a key-driving factor behind 
the recent collapse of the corporate CDS market that captures the credit risk of the 
banking sector. Specifically, there exists a negative relationship between the CDS 
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spread and the house price index in the UK after controlling for other determinants 
of credit risk.  In addition, a negative relationship exists between the CDS spread and 
the yield spread that reflects investors’ risk aversion following the financial crisis. 
Also, the TED spread and the CDS spread appear to be positively related in the long-
run, while the FTSE100 is also negatively related to the CDS spread. This negative 
relationship between the stock index and the CDS spread was reflected in the wake 
of the recent crisis, when FTSE 100 crashed, much of its market capitalization led to 
a dramatic increase the bank CDS 
 
In the Structural VAR I impose short-run restrictions to identify the five 
shocks arising from the CDS spread, namely: the house price index, the yield spread, 
the TED spread, and the FTSE100.  Each of these variables are of particular interest 
given that they represent the housing market, the stock market as well as the money 
market. The Structural VAR analysis allows us to capture the empirical 
interrelationships among these variables. The SVAR findings indicate that a positive 
shock to house prices significantly increases the CDS spread in the medium-term, in 
the UK banking sector. In addition, apart from its own shock, the house price shock 
explains a big part of the variance (nearly 20%) in CDS spread. These results 
remained robust even after changing the ordering of the variables in the Structural 
VAR. 
 
The findings from chapter 4 of this thesis indicate that the strongest variable 
that is able to explain the CDS spread is the house price index, which is influenced 
by yield spread and TED spread. In addition, we find that positive shock to the CDS 
spread reduces house prices. The rationale for this may be that an increase in the 
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CDS premium causes financial institutions and banks lend less, reducing the demand 
for housing and consequently putting downward pressure on house prices. None o f 
the other variables in the model have a direct impact on CDS, but they indirectly 
influence the CDS premium via their impact on house prices. By undertaking a 
variance decomposition analysis, we show that the house price shock explains nearly 
20% of the long-run forecast-error variance of the CDS premium while shocks in the 
other variables each explain under 10% of this forecast-error variance. 
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Table 1.1: Testing for Unit Roots (variables in levels) 
 
 
Notes for table 1.1: ADF is a test of the unit root null hypothesis where the test regression contains a constant and no dete rministic components. DFGLS and 
KPSS tests are known as Dickey-Fuller test with GLS detrending, and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test respectively. The DFGLS test 
involves estimating the standard ADF test equation with the GLS de-trended data as opposed to the origina l series. The DFGLS contains a constant and no 
deterministic components. The KPSS test differs from other unit root tests in the sense that the time series is assumed to be trend-stationary under the null.  
The KPSS contains a constant and no deterministic components. Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test allows for structural break in both intercept and trend.  
 ** indicate t-values being significant at 1% level, * indicate t-values being significant at 5% level implying no unit root in the series. The asymptotic 1 per 
cent critical values for the ADF test is: -3.51. The critical value at 1 percent level for the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS:  -2.60. The asymptotic 1 per cent 
critical values for the Phillips Perron test is: -3.51. The asymptotic 1 per cent critical values for the KPSS test is: 0.7390. Under KPSS test, the null is 
stationary. The Critical Values at 1% level for the Zivot and Andrews test are:  -5.57 and at 5% level: -5.08, the numbers in brackets are the estimated 
structural breaks based on the ZA test. Lumsdaine-Papell Unit Root Test critical values are -7.1900 (1% sig level), -6.6200 (5% sig level) and -6.3700 (10% 
sig level). Critical values of the endogenous two-break LM unit-root test at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance are -3.504, -3.842 and -4.545 respectively 
from Table 2 Lee and Strazicich (2003: 1084). 
  
ADF 
 
DFGLS 
Phillips 
Perron Test  
Kwiatowski 
Phillips Shmidt 
Shin (KPSS)  
 
Zivot-Andrews 
Lumsdaine-Papell Lee-Strazicich 
ln(CDS) - 0.5865 -0.3986 -0.7419 0.9086**  -7.5062** 
[August 2008] 
-6.2853 
[2007:04 2008:04] 
-5.6303** 
[2007:02 2007:12] 
ln(House Price Index) -2.2372 -0.9099 -2.5931 0.3303  -5.0826* 
[March 2008] 
-5.7720 
[2007:11 2009:01] 
-4.8715** 
[2006:10 2008:10] 
Yield Spread -0.8702 -0.8867 -0.6464 0.7456**  -5.6978** 
[October 2008] 
-5.0559 
[2008:04 2009:04] 
-5.6644** 
[2008:01 2009:01] 
TED 
 
-2.1354 -2.0111 
 
-2.1413 
 
0.3437 -3.7427 
[February 2008] 
-4.1139  
[2007:03 2008:11] 
-5.9759** 
[2007:06 2009:03] 
ln(FTSE 100) -1.9347 -1.2743 -1.7848 0.1908 -3.2745 
[September 2009] 
-5.1457 
[2007:11 2009:03] 
-5.2724** 
[2007:10 2008:09] 
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Table 1.2: Testing for Unit Roots (variables in first differences) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes for table 1.2: ADF is a test of the unit root null hypothesis where the test regression contains a constant and no deterministic components. DFGLS and 
KPSS tests are known as Dickey-Fuller test with GLS detrending, and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test respectively. The DFGLS test 
involves estimating the standard ADF test equation with the GLS de-trended data as opposed to the origina l series. The DFGLS contains a constant and no 
deterministic components. The KPSS test differs from other unit root tests in the sense that the time series is assumed to be trend-stationary under the null.  
The KPSS contains a constant and no deterministic components. Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test allows for structural break in both intercept and trend. 
 ** indicate t-values being significant at 1% level, * indicate t-values being significant at 5% level implying no unit root in the series. The asymptotic 1 per 
cent critical values for the ADF test is: -3.51. The critical value at 1 percent level for the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS, with a constant is:  - 2.59. The 
asymptotic 1 per cent critical values for the Phillips Perron test is: -3.51. The asymptotic 1 per cent critical values for the KPSS test is: 0.7390. Under KPSS 
test, the null is stationary. The Critical Values at 1% level for the Zivot and Andrews test are:  -5.57 and at 5% level: -5.08, the numbers in brackets are the 
estimated structural breaks based on the ZA test. 
 
 
  
ADF 
 
DFGLS 
Phillips Perron  
 
Test 
Kwiatowski 
Phillips 
Shmidt Shin 
(KPSS) 
 
Zivot-Andrews 
∆ln(CDS) -7.2753** -6.1590** -7.2984** 0.1263 - 
∆ln(House Price Index) -2.7105 -1.1345 -5.0465** 0.2900 - 
∆Yield Spread -5.3400** 
 
-4.3868** 
 
-5.3319** 0.2173 - 
∆TED 
 
-9.3110** -9.3651** 
 
-9.4266** 0.0957 -7.5604** 
[January 2009] 
∆ln(FTSE 100) -8.7291** -8.1586** -9.535794** 0.1146 -5.9963** 
[April 2009] 
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Table 1.3: VAR Lag Order Selection 
Lag LR FPE AIC HQ 
0 NA   4.21e-05  4.21e-05  1.324539 
1  819.1956  6.26e-10  6.26e-10 -9.596274 
2  48.53018  4.64e-10  4.64e-10 -9.703453 
3   39.48386*   3.81e-10*   3.81e-10*  -9.713028* 
4  19.63113  4.23e-10  4.23e-10 -9.428607 
5  19.30998  4.67e-10  4.67e-10 -9.162545 
6  14.97610  5.54e-10  5.54e-10 -8.839041 
7  15.83245  6.40e-10  6.40e-10 -8.558750 
8  16.84717  7.17e-10  7.17e-10 -8.333392 
9  19.20207  7.48e-10  7.48e-10 -8.208600 
10  19.42243  7.61e-10  7.61e-10 -8.146374 
Notes for table 1.3:  * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. LR: sequential modified 
LR test statistic (each test at 5% level), FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: Akaike 
information criterion,  HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. The optimal lag length is 
found to be 3 months across different lag selection criteria 
 
Table 1.4: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. Of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue  Trace 
Statistic 
 0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.343598  71.73126  63.87610  0.0094 
At most 1  0.197909  37.21076  42.91525  0.1655 
At most 2  0.141312  19.12702  25.87211  0.2733 
At most 3  0.077721  6.634399  12.51798  0.3842 
Notes for table 1.4: Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 
level, *denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level,  **MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. The test confirms existence of one long-run relation. 
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Table 1.5: Variance decomposition of model variables 
Period S.E. TED YIELDCURVE LFTSE HOUSEPRICE CDS 
  Variance Decomposition of TED:       
1 0.17 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 0.28 75.20 10.39 0.04 0.33 14.03 
12 0.33 58.47 16.95 0.34 0.44 23.81 
24 0.37 56.43 15.92 0.41 4.22 23.02 
36 0.38 51.97 16.64 0.45 4.69 26.25 
         
   Variance Decomposition of YIELDCURVE30:   
1 0.24 10.80 89.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 0.71 51.27 41.86 3.79 0.04 3.04 
12 1.05 53.80 20.82 4.19 0.10 21.09 
24 1.45 33.53 11.59 3.18 1.28 50.42 
36 1.61 27.76 10.65 3.54 7.39 50.66 
         
   Variance Decomposition of LFTSE:     
1 0.05 23.14 0.63 76.24 0.00 0.00 
6 0.08 25.58 7.16 47.03 10.48 9.75 
12 0.11 16.27 14.55 28.88 14.22 26.08 
24 0.12 15.05 16.07 22.04 11.98 34.87 
36 0.12 15.00 16.16 21.55 12.93 34.36 
         
   Variance Decomposition of LOGHOUSEPRICE:   
1 0.01 1.44 0.40 0.13 98.02 0.00 
6 0.02 10.72 4.95 0.23 76.41 7.70 
12 0.03 7.13 13.17 0.50 53.76 25.44 
24 0.04 5.94 17.01 0.66 35.62 40.77 
36 0.05 6.45 16.59 0.69 35.02 41.26 
         
   Variance Decomposition of LOGCDS:     
1 0.23 14.08 1.31 15.26 0.38 68.97 
6 0.53 9.20 1.55 7.02 0.71 81.51 
12 0.69 6.31 1.12 5.17 3.49 83.91 
24 0.84 5.30 3.11 5.36 13.76 72.47 
36 0.93 7.09 6.46 6.02 19.19 61.25 
 
Notes for table 1.5: Cholesky Ordering: TED YIELDCURVE LFTSE LOGHOUSEPRICE 
LOGCDS; The variables in each column denotes shocks or innovations in that variable. 
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Figure 1.1: The Transmission Channel Leading to the Credit Crisis 
 
Notes for figure 1.1: This figure demonstrates how the housing bubble that 
originated in the US evolved into subprime mortgage crisis, which later turned into 
the global financial crisis affecting the world economy. It can be observed that the 
subprime mortgage crisis suggests a spillover effect, creating volatility in other 
markets, thus affecting the CDS spread.   
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Figure 1.2: Graphical illustration of the CDS spread, House Price Index, Yield 
Spread and the FTSE 100 index series 
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to a shock in TED spread 
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Notes: This figure indicates the outcome of the impulse responses to a shock in TED spread. The SVAR model is  
formulated as follows: TED spread, Yield Spread, LOG (House Price Index) ,  LOG (FTSE 100) and LOG (CDS 
spread) .   
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Figure 1.4 Impulse responses to a shock in Yield spread 
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Figure 1.5 Impulse responses to a shock in Share Price 
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Figure 1.6 Impulse responses to a shock in House Price 
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Figure 1.7 Impulse responses to a shock in CDS spread 
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Notes for figure 1.3 
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Figure 1.8 Generalised impulse responses with change in ordering for 
robustness 
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Notes: The ordering is reversed here as follows: log(cds) ted yieldcurve30 log(ftse) log(houseprice). The graphs 
that are plotted vertically demonstrate the response of the variables to each shock in the same sequence as the 
above ordering.  
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Footnotes: 
 
(1) The growth of the CDS market over the period was phenomenal in 2001 the 
outstanding notional amount of $631.5 billion. In the last quarter of 2007, the 
total notional outstanding amount of CDS contracts had reached $62.2 
trillion. At the end of 2008, due to the severe financial crisis, this figure more 
than halved, reaching $38.6 trillion and continued to decrease further so that 
at the end of the third quarter of 2009, the notional amount of outstanding 
CDS contracts averaged $28 trillion (figures supplied by ISDA 2010). 
 
(2) CDS data on the UK banking sector was obtained from Credit Market 
Analysis (CMA) Group. The CDS banking sector data were first launched by 
the CMA group in 2004.  We used the CDS premium mid-rate expressed in 
basis points. The index covers the banking sector in the UK and is 
denominated in Pounds. We use log of CDS prices in our analysis. The data 
include indices with a five-year maturity because they are the most liquid 
type of CDS. 
 
(3) In fact, the period between July 2007 and March 2009 was marked by the 
bankruptcy of large investment banks, including AIG, Lehman Brothers, and 
Bear Sterns among other major banks that threatened the stability of the 
overall financial system. 
 
(4) The test is based upon the recursive estimation of a test regression. The test 
statistic is interpreted as the minimum t-statistic of the coefficient of the 
lagged endogenous variable. 
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Chapter 5 
Impact of bank size on CDS spreads: 
International evidence before and during the financial crisis 
 
 
Abstract 
The fifth chapter of this thesis identifies the drivers of the CDS spread as a measure 
of credit risk by considering bank level factors (regulatory capital, leverage, 
liquidity, asset quality and operations Income ratio) and the housing market, in both 
developed and emerging countries. In addition, it investigates whether bank size 
matters in driving credit risk. Our unique dataset allows us to uncover the behavior 
of the CDS spread and the fluctuations in credit risk both before and during the 
financial crisis, over the period of 2004-2011. Our sample consists of 30 countries 
and 115 banks. The findings reveal that the strongest bank-level factors driving the 
CDS spread were found to be asset quality, liquidity and operations Income ratio. In 
fact, the more liquid banks, with better quality of assets, were found to face narrower 
CDS spread and reduced levels of credit risk. Furthermore, banks with higher levels 
of liquidity were better able to avoid bank-runs and sustain themselves in times of 
credit shortages. In addition, we find that banks with higher levels of operations 
Income ratio were found to be more resilient to default risk and therefore faced 
lower levels of CDS spread. When considering the impact of bank size on the CDS 
spread, our findings suggest that bigger banks were subject to higher CDS spreads 
and increased credit risk, while smaller banks experienced relatively lower CDS 
spreads and were considered to be safer, allowing us to derive an optimal level of 
bank size. Any financial institution growing beyond that threshold becomes subject 
to higher credit risk. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis was considered to be the worst crisis since the 
great depression of 1929. The high reliance on financial engineering and 
securitization activities boosted mortgage issuance and allowed a dramatic credit 
expansion for more than a decade. However, since summer 2007, the credit boom era 
was officially over. In fact, the housing market collapsed, financial markets froze, 
and banks and investors started heavily defaulting.  
 
Before the financial crisis, there has been a predominant perception that big 
banks would always benefit from government protection and intervention, should 
they face any solvency issues. This gave rise to banks growing beyond their optimal 
size, exceeding the allowed leverage intakes and excessively increasing their landing 
activities to low-income (sub-prime) consumers. Most of the large financial 
institutions believed that by exceeding their optimal size, they would be categorized 
as too-big-to-fall and too-important-to-fall and would therefore never have to worry 
about their solvency. As the financial crisis unveiled, not all systemically important 
banks benefited from a government bailout. In fact, Lehman Brothers, which 
collapsed on 15 September 2008, is one of the brightest examples of a systemically 
important bank that was let go by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury.  The bank 
filed for the Chapter 11 of Bankruptcy, with an outstanding debt of $613 billion. Its 
failure engendered a huge crisis globally, which many referred to as the “perfect 
storm”.  
 
Prior to Lehman Brothers collapse, on 16 March 2008, the financial system 
witnessed the fall of Bear Sterns that was actively involved in the mortgage and asset 
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backed securitizations that led to its downfall. In this instance, the Fed offered an 
emergency assistance that did not prove to be sufficient. Bear Sterns was later taken 
over by JP Morgan Chase in a fire sale.  Similarly, Merrill Lynch, which was also on 
the verge of collapse, did not benefit from any financial support from the 
government and had to be acquired by Bank of America. Other financial institutions 
including AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were more fortunate as they received 
the largest bailout packages in the history; amounting to $182.3 billion and $200 
billion respectively. The reason for government intervention for these institutions 
was the impact they had on the public sector and consumers, which was deemed to 
be far more important than that of large investment banks. 
 
A stream of literature that developed in the last decade investigated the 
impact of bank size on credit risk, credit ratings, government bailout and bank 
failures. Gómez-González and Kiefer (2009) looked at bank size and bank failures 
and found that small financial institutions were more prone to failure when compared 
to bigger financial institutions that have a better advantage of risk diversification. 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) similarly show that big banks can lend more and 
increase their debt exposure, keeping at the same time a low level of credit risk. 
Furthermore, Sousa (2000) establishes that banks that are considered to be too-big-
to-fail have a competitive advantage when compared to smaller banks, as they find a 
difference of ratings of three credit notches. In the same vein, Rime (2005) also 
looked at bank size, credit ratings and the too-big-to-fail phenomenon and find that 
bank size, proxied by total assets and market share, exhibits a positive and strong 
impact on issuer ratings. 
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Limited literature considered the recent financial crisis that led to the collapse 
of many systemically important banks, which despite their big size,  were left to go 
bankrupt. These cases raise important questions of whether big banks are truly safer 
and face lower credit risk and narrower CDS spreads when compared to smaller 
banks as it was claimed in most of the past literature. More recent research 
conducted by Völz and Wedow (2011) show evidence that CDS price is subject to 
distortion due to bank size effect, especially for banks that are considered to be too-
big-to-fail. In addition, the authors show that certain banks have surpassed their 
optimal size to benefit from government support in case there is a negative event and 
therefore face higher credit risk. Furthermore, there is evidence that big banks were 
taking over smaller financial institutions to further expand in size (Penas and Unal 
(2004) and Kane (2000)). Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) looked at 
CDS and equity prices to investigate whether there were banks that were constrained 
by their big size and conclude that many banks have become too-big-to-be-saved.  
 
Past literature also identifies the importance of the housing market, interest 
rates, yield spread and inflation as significant drivers of credit risk (Alexander & 
Kaeck (2008); Bevan & Garzarelli (2000); Duffie & Singleton (1999); In, Brown & 
Fang (2003); Lekkos & Milas (2001) and Naifar (2010)). In addition, more recent 
literature looked at the bank- level factors driving the CDS spread and finds that 
leverage, regulatory capital, liquidity, asset quality as well as credit ratings have a 
strong explanatory power to affect credit risk (Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), 
Fabozzi et al. (2007); Hull et al. (2004), Collin Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and 
Taksler (2003) and Benkert (2004)). 
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The fifth chapter of this dissertation addresses two key issues related to the 
CDS spread as a measure of credit risk. First, it considers the housing market and the 
bank level factors driving the CDS spread, both before and during the financial 
crisis, over the period of 2004-2011. The second contribution of this chapter is that it 
analyses whether bigger banks are subject to higher or lower credit risk when 
compared to smaller banks and financial institutions. This brings important 
implications for future policies as developed countries are battling the previous lax 
regulatory regime. As such, identifying the type of banks that are more prone to 
default will help authorities to prevent the negative consequences that may arise 
during economic downturns. This can be achieved by establishing and designing 
specific set of rules and standards to be followed by riskier banks and financial 
institutions.  
 
The findings of this chapter indicate that in the pre-crisis period, the housing 
market and all the bank- level factors were significant drivers of the CDS spread. 
More specifically, the results indicate the presence of a negative relationship 
between house prices and the CDS spread, implying that when the housing market is 
strong, it is easier for banks to recover the initial mortgage value in case there is a 
negative credit event. Second, higher leverage was found to be positively associated 
with the CDS spread and credit risk. In addition, there is a negative relationship 
between asset quality, liquidity and regulatory capital with the CDS spread. During 
the crisis period, the key driver of the CDS spread was found to be regulatory 
capital, exhibiting a negative relationship, where banks with stronger capital buffers 
were better able to cope with defaults in times of financial crisis. When merging the 
pre-crisis and the crisis sample, the significance of the regulatory capital remained 
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strong and negatively related to the CDS spread, and leverage was also found to be 
an important factor affecting the CDS spread, with a positive impact on credit risk, 
thus implying that banks with higher levels of leverage were facing increased CDS 
spread due to their inability to repay their short-term liabilities.  
 
When considering the impact of bank size on credit risk, we find evidence of 
a positive relationship between total assets and the CDS spread. This implies that the 
bigger the bank, the higher the CDS spread and the level of credit risk. However, 
when we include a squared term of bank size in order to address the issue of non-
linearity in the relationship between bank size and credit risk, we find that the level 
of credit risk varies significantly depending on the size of the specific bank. As such, 
our findings imply that smaller financial institutions exhibit lower CDS spread level 
and credit risk, while larger banks tend to face higher CDS spread and increased 
credit risk. This suggests the existence of an optimal bank size, which we derive 
statistically from our estimates. If a particular bank grows beyond that point, it 
becomes more exposed to credit risk and becomes subject to high CDS spreads.  
 
In section 5.2, we present the methodology. In section 5.3, we present the 
methodology, while in section in section 5.4, we discuss the empirical findings. 
Finally, in section 5.4, we conclude. 
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5.2 Methodology 
In this chapter, the results from both fixed effect and random effect 
estimations are reported. Fixed effects models control for the effects of time-
invariant variables with time- invariant effects. Therefore, it permits controlling for 
any unobserved country-specific time- invariant effects in the data, it does so, by 
conditioning them out and taking deviations from time averaged sample means. The 
result of this is the removal of any long-run variation in the dependent variable. In a 
random effects model, the unobserved variables are assumed to be statistically 
independent of all the observed variables. Thus, in the next section, we will proceed 
and explain the benchmark model and the bank size model. The results from both the 
FE and the RE models are summarised in tables 2.5-2.7.  
 
5.2.1 Benchmark Model  
Our objective is to establish the drivers of the CDS spread over the period of 2004-
2011, across 30 countries and 115 banks, considering the housing market and the 
various bank- level factors, namely: asset quality, liquidity, leverage, regulatory 
capital and operations income ratio. The data covers a particularly interesting period 
as it looks at both the pre-crisis and the crisis period. As such, we estimate the 
following model using both Fixed Effect (FE) and the Random Effect (RE) 
methodologies, which controls for unobserved heterogeneity in country 
characteristics. The benchmark model is defined as follows: 
                                                          
                                                                 
              (1)                                                                                                                                                       
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Where the acronyms stand for: 
         : Natural Logarithm of the Bank CDS spread. 
lnHP: Natural Logarithm of the House Price Index 
Asset Quality: Impaired Loans/Equity 
Liquidity: Liquid Assets to Total Deposits and Short-term funding 
Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital 
Leverage: Long-term Debt to Common Equity  
Operations Income Ratio: EBITA (Earnings Before Interest Tax and 
Earnings)/ Average Assets 
    Bank fixed effect  
  : Time fixed effect 
     : Disturbance term 
 i stands for the country 
 j stands for the banks 
 t stands for time  
 
We start by estimating the benchmark model, considering the housing 
market, asset quality, liquidity, regulatory capital, leverage and operations income 
ratio effect. The results are summarized in tables 2.5 – 2.7, which report the main 
findings using both the FE and RE estimations, over the period of 2004-2011. In 
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addition, we report which of the two methods is preferred, based on the p-value from 
the Hausman test. 
 
5.2.2 Bank Size Model 
After considering the bank- level drivers of the CDS spread, we analyse the 
impact of bank size on the CDS spread, over the period of 2004-2011 periods. The 
sample looks at 115 banks and 30 countries. The model is defined as follows: 
                                                          
                                                                      
                             
                                                                  (2)                                                                                                            
 
Where the acronyms stand for: 
lnHP: Natural Logarithm of the House Price Index. 
Asset Quality: Impaired Loans / Equity 
Liquidity: Liquid Assets / Deposits and short-term Funding 
Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital 
Leverage: Long-term debt to common equity 
Operations Income Ratio: EBITA / Average Assets 
lnBank Size: Natural Logarithm of Bank Total Assets  
Bank SizeSq: Squared term of the Natural Logarithm of Bank Total Assets  
    bank fixed effect  
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  : time fixed effect 
     : disturbance term 
 i stands for the country 
 j stands for the banks 
 t stands for time  
 
The estimates of model 2 are demonstrated in tables 2.8 – 2.9. Having 
identified the bank-size model, we will now proceed and explain the GMM model. 
 
5.2.3 GMM model 
As indicated in previous research conducted by Kiviet (1995) and Judson and 
Owen (1999) when the number of banks (N) is higher than the number of the years 
(T) in the data sample, the GMM estimations allow generating a lower Root Mean 
Square Error (RMSE). Since there are no exogenous instruments in our model with 
the adequate properties to be considered, that would be correlated with the 
endogenous variable but uncorrelated with the error term (u), it is appropriate to 
consider the system GMM model approach that employs instruments with lags of the 
endogenous variable (lagged ln(BankCDS)) 
 
The GMM estimation included instruments for differenced equation. As 
such, the GMM-type instruments consisted of one lag of ln(Bank CDS). The 
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Standard instruments were: Δ           , Δln(HousePriceIndex), ΔAssetQuality, 
ΔLiquidity,  ΔRegulatoryCapital, ΔLeverage, ΔOperations Income ratio, 
Δln(BankSize), ΔBankSizeSq. The instrument for level equation consisted of the 
GMM-type instrument, namely: Δ              .The GMM model is defined as 
follows: 
 
                                                             
                                                     
                                                                   
      (3)                                                                                                                                                                        
 
Where the acronyms stand for: 
              : Lag of the Natural Logarithm of the Bank CDS spread 
lnHP: Natural Logarithm of the House Price Index. 
Asset Quality: Impaired Loans / Equity 
Liquidity: Liquid Assets / Deposits and short-term Funding 
Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital 
Leverage: Long-term debt to common equity 
Operations Income Ratio: EBITA / Average Assets 
lnBank Size: Natural Logarithm of Bank Total Assets  
Bank SizeSq: Squared term of the Natural Logarithm of Bank Total Assets  
    bank fixed effect  
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  : time fixed effect 
     : disturbance term 
 i stands for the country 
 j stands for the banks 
 t stands for time  
 
Having identified the baseline model, the bank size model and the GMM 
model, we will now proceed and discuss the findings from these estimations. 
 
5.3 Empirical Results 
Before discussing the empirical findings from the baseline, the bank size 
model and the GMM estimations, it is important to conduct the unit root test in order 
to check whether out data is stationary. Since the data we are dealing with is an 
unbalanced panel dataset, the only test that we can conduct in order to check for 
stationarity is the Fisher Unit Root test. All other stationarity tests (Levin-Lin-Chu, 
Harris-Tzavalis, Breitung, Lm Pesaran Shin and Hadri LM test) require the data to 
be strongly balanced. The outcome from the Fisher Unit root test will be discussed in 
the next section.  
 
5.3.1 Fisher Unit-Root Test 
Fisher-type unit-root test is based on augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
According to the Fisher unit-root test, the P statistic requires the number of panels to 
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be finite. As such, the null hypothesis states that all the panels contain a unit root.  
Therefore, there is an assumption that T tends to infinity.  If the number of panels, N, 
is fixed, then the Fisher test is consistent against the alternative that at least one panel 
is stationary.  If we allow N to tend to infinity, then the number of panels that do not 
contain a unit root must grow at the same rate as N for the tests to be consistent. 
Therefore, the null and the alternative hypothesis are the following: 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots 
H1: At least one panel is stationary 
 
Table 2.3 and table 2.4 summarize the outcomes of the Fisher unit-root test 
for the ln(Bank CDS) spread and the ln(House Price Index) over the period of 2004-
2011. It can be clearly observed that we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that both bank CDS spread and the house price index do not contain a unit root and 
are therefore stationary.  
 
5.3.2a Baseline model findings 
Tables 2.5-2.7 summarize the results from both the fixed effect (FE) and the 
random effect (RE) estimations for the baseline model. According to the Hausman 
test, the RE model is the preferred method of estimation. Therefore, we will base our 
analysis on the results obtained from the RE estimation.  
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One of the first findings this research uncovers the important relationship 
linking liquidity to bank CDS spread. Our findings show that liquidity has a strong 
negative impact on the CDS spread. This implies that more liquidity meant that 
banks were better able to deal with large bank withdrawals and avoid bank-runs. As 
such, the only banks that were able to survive the recent financial crisis and maintain 
a relatively low level of credit risk and narrow CDS spread were the financial 
institutions that held sufficient liquidity levels.  
 
The main responsibility of financial institutions is to provide liquidity to 
depositors and creditors by standing ready to offer them cash on demand. In the 
traditional framework, liquidity risk comes from the risk arising from bank-runs. 
This is a situation where depositors lose trust in their bank and withdraw their funds, 
driving investor sentiment down, either as a result of concerns about the bank’s 
financial condition or because they worry that other depositors may also start 
withdrawing their funds, thus causing bank-runs. Such runs could make banks 
insolvent by initiating a chain reaction that may force a fire sale of illiquid loans. 
This in turn can result in bankruptcy of the financial institution.  
 
Before 2007, banks and other financial institutions heavily relied on 
borrowing from capital markets. In fact, the debt to equity ratios for many large 
international banks exceeded 20 to 30 multiples. Graph 2.1 illustrates of the 
fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and leverage, showing that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and credit risk (CDS spread). Therefore, in case of a 
bank-run, there was a high likelihood of bankruptcy, which could potentially 
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translate into a contagion and cause a systemic collapse of the entire financial system 
(Antão and Lacerda (2011)).  
 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, as capital markets and money 
markets dried, the only banks that were able to survive without the heavy reliance on 
borrowing from the lemon markets were those that held high liquidity levels. Other 
banks such as Northern Rock were unable to survive and had to be bailed out by the 
Bank of England as a result of bank-runs. In fact, as of September 2007, Northern 
Rock’s liquidity gap within 3 months was more than £ 25 billion. As such, in less 
than one year, Northern Rock was under the obligation to refund £30 billion, with all 
the associated market risks (Congdon et al. (2009)). 
 
Our results are in line with the research conducted by Annaert et al. (2013) 
which looked at determinants of Euro-area CDS spreads and found that the most 
significant driver of credit risk  before and during the crisis was the liquidity spread. 
In addition, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) also looked at the determinants of CDS 
spreads, focusing on bank balance-sheet ratios before and during the financial crisis, 
and showed that liquidity played an important role in explaining credit risk and more 
specifically the CDS spread. Moreover, other researchers including Chen et al. 
(2007), Fabozzi et al. (2007) as well as Annaert et al. (2013) found that liquidity is 
an important determinant of the CDS spread. 
 
Besides the significance of liquidity as a driver of the CDS spread, we also 
find evidence that asset quality is another important determinant of the CDS spread. 
From table 2.5, it can be seen that bank CDS spreads reflect the risk captured by the 
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bank balance sheet i.e. the risk associated with their assets quality. More specifically, 
the ratio of impaired loans/equity proves to have a significantly positive link with 
banks’ CDS spread. Indeed, the higher the ratio (i.e. as the ratio of impaired 
loans/equity increases) the more problematic the loans will be and, thus, the positive 
coefficient of this ratio does reflect higher credit risk as reflected by the deterioratio n 
of the assets’ quality.  As illustrated in graph 2.3, there is a positive relationship 
between the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and asset quality, which in turn 
implies that higher impaired loans/equity implies leads to higher credit risk. This 
finding is consistent with a research conducted by Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), 
who proxied asset quality with the ratio Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans, and 
found that is it was a significant driver of the CDS spread before, during and after 
the recent financial crisis. The authors’ findings indicate that the probability of 
default increases especially for banks that have low quality loan portfolios.  
 
Our third finding relates to the relationship between bank- level leverage and 
credit risk as reflected by the CDS spread. It can be clearly observed from table 2.5 
that as leverage increases; the level of credit risk also goes up, entailing higher credit 
risk. In fact, before the financial crisis, banks were heavily borrowing from capital 
markets. As credit conditions were booming, lending to financial institutions was 
made easy, with consumers blindly investing their savings in banks expecting to earn 
interest. In addition, financial engineering and securitization also greatly contributed 
to the increased leverage intakes that banks were subject to. This was reflected in the 
deteriorations of banks’ asset quality.  With the beginning of financial crisis, the real 
leverage ratios came to light revealing that most banks were borrowing well above 
the authorized norms. Our findings are in accordance with the theory which shows 
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the presence of a positive and highly significant relationship between leverage and 
the CDS spread. In fact, in a research conducted by Ericsson et al. (2009), the 
authors show that leverage, among other factors, explain approximately 23% of CDS 
spread fluctuations. Table 2.5 below indicates that the higher the leverage level and 
the wider the CDS spread, reflecting greater credit risk. Thus, banks that borrowed 
more aggressively experienced much higher CDS spread levels.  During the financial 
crisis, the highly leveraged banks lost access to external funding given that capital 
markets froze. In addition, consumers lost confidence in the banking sector and were 
withdrawing their savings.  
 
When considering the impact of macroeconomic drivers on the CDS spread, 
the housing market appears to be negatively affecting credit risk. As shown in table 
2.5, higher house prices are associated with narrower CDS spreads. This follows the 
economic rationale given that before summer 2007, real estate was continuously 
appreciating in value, banks were therefore subject to lower credit risk as not only 
they were able to regain the initial mortgage value if the borrower defaulted, but they 
could also earn a profit. However, during the crisis period, the picture drastically 
changed. In fact, when house prices dramatically fell in value, the housing market no 
longer affected the CDS spread and credit risk.  
 
As a robustness check, in the next section, we have replaced the benchmark 
explanatory variables with alternative variables that similarly reflect asset quality, 
liquidity, regulatory capital and leverage.  
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5.3.2b Alternative Bank Characteristic 
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of the benchmark model to the 
choice of bank characteristics. Therefore, in table 2.7, we: (i) replace the ratio of 
Impaired Loans / Equity with the ratio of Impaired Loans / Gross Loans, as a 
measure of asset quality; (ii) replace the ratio of Liquid Assets / Deposits & Short-
term Funding with the ratio of Liquid Assets / Total Deposits & Borrowings as a 
measure of liquidity; (iii) replace Tier 2 Capital Ratio by the Total Capital Ratio as a 
measure of regulatory capital (iv) replace the ratio of Long-term Debt to Common 
Equity by the ratio of Equity / Total Assets as a measure of leverage; (v) replace the 
ratio of EBITA (Earnings Before Interest Tax and Earnings)/ Average Assets by 
Return On Average Equity (ROAE), as an indicator of bank- level operations Income 
ratio. 
 
The results that are demonstrated in table 2.7 show that the main findings 
remain unchanged. Therefore, any deterioration in the asset quality ratio leads to an 
increase in credit risk, while a rise in the degree of liquidity of the assets held by 
banks reduces their default risk in a significant manner. In addition, the results also 
show that the level of bank operations Income ratio is negatively related to the CDS 
spread and credit risk. 
 
As for the regulatory capital and leverage, the findings from table 2.7 do not 
suggest a significant impact on banks’ CDS spread. Yet, the coefficient associated 
with this of the regulatory capital variable is negative. Besides the numerous positive 
aspects of high capital regulation, one constraint relates to the potential impact that it 
has on banks’ return on assets: higher capital requirements tend to be costly for a 
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financial institution and are usually perceived as a burden. The riskier a bank's 
portfolio, the more capital it will be required to hold. By being forced to keep a 
certain percentage of capital as a cushion in case there is a negative credit event, a 
bank’s investment may be reduced, which decreases its competitiveness in financial 
markets. In this respect, our results confirm the importance of bank operations  
income ratio, measured by (Return on Average Equity (ROAE), in eroding credit 
risk, as it has a negative and highly significant effect on bank CDS. The negative 
relationship between bank operation and bank CDS spread is demonstrated in graph 
2.5. 
 
In addition, while leverage was only marginally significant (at a 10% level) 
in the baseline model, once we replace the long-term debt to common equity ratio by 
an alternative ratio of equity to total liabilities, it is turns insignificant. One of the 
explanations of the marginal significance of leverage as a driver of the CDS spread 
relates to the fact that banks used off-balance sheet securitization in order to hide 
their real leverage intakes to finance their investment activities. In addition, this also  
translated into bank’s ability to escape regulatory requirements by showing less 
leverage in their balance sheet. This is one of the reasons that explain the sensitivity 
of the leverage as a driver of the CDS spread.  
 
5.3.3 Bank Size model findings 
The tables show that bank size is positively related to the CDS spread over 
the period of 2004-2011. Bank size would grow as the bank total assets rises. Our 
findings are demonstrated in tables 2.8 and 2.9. According to the Hausman test, the 
FE model is the preferred method of estimation. The findings from table 2.8 indicate 
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that the bigger the bank and the higher the CDS spread. In fact, during the credit 
boom of early 2000, banks were enjoying high credit injections in a form of foreign 
funding inflows. This enabled them to expand their lending activities, mostly 
through the issuance of complex mortgage securities, which in turn boosted their 
profits. The idea of increasing their size in both the domestic and international 
markets was appealing to these financial institutions. As such, the phenomenon of 
the too-big and the too-important-to-fail gave banks the wrong incentives to grow 
beyond their optimal size; believing that they would never collapse as the 
government would always be there to rescue them. However, as the recent financial 
crisis unfolded, many of these big financial institutions were left to go bankrupt. 
Therefore, bigger banks were subject to higher credit risk and wider CDS spreads. 
The only exception was financial institutions that were closely related to the public 
sector, such as AIG, that did benefit from a government bailout package.  
 
In order to address the issue of any non- linearity in this relationship, in the 
next section we need to add a squared term of bank size to capture this effect.  
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5.3.4 Robustness Checks 
5.3.4.1 The identification of non-linear effects between Bank CDS 
spread and Bank Size and the result from the U-test 
To assess the empirical validity of the link between bank size and CDS 
spread, we introduce a quadratic term of bank size (            ) in equation (2). 
Results from these specifications are illustrated in tables 2.8-2.9. 
 
Regression output in tables 2.8 and 2.9 implicitly assumes that bank size 
causes distortions in the CDS spread at different levels. In other words, the CDS 
spread is linear over all levels of Bank size. A quadratic prediction plot between 
bank size and the CDS spread showed in graph 2.7 suggest a U-shaped relationship. 
This means that at low levels of bank size, CDS spread moves negatively with bank 
size, while there is a critical threshold beyond which further increases in bank size 
lead to a rise in the CDS spread. However, in order to ensure that the U-shape 
relationship between the CDS spread and bank size really exist, it is essential to 
conduct the U-test. 
 
In order to test for the presence of this U-shape relationship between the CDS 
spread and bank size, we have used the U-test developed by Lind and Mehlum 
(2010). More precisely, we have followed the approach adapted by Leonida, et al. 
(2012), the authors investigated the effect of political replacement effect in a panel of 
102 countries over the period 1980 to 2005. More precisely, the authors tested for the 
presence of a U-shape relationship. In addition, they also tested for non-
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monotonicity in the relationship between political competition and economic reform, 
by examining whether the relationship is decreasing at low values and increasing at 
high values within the data range. 
 
In our analysis, for each model, we report the interval, slope estimated at the 
minimum and maximum values, the associated t -statistics, as well as the test for the 
overall significance of a U-shaped relationship. For all of the models, we also report 
the estimated extreme point together with the associated confidence interval 
estimated by the Fieller method. Our empirical analysis strongly supports the 
existence of a U shape relationship between bank CDS spread and bank size. In 
order to reassert our findings of the presence of a U-shape type of relationship 
between the CDS spread and bank size, we check our results for robustness using 
several estimation frameworks, including the FE, RE and alternative Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) approaches. As such, we have undertaken the U-test, 
developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010), and given our p-value (reported in table 2.10 
and 2.11), we can reject the null hypothesis (H0: Monotone or Inverse U shape) and 
conclude that there is a U-shape relationship between the bank CDS spread and bank 
size. Our findings show that indeed the CDS spread and bank size are negatively 
related up to a threshold after which this relationship becomes positive. The outcome 
from the U-test is demonstrated in tables 2.10 and 2.11. 
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Optimal Bank Size  
From table 2.8, the quadratic term of Bank Size is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level, while the linear term is negative and also significant at 10% 
level.  In addition, the U-test proves that there is a U-shape relationship linking CDS 
spread and bank size. 
 
As such, these findings from table 2.8 are supportive of a non- linear 
relationship and allow us to derive from the estimated equation the critical value of 
bank size beyond which the CDS spread starts increasing. The u-test for both the FE 
and RE model confirms the existence of the U-shape relationship. The threshold 
point can be derived from the above estimated equation as follows: 
     
           
                         
                
   
   
 = 
        
            
 
=10.61 
 
This implies that the optimal bank size in terms of absolute values will be:  
exp (10.61) = 40560.7 Million of Euros 
 
 
From equation (2), we can figure out that the turning point is equal to  
1,645,173,570 Millions of Euros. This point indicates that as bank size increases 
above this threshold, it causes the CDS spread to widen and the credit risk to 
subsequently go up and rise. Thus, bank size and the CDS spread are negatively 
related up till the size of the bank in terms of total assets reaching 1,645,173,570 
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Millions of Euros. This implies that smaller banks face lower credit risk. After, this 
threshold, bank size and the CDS spread become positively related, implying that the 
bigger the bank, the higher the CDS spread and credit risk.  
 
Our results show that the level of credit risk varies across big and small 
banks. As such, smaller banks typically experience narrower CDS spread and lower 
level of credit risk. They are therefore safer, although they do not have the same 
ability to diversify their risk portfolios as bigger financial institutions; these banks 
are considered to be more cautious with their investment decision-making process. 
 
This finding is in line with the literature on the too-big-to-save. In a research 
conducted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013), the authors focused on equity 
prices and CDS spread in the context of public deficit and bailouts. Their findings 
show that the too-big-to-save hypothesis infers that large banks are typically subject 
to reduced bailout prospects particularly in countries that experience fiscal 
constraints. Therefore, bigger banks are considered to be riskier, while smaller 
banks, which conduct small size investment activities,  are considered to be safer and 
more secure. 
 
In the next section, in order to correct for the potential problem of 
endogeneity, system GMM is used in our analysis. 
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5.3.5 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  
Since the number of years in our sample is smaller than the number of banks, 
in this chapter we have conducted the GMM estimations. As such, the Arellano-
Bond (1991) was undertaken in order to test of autocorrelation. As presented in table 
2.12, according to the Arellano-Bond test, there is no evidence of second order 
autocorrelation; therefore our model is correctly specified. The difference equation is 
instrumented with the lagged levels, one period of the dependent variable and the 
levels equation with the difference lagged one period. 
 
Moreover, we report Sargan-Hansen test that follows the Chi-squared 
distribution with (L-K) degrees of freedom. The statistic values test the validity of 
instruments. Under the null, the instruments included are uncorrelated with the error 
term, thus they are valid. The outcome of the Sargan test would indicate whether our 
equation is correctly identified or is over- identified. Under the null hypothesis, the 
equation is adequately and correctly identified. The alternative hypothesis states that 
our model is over- identified (i.e. the number of instruments is more than the number 
of endogenous variables). According to our findings from table 2.12, the p-values for 
the Sargan test for over- identifying restrictions, where the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, confirm that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residuals and they are valid instruments. Furthermore, we are 
satisfying the condition whereby our number of instruments is 22 and is less than the 
number of groups, which is equal to 24. The lagged dependent variable is 
statistically significant reflecting a high degree of persistence in the variables.  
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Table 2.12 below reports the results from the GMM analysis. The results a re 
consistent with the outcome obtained from both the benchmark model and the bank 
size model (tables 2.5, 2.7 and 2.8). Our findings indicate that the housing market is 
significant and negatively related to the CDS spread (table 2.5 and table 2.7). As 
such, as house prices were increasing before the financial crisis, the level of default 
and credit risk was low. This ultimately translated into narrower CDS spread. 
Whereas after the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis, when the house 
prices drastically fell, the level of credit risk sharply increased, pushing up the level 
of defaults and the CDS spread. Therefore, this follows the rationale whereby higher 
house prices minimize the credit risk, making it always possible for the financial 
institution granting mortgage contracts to protect itself from a customer defaulting 
by reselling the property for a higher price in the secondary market 
 
The second finding from the GMM results is the positive relationship 
between asset quality and the CDS spread, which is demonstrated in table 2.12. In 
fact, our findings are in line with our previous results from the baseline model and 
the bank size model (tables 2.5 and 2.8). As such, as the ratio of impaired loans to 
equity increases, the quality of assets decreases. This implies that the bank becomes 
more risky when it holds a higher proportion of toxic assets. Before the recent 
financial crisis, banks heavily invested in highly structured products which were 
associated with very high risks. This was particularly easy with the increased 
popularity of securitization activities and financial engineering. As the crisis began, 
many of banks’ assets started defaulting due to their toxic nature. This was despite 
the excessively high rating most structured products enjoyed before the beginning of 
the crisis. In fact, credit rating agencies played a predominant role in boosting the 
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ratings of highly risky instruments to increase their marketability. Our results GMM 
are in line with the previous findings and confirm our hypothesis which stipulates 
that a bank with more reliable quality of assets will face reduced credit risk. 
 
Furthermore, the findings from table 2.12 also illustrates the negative 
relationship between the CDS spread and bank liquidity. As such, banks with higher 
levels of liquidity were in a better position to avoid bank-runs that resulted from the 
recent financial crisis. From summer 2007, both money markets and capital markets 
stopped lending to banks and other financial institutions. Therefore, financial 
markets froze. In addition, investors’ sentiment reached its lowest level as consumers 
and lenders lost trust in the financial system and decided to withdraw their deposits 
from banks. The only financial institutions that were able to withstand the crisis were 
those that kept high liquidity levels and were able to sustain themselves despite the 
lemon markets. Thus, the banks that had high levels of liquidity were subject to 
tighter CDS spread and lower credit risk. 
 
Moreover, table 2.12 shows evidence of a negative relationship between the 
level of bank operations income ratio (EBITA / Average Assets) and the CDS spread. 
As such, banks that are more profitable are better able to cope with negative credit 
event and are considered to be stronger as compared to banks that have low levels of 
operations income ratio. This is in line with our initial hypothesis and follows the 
economic rational.  
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Last but not the least, our results in table 2.12 demonstrate that, on average, 
the CDS spread and bank size is positively related. Once the quadratic term is 
included to capture non- linearity, there is clear evidence in favour of a non- linear 
relationship that the smaller banks faced narrower CDS spread levels and credit risk 
as they were deemed to be safer relative to bigger banks.  For bigger banks with 
assets beyond a critical level, we find that the CDS spread is positively related to 
bank size. In order to reassert out previous findings, after having conducted the 
GMM analysis, we followed the lead of Leonida et al. (2012) and Lind and Mehlum 
(2010) and undertook the U-test. Our findings strongly support the evidence that 
there is a U-shape relationship linking bank CDS spread and bank size, with a t-
value of 3.01 (table 2.13). The outcome from U-test conducted following the GMM 
estimation, which is presented in table 2.13. Therefore, it can be concluded that bank 
size and the CDS spread are negatively related up until bank size reaches a certain 
threshold. After that threshold, the relationship between bank size and credit risk 
turns into becoming positive, meaning that the bigger the bank, the wider the CDS 
spread and vice versa.  
 
A quadratic prediction plot between bank size and CDS spread shows in 
Graph 2.8, a U-shaped relationship. As such, when bank size goes up, the CDS 
spread level moves inversely with bank size. This U-shape type of relationship has 
been confirmed by the U-test developed by Lind and Mehlum, (2010), and which is 
reported in table 2.13. There is a critical threshold beyond which further rise in bank 
size leads to an increase in the CDS spread. .  
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 Following the estimated GMM results, we can derive the bank size optimal 
point as follows: 
     
           
                         
 
                
   
   
 = 
     
         
 
= 10.79646 
 
The optimal bank size in terms of absolute values will be:  
exp(10.79646) = 48847.58 Millions of Euros 
                                                                  
Therefore, as long as bank total assets are below or equal 48847.58 Millions 
of Euros, bank size and the CDS spread will exhibit a negative relationship. Even 
with the GMM approach, there is still a critical level of bank size, although the 
threshold point is at a lower level compared to the optimal size derived in the fixed 
effects estimation. After this point, bank size and the CDS spread become positively 
related. Thus, bigger banks face more risk, while smaller banks are safer given that 
they experience narrower CDS spreads.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
The fifth chapter of this dissertation explores the key bank level drivers of 
bank CDS spreads, over the period of 2004-2011, across 30 countries and 115 banks. 
Most importantly, this research significantly contributes to the existing literature as it 
looks at the impact of bank size on the CDS spread over the period of 2004-2011 and 
uncovers important findings relating to optimal size of banks and credit risk. 
  
We find that the fluctuations of bank CDS spread strongly depend from: (i) 
the quality of the bank’s balance sheet; (ii) liquidity of banks’ assets; and (iii) how 
profitable banks’ operations are.  As such, banks’ with better asset quality are subject 
to less credit risk. In addition, higher liquidity enables banks to avoid bank-runs and 
be more resilient to bankruptcy and insolvency. Finally, banks with higher levels of 
operations income ratio have more income to withstand a negative credit event such 
as the recent financial crisis, and therefore face lower CDS spread. We find that both 
regulatory capital and leverage appear to have a reduced ability to explain the 
variations in credit risk over the sample period. On a country level, we also uncover 
the close interconnection between credit risk and the housing market; implying that 
higher house prices would lead to narrower CDS spread and lower credit risk. Our 
results are consistent using FE, RE and the GMM estimations. 
 
When considering the impact of bank size on the CDS spread, we 
demonstrate that total assets and credit risk are negatively related up until a certain 
point, which we refer to as “bank optimal size”. Before this point, banks are 
considered to be either small or average, and are typically subject to reduced risk. 
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After that point, bank size and the CDS spread become positively related, meaning 
that the bigger the bank, the higher the CDS spread. Our findings are in line with the 
previous literature on the too-big-to-save. In fact, while most banks during the credit 
expansion were trying to grow beyond their optimal size thinking that they will 
benefit from government support in case of a negative credit event, the recent 
financial crisis revealed that not all big banks are systematically saved. This leads us 
to the conclusion that smaller and medium sized banks are safer than large banks. 
 
Having analysed the bank- level determinants of CDS spread and after 
establishing the relationship between bank size and CDS spread, in the next chapter 
we will investigate whether the difference in financial systems and regulatory 
structures matter in explaining cross-country bank CDS spreads.
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Graph 2.1: Graphical Illustration of the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and Leverage 
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Graph 2.2: Graphical Illustration of the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and Regulatory Capital  
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Graph 2.3: Graphical Illustration of the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and Asset Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
Graph 2.4: Graphical Illustration of the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and Liquidity 
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Graph 2.5: Graphical Illustration of the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and Operations Income Ratio 
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Graph 2.6: Graphical Illustration of the fluctuations of the ln(CDS) spread and Bank Size  
 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Graph 2.7: Bank Optimal Size (FE Robust)  
3
4
5
6
7
F
it
te
d
 v
a
lu
e
s
10 11 12 13 14 15
lnoftotalassetsconverted
170 
 
Graph 2.8: Bank Optimal Size (GMM) 
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Table 2.1: Source of the Data and Expected Signs on the Coefficients of the Regression 
 
 
Type of the Variable Description and the source of the variables Predicted Sign 
 
ln(CDS) 
 
Dependant 
• Natural logarithm of the CDS, 5 year, bank level, mid-spread 
• Expressed in basis points, denominated in the country’s local currency  
• Published by CMA and retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datasteream 
 
 
 
ln(HP) 
 
 
Explanatory 
• Natural logarithm of the House Price Index. 
• Expressed in basis points 
• Published by Oxford Economics and retrieved from Thomson  Reuters Datastream 
 
 
(-) 
 
Regulatory Capital 
 
Explanatory 
• Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital.  
• Expressed as a percentage. Retrieved from Bankscope 
 
(-) 
 
Leverage 
 
Explanatory 
 
• Long term debt to common equity Expressed as a fraction 
• Published by World Scope Fundamentals and retrieved from Thomson  Reuters Datasteream  
 
(+) 
 
Liquidity 
 
Explanatory 
• Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding 
• Expressed as a percentage 
• Retrieved from Bankscope 
 
(-) 
 
Asset Quality 
 
Explanatory 
• Impaired Loans / Equity 
• Expressed as a percentage 
• Retrieved from Bankscope 
 
(+) 
Operations Income 
Ratio 
Explanatory • EBITA / Avg Assets 
• Expressed as a percentage 
• Retrieved from Bankscope 
(-) 
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Table 2.2: Hypothesis of the explanatory variables 
Variables Hypothesis of the variables: 
ln(CDS) 
• Reflects bank level credit default risk – The dependant variable. 
ln(HP) 
• Higher HP, leads to lower credit default risk and CDS spread.  
• If a borrower defaults, the bank is always able to resell the property and recover the initial mortgage value. Real estate was 
drastically increasing before the crisis.  
Regulatory Capital • The higher the ratio, the higher is the capital buffer. The bank has a better ability to deal with a negative credit event. This 
leads to a lower is credit risk.  
Leverage • The higher the leverage ratio, the higher the debt level of the bank. Thus, default risk increases and so does the total credit 
risk and the CDS spread.  
Liquidity • The higher the liquidity level, the better the bank’s ability to deal with large bank withdrawals and bank runs, which 
implies a lower credit risk and CDS spread 
Operations Income 
Ratio 
• Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) is a measure of profitability that tells investors how much revenue will 
eventually become profit for a company. It is taken as percentage of average assets. 
• As long as this figure not volatile, it can be seen as a lower risk form of income.  
• The higher the ratio and the higher the bank’s revenue. This translates into lower levels of CDS spread. 
Asset Quality • Higher Impaired Loans / Equity implies that the bank has a higher proportion of bad debt which deteriorates its asset 
quality, which subsequently increases its credit risk and the CDS spread. 
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Table 2.3: Fisher Unit Root Test for ln(BankCDS)  
 lnBankCDS, 
with a drift 
 lnBankCDS, without 
a drift 
 
 Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Inverse chi-squared (218)P 514.8068 0.0000 308.1825 0.0000 
Inverse normal    Z 1.8335 0.9666 -6.0148 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(504)   L* -4.2132 0.0000 -5.7444 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared    Pm 14.2145 0.0000 5.0342 0.0000 
Notes: Fisher-type unit-root test, Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. Other statistics are suitable for 
finite or infinite number of panels. Ho: All panels contain unit roots, while H1: At least one panel is stationary. Therefore, ln(Bank CDS) is stationary. 
 
Table 2.4: Fisher Unit Root Test for ln(House Price Index) 
 
 lnHouse 
Price Index, 
with a drift 
 lnHouse Price 
Index, without a 
drift 
 
 Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Inverse chi-squared (210) P 505.9150 0.0000 441.7546 0.0000 
Inverse normal    Z -1.1500   0.1251 -8.8768 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(499) L* -4.3528 0.0000 -9.2317 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared    Pm 14.4392 0.0000 11.9282 0.0000 
Notes : Fisher-type unit-root test, Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. P s tatistic requires number of panels to be finite. Other s tatistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
Ho: Al l  panels contain unit roots, while H1: At least one panel is stationary. Therefore, ln(House price index) is s tationary. 
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Table 2.5: Baseline Model (RE Robust) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln (House Price Index) 
-0.0793 -0.135 -0.140 -0.214 -0.207
***
 -0.209
***
 
 
(0.0918) (0.0931) (0.106) (0.139) (0.0653) (0.0664) 
Liquidity  
-0.00145 -0.00179 -0.00497** -0.00529* -0.00534* 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding)  
(0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00241) (0.00290) (0.00292) 
Asset Quality 
  
0.00390
***
 0.00507
***
 0.00767
**
 0.00785
*
 
(Impaired Loans / Equity)   
(0.000654) (0.00128) (0.00370) (0.00415) 
Regulatory Capital    -0.0320 -0.0336 -0.0367 
(Tier 2 Capital)    (0.0288) (0.0430) (0.0426) 
 
Leverage 
    
0.0288
*
 0.0297
*
 
(Long-term debt to equity)     (0.0164) (0.0175) 
Operations Income Ratio      0.00953 
(EBITA / Avg Assets)      (0.107) 
_cons  3.401*** 3.776*** 3.774*** 4.315*** 4.162*** 4.165*** 
 (0.462) (0.459) (0.514) (0.675) (0.359) (0.363) 
N 521 457 426 234 130 130 
adj. R2 0.7098 0.7094 0.7272 0.7201 0.7936   0.7939 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** indicate significance at 1% level, ** indicate significance at 5% level, * indicate signi ficance at 10% level. According to the 
Hausman test, the Prob>chi2 = 0.1144. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the different in the coefficients is not systematic and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
Thus, preferred method of estimations for the benchmark model is Random Effect. 
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Table 2.6: Baseline Model (FE Robust) 
FE Robust (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln (House Price Index) -1.413 -2.271*** -1.659** -1.041 -0.530 0.0294 
 (0.915) (0.827) (0.807) (1.119) (1.253) (1.286) 
       
Liquidity  -0.000565 -0.00166 -0.00473 -0.00697 -0.00487 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST 
Funding) 
 (0.00129) (0.00155) (0.00288) (0.00496) (0.00564) 
       
Asset Quality   0.00373*** 0.00607*** 0.0151** 0.0192*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity)   (0.000877) (0.00203) (0.00672) (0.00540) 
       
Regulatory Capital    -0.0582 -0.0903 -0.0468 
(Tier 2 Capital)    (0.0356) (0.0731) (0.0780) 
       
Leverage     0.0382 0.00747 
(Long-term debt to equity)     (0.0256) (0.0227) 
       
Operations Income Ratio      -0.221*** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets)      (0.0739) 
       
_cons 9.954** 14.16*** 11.15*** 8.409 5.719 2.952 
 (4.514) (3.993) (3.907) (5.478) (6.214) (6.333) 
N 521 457 426 234 130 130 
adj. R2 0.730 0.757 0.763 0.801 0.812 0.825 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** indicate significance at 1% level, ** indicate significance at 5% level, * indicate significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.7: Baseline Model, Sensitivity Analysis (RE Robust) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln (House Price Index) -0.0793 -0.136 -0.206* -0.202* -0.214* -0.204* 
 (0.0918) (0.0927) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.106) 
       
Liquidity  -0.00498** -0.00557** -0.00497* -0.00442 -0.00462* 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor)  (0.00217) (0.00260) (0.00275) (0.00283) (0.00260) 
       
Asset Quality   0.0875*** 0.0832*** 0.0847*** 0.0606*** 
(Impaired Loans / Gross Loans)   (0.0123) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0158) 
       
Regulatory Capital    -0.00711 -0.0123 -0.00143 
(Total Capital Ratio)    (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0155) 
       
Leverage     0.0159 0.0231 
(Equity / Liabilities)     (0.0171) (0.0159) 
       
Operations Income Ratio      -0.00668*** 
(Return On Avg Equity (ROAE))      (0.00234) 
       
_cons 3.401*** 3.828*** 4.093*** 4.076*** 4.077*** 3.975*** 
 (0.462) (0.453) (0.532) (0.561) (0.573) (0.529) 
N 521 458 420 396 395 392 
adj. R2 0.7098 0.7107 0.7290 0.7276 0.7283 0.7442 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** indicate significance at 1% level, ** indicate significance at 5% level, * indicate significance at 10% level.
177 
 
Table 2.8: Bank Size Model (FE Robust) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (House Price Index) -0.209*** 0.633 0.928 
 (0.0664) (1.970) (1.942) 
    
Liquidity 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding) 
-0.00534* -0.0193*** -0.0182*** 
 (0.00292) (0.00629) (0.00631) 
    
Asset Quality 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) 
0.00785* 0.0474*** 0.0481*** 
 (0.00415) (0.0123) (0.0120) 
    
Regulatory Capital 
(Tier 2 Capital) 
-0.0367 -0.0937 -0.100 
 (0.0426) (0.122) (0.122) 
    
Leverage 0.0297* -0.0433 -0.0442 
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.0175) (0.0378) (0.0329) 
    
Operations Income Ratio 0.00953 -0.366** -0.439** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.107) (0.155) (0.159) 
    
Bank Size  1.946** -7.447* 
(ln(Total Assets))  (0.881) (4.213) 
    
Bank Size Sq   0.351** 
(ln(Total Assets))^2   (0.159) 
    
_cons 4.165*** -24.32** 36.42 
 (0.363) (9.526) (25.23) 
N 130 105 105 
adj. R2 0.7939 0.626 0.637 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** indicate significance at 1% level, ** indicate significance 
at 5% level, * indicate significance at 10% level. According to the Hausman test, the Prob>chi2 = 
0.000. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis  that the different in  the coefficients is not 
systematic and accept the alternative hypothesis . Thus, the preferred method of estimations for the 
bank size model is Fixed Effect. 
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Table 2.9: Bank Size Model (RE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (House Price Index) -0.209*** -0.306 -0.254 
 (0.0664) (0.190) (0.195) 
    
Liquidity -0.00534* -0.0216*** -0.0204*** 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding) (0.00292) (0.00494) (0.00503) 
    
Asset Quality 0.00785* -0.0255*** -0.0271*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.00415) (0.00530) (0.00534) 
    
Regulatory Capital -0.0367 -0.0259 -0.102 
(Tier 2 Capital) (0.0426) (0.107) (0.113) 
    
Leverage 0.0297* -0.00663 -0.00608 
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.0175) (0.0338) (0.0336) 
    
Operations Income Ratio 0.00953 -0.0479 -0.0608 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.107) (0.106) (0.105) 
    
Bank Size  0.147 -4.730* 
(ln(Total Assets))  (0.131) (2.673) 
    
Bank Size Sq   0.195* 
(ln(Total Assets))^2   (0.106) 
    
_cons 4.165*** 4.279** 34.58** 
 (0.363) (1.987) (16.74) 
N 130 105 105 
adj. R2 0.7939 0.3669 0.3751 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** indicate significance at 1% level, ** indicate significance 
at 5% level, * indicate significance at 10% level. According to the Hausman test, the Prob>chi2 = 
0.000. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the different in  the coefficients is not 
systematic and accept the alternative hypothesis . Thus, the preferred method of estimations for the 
bank size model is Fixed Effect presented above (table 2.8).  
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Table 2.10: U-test based on FE (Robust) estimations 
 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Interval  3.517328 18.14844 
Slope -4.978387 5.290466 
t-value -1.593625 2.869668 
P>|t| .0623356 .0043301 
 
Fieller Extreme Point is at: 
 
95% Fieller interval for 
extreme point: 
 
 
10.61056 
 
 
[-26.270312; 13.073614] 
 
Note for the table: H1: U shape, vs. H0: Monotone or Inverse U shape. Overall  the U-test indicates 
the presence of a U-shape: t-value =      1.59, P>|t|   =     .0623. 
 
Table 2.11: U-test based on RE estimations 
 Lower bound Upper bound 
Interval  3.517328 18.14844 
Slope -3.360469 2.338308 
t-value -1.743732 1.96348 
P>|t| .0420663 .0261174 
 
Fieller Extreme Point is at: 
 
95% Fieller interval for 
extreme point: 
 
 
12.14504 
 
[-Inf;17.337363] U 
[12.912834;+Inf] 
 
Note for the table: H1: U shape, vs. H0: Monotone or Inverse U shape.  Overall  the U-test indicates 
the presence of a U-shape: t-value =   1.74 , P>|t|   =  .0421.    
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Table 2.12: GMM Model 
VARIABLES Z 
                 0.325*** 
 
[0.062] 
ln (House Price Index) -1.135** 
 
[0.491] 
Asset Quality 0.015*** 
 
[0.004] 
Liquidity -0.042*** 
 
[0.007] 
Regulatory Capital  0.043 
 
[0.077] 
Leverage -0.011 
 
[0.020] 
Operations Income 
Ratio 
-0.336*** 
 
[0.072] 
ln(Bank Size) -4.880*** 
 
[1.509] 
Bank Size Sq 0.226*** 
 
[0.060] 
Constant 35.353*** 
 
[8.909] 
Observations 105 
Number of id 
Number of instruments 
24 
22 
chi2 1174 
Arellano-Bond 
0.0023 Test for 1st order 
Autocorr: p value 
Arellano-Bond 
0.5655 Test for 2nd order 
Autocorr: p value 
Sargan test for 
0.188 over-identifying 
restriction: p value 
 
Note: Robust standard errors  reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels , 
respectively. According to the Arellano-Bond test, the value of the test for second-order autocorrelation 
presents  no evidence of model  misspecification. The di fference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels , 
one period of the dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period.  
The GMM-type instruments  consisted of one lag of ln(Bank CDS). The Standard instruments  were: 
Δ              , Δln(HousePriceIndex), ΔAssetQuality, ΔLiquidi ty,  ΔRegulatoryCapital, ΔLeverage, ΔOperations 
Income Ratio, ΔlnBankSize, ΔBankSizeSq. The instruments  for level  equation consisted of the GMM-type 
ins truments , namely: Δ              . The p values for the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, where 
the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, confi rm that the instruments  are 
not correlated with the residuals and they are valid instruments . The lagged dependent variable  is s tatistically 
signi ficant reflecting a high degree of persistence in the variables. The number of instruments is 22 and is less 
than the number of groups, which i s equal to 24. 
181 
 
 
Table 2.13: U-test based on GMM estimations 
 Lower bound Upper bound 
Interval  3.517328 18.14844 
Slope -3.287294 3.337281 
t-value -3.013213 4.930337 
P>|t| .0016201 1.54e-06 
 
Fieller Extreme Point is at: 
 
95% Fieller interval for 
extreme point: 
 
 
10.77768 
 
[8.6324106; 11.560559] 
 
Note for the table: H1: U shape, vs. H0: Monotone or Inverse U shape. We conclude that 
the  overall the U-test indicates the presence of a U-shape: t-value =      3.01, P>|t|   =    
.00162. 
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Chapter 6 
Does the difference in financial systems and regulatory 
structures matter in explaining cross-country bank CDS 
spreads? 
 
Abstract 
The sixth chapter of this thesis aims at identifying the factors driving bank CDS spread as an 
indicator of credit risk, across 15 countries with a total of 58 banks, over the period of 2004-
2011. It investigates whether the difference in financial systems at country-level (namely the 
degree financial deepening, financial stability, profitability and financial access) and 
regulatory structures at bank-level can explain why some countries experience higher levels 
of credit risk relative to others.  The data set is unique as it allows us to shed more light into 
the factors contributing to credit risk before and during the recent global financial crisis 
period. In this context, there has been very little focus in the literature considering both bank 
and country-level drivers of credit risk. The findings from this chapter indicate that the 
country-level financial deepening as an indicator of credit bubble has contributed to 
increasing credit risk. In addition, over the period of 2004-2011, financial stability turned 
out to be insignificant reflecting the fragility of the financial system. When considering 
bank-level indicators, financial institutions with higher operations income ratio were subject 
to lower credit risk, while banks with lower asset quality and lower levels of liquidity 
appeared to be more likely to face high CDS spreads and increased credit risk.  
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6.1 Introduction 
The perception of credit risk in the banking sector has deeply changed since 
the beginning of the 2007-2009 crisis, when the financial system was hit by a wave 
of defaults, with the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads reaching record high levels 
in most major markets. The underlying cause of the crisis of 2007-2009 has been 
identified to be channels through which banks have transferred credit risk within the 
financial system either via trading CDS or issuing CDOs (Collateralized debt 
obligations). CDS spread therefore has been identified as a superior measure of 
credit risk compared to bond spreads ((Houweling and Vorst (2005), Hull et al., 
(2004); Blanco et al., (2005); Zhu, (2006)). These CDS spreads can differ across 
countries depending on the extent to which such activities have been encouraged by 
the regulators or the financial systems in individual countries, thereby making 
country- level ﬁnancial system soundness (stability) and financial market 
development (financial deepening) as key determinants in reflecting any sign of 
credit bubble or financial fragility.  
 
Past literature on the CDS spread and its determinants can be split into two 
groups. The first stream of literature focused mainly on the macroeconomic drivers 
of the CDS spread, identifying the relevance of interest rates, yield spreads and 
inflation among other indicators (Alexander & Kaeck (2008); Bevan & Garzarelli 
(2000); Duffie & Singleton (1999); In, Brown & Fang (2003); Lekkos & Milas 
(2001); Naifar (2010)). The second stream of literature looked at the bank level 
determinants of CDS spreads, which included: liquidity, leverage, asset quality, 
credit ratings and volatility (Casu and Chiaramonte (2013), Fabozzi et al. (2007); 
Hull et al. (2004), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003) and 
184 
 
Benkert (2004)). Little focus has been made in this literature combining both country 
and bank level determinants of bank CDS spread. While much of the extant literature 
so far has focused on the bank level indicators in driving credit risk, in this chapter 
we contribute to this emerging research area by examining whether country- level 
financial systems can explain differences in bank-level credit risk across countries. 
 
The existing literature linking capital requirement to credit risk states that the 
minimum regulatory capital banks need to hold will primarily depend on the capital 
buffer that each financial firm is required to adhere to. From previous experience, 
there is evidence that banks have the tendency to adjust their levels of cap ital buffer 
according to the variations in stock prices and their stockholders’ and debt holders’ 
preferences (Flannery (1994); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Myers and Rajan 
(1998); Diamond and Rajan (2000). In addition, there are other factors that affected 
the minimum level of capital held by banks. Financial institutions used securitization 
and structured financial products to shift their real debt exposures and evade 
regulatory requirements. Froot et al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) shed light  
into how banks jeopardized their lending activities and misused risk management 
techniques to escape regulatory requirements. Similarly, Dias and Mroczkowski 
(2012) argue that CDS instruments were used for speculative reasons, while they 
were originally conceived for hedging purposes. 
 
Limited research however linked the CDS spread to financial stability. In 
fact, Huang et al. (2009), Cont and Minca (2010), Markose et al. (2012) and 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) were among the very few authors that 
investigated the impact of the CDS spread on systemic stability. As of 2008, the 
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CDS market generated over $60 trillion (ISDA, 2008). With such a strong market 
presence, any shock to the CDS market is very likely to cause significant disruptions, 
if not the collapse, of the already fragile banking system. It is therefore important to 
address the relationship between the CDS market and financial stability. 
 
In addition, there is a significant gap in the existing literature linking credit 
risk and the excessive bank lending activities. The credit expansion of early 2000 has 
significantly contributed to the availability of easy credit. In fact, it increased the 
banks’ ability to provide credit to low- income consumers, who later defaulted on 
their obligations. Although past literature identified the factors contributing to the 
beginning of the financial crisis (such as financial imbalances, large foreign funding 
inflows, lax monetary policy of low interest rates as well as financial innovation) 
(Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Taylor (2007, 2009) and Jorda et al. (2011)), it failed 
to address how the excessive credit supply increased CDS spread and the overall 
credit risk. 
 
Due to the difference in regulatory structures and financial systems across the 
global financial markets, this chapter aims at understanding why some countries 
experience higher levels of credit risk relative to others.  Our unique dataset allows us 
to uncover the behavior of bank CDS spread as a measure of credit r isk, across 15 
countries with 58 banks, over the period of 2004 and 2011. The data on financial 
systems is unique and new. In the light of the recent financial crisis, it is essential for 
governments and regulatory authorities to uncover the different drivers of credit risk 
and come up with an optimal regulatory structure to ensure the soundness of the 
financial system.  
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This chapter uses five determinants of the Bank CDS spread at a country-
level (namely the degree of financial deepening, financial stability, financial access, 
financial profitability, and the housing market). In addition, at bank-level, we 
incorporate five determinants of the Bank CDS spread (namely asset quality, 
liquidity, regulatory capital, operations income ratio and leverage). Based on our 
findings, we argue that: (a) at country-level, financial deepening as an indicator of 
credit bubble has contributed to increasing credit risk. In addition, financial stability 
emerged as significant reflecting the fragility of the financial system. (b) at bank-
level, financial institutions with lower asset quality and decreased levels of liquidity 
appear to be more likely to face higher CDS spreads and increase in credit risk. 
Furthermore, banks with high level of operations were better able to sustain the 
recent financial crisis and were therefore subject to less risk. 
 
The rest of the sixth chapter of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
Section 6.2 describes the econometric methodology. Section 6.3 reports the 
empirical results. Section 6.4 concludes. 
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6.2 Methodology 
In this section, we will first discuss the baseline model, which consists of 
identifying the drivers of the CDS using bank- level determinants (namely: asset 
quality, liquidity, leverage, operations income ratio and leverage) across 58 banks 
and 15 countries, over the period of 2004-2011. Furthermore, our analysis will be 
then extended, by incorporating both country- level characteristics and bank- level 
CDS spread determinants, in order to identify the factors that make some countries 
less prone to credit risk compared to others. The results are summarized in Tables 
4.2-4.8, which report the main findings using OLS, fixed effect, random effect 
estimations (depending from the Hausman test) and GMM estimations.  
 
Before defining our models, it is essential to test whether our variables are 
stationary. Therefore, we will first start by conducting the unit root test.  
 
6.2.1 Unit root Test 
Since we are dealing with an unbalanced panel dataset, the only test that we 
can conduct is the Fisher unit root test.  
 
The Fisher-type test uses p-values from unit root tests for each cross-section 
i. The formula of the test looks as follows: 
 
P = -  ∑                                                                                                                (1) 
 
The test is asymptotically chi-square distributed with 2N degrees of freedom 
(     for finite N). The advantage of using Fisher Cointegration test is that it can 
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handle unbalanced panels. Furthermore, the lag lengths of the individual augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests are allowed to vary.  
 
When ln     is close to 0, the null hypothesis is rejected. When ln    closes to 
   such large p values are identified, implying the rejection of the null hypothesis 
and the presence of a unit root. However, if    approaches the value of 1, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. In case ln    approaches the value of 0, then a small p 
value will be identified, and the null hypothesis stating the existence of a unit root 
will be accepted.  
 
The unit root test represented in Eq. (1) is therefore utilized in order to test 
the null and the alternative hypothesis of the Fisher-type test based on the p-value. 
These are summarized as follows: 
 
  : All panels contain unit roots            
  : At least one panel is stationary 
 
The results from the Fisher test are presented in table 3.1. The findings 
indicate that at 1% level, both the natural logarithm of the bank CDS spread and the 
natural logarithm of the house price index do not contain a unit root and are therefore 
considered to be stationary. Having conducted the unit-root test, in the section we 
will identity our baseline model, and the extended model which considers both the 
bank- level and the country- level factors driving the CDS spread across 15 countries 
and 58 banks, over the period of 2004-2011, using FE, RE and GMM estimations. 
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6.2.2 Baseline Model (Bank-level Factors) 
We will first start by estimating the baseline model, expressed in equation 2 
below, using bank- level characteristics in order to identify the factors that make 
some banks riskier than others, across different countries. The results are 
summarized in tables 4.2-4.4, which report the main findings using three 
econometric methodologies (i.e. pooled OLS and FE and RE estimations, ( 
depending the Hausman test). The baseline model is defined in equation (2) as 
follows: 
 
             
                                                                     
                                                                                        (2)                                                                                                                                           
Where the acronyms stand for: 
           : Natural Logarithm of the Bank CDS spread. 
ln(HP): Natural Logarithm of the House Price Index 
Asset Quality: Impaired Loans/Equity 
Liquidity: Liquid Assets to Total Deposits and Short-term funding 
Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital 
Leverage: Long-term Debt to Common Equity  
Operations Income Ratio: EBITA (Earnings Before Interest Tax and 
Amortization)/ Average Assets) 
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: Time fixed effect 
     : Disturbance term 
 i stands for the country 
 j stands for the banks 
 t stands for time  
 
After estimating the bank- level factors driving of the CDS spread across 58  
banks and 15 countries, expressed in equation (2), in the next part of our analysis we 
will investigate what make some countries subject to less credit risk compared to 
others countries by incorporating both bank- level factors and country-level factors 
driving the CDS spread, namely: Financial Deepening, Financial Stability, 
Profitability and Financial Access. In addition, we will conduct a robustness check 
by substituting each country- level indicator by its alternative proxy in order to verify 
whether our results still hold. The model is explained in the next section. 
 
6.2.3 Country Level Indicators 
Equation 3 below defines the model that considers both bank and country-
level characteristics, which we estimate using the FE and RE estimations (depending 
from the Hausman test) as follows: 
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                                                                                    (3)                                                                      
 
Where the acronyms stand for: 
         : Natural Logarithm of the bank CDS spread. 
lnHP: Natural Logarithm of the House Price Index, across countries. 
Asset Quality: Impaired Loans/Equity, at individual bank-level. 
Liquidity: Liquid Assets to Total Deposits and Short-term funding, at 
individual bank-level. 
Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital, at 
individual bank-level. 
Leverage: Long-term Debt to Common Equity, at individual bank-level. 
Operations Income Ratio: EBITA (Earnings Before Interest Tax and 
Amortization)/ Average Assets), at individual bank-level. 
Financial Deepening: Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%), at country 
level for the entire banking sector. 
Financial Stability: Bank Z-Score, at country level for the entire banking 
sector. 
Profitability: Overhead costs to total assets (%), at country level the entire 
banking sector. 
Financial Access: Bank branches per 100,000 adults. 
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    Bank fixed effect  
 
 
: Time fixed effect  
     : Disturbance term 
 i stands for the Country 
 j stands for the banks 
 t stands for time  
 
Having identified the models that incorporate both bank- level and country-
level indicators of credit risk, in the next section, we will explain the GMM model. 
 
6.2.4 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Model 
It is likely that the above results could be plagued by endogeneity, that is, 
they may be correlated with the error term. It is for this reason that we adopt the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to check the robustness of our 
previously obtained results.  
 
The GMM methodology is the most appropriate estimation technique to 
analyze the drivers of the CDS spread, considering both bank and country- level 
factors, because the number of banks (N) is in our sample (58 banks) is higher than 
the number of the years (T) (7 years) (Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen (1999)). 
Our baseline model consists of the CDS spread as the dependent variable. The 
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explanatory variables consist of the bank- level drivers of the CDS spread, namely: 
leverage, regulatory capital, liquidity, asset quality and operations Income ratio. In 
addition, we also consider the country- level drivers of the bank CDS spread, namely: 
financial deepening, financial stability, profitability, financial access and the house 
price index. Since there are no exogenous instruments in our model with the 
adequate properties to be considered, that would be correlated with the endogenous 
variable but uncorrelated with the error term (u), it is appropriate to consider the 
system GMM model approach that employs instruments with lags of the endogenous 
variable (lagged            ) 
 
The GMM estimation includes instruments for differenced equation. As such, 
the GMM-type instruments consisted of one lag of ln(Bank CDS). The Standard 
instruments were: Δ             ), Δln(HousePriceIndex), ΔAssetQuality, 
ΔLiquidity, ΔRegulatoryCapital, ΔLeverage, ΔOperations Income Ratio, 
ΔFinancialDeepening, ΔFinancial Stability and ΔProfitability . The instruments for 
level-equation consisted of the GMM-type instruments, namely: Δln(BankCDS). The 
GMM model is defined in equation (4) as follows: 
                                                             
                                                     
                                                                     
                                                                                                             (4)                               
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Where the acronyms stand for: 
               : Lag of Natural Logarithm of the bank CDS spread. 
         : Natural Logarithm of the bank CDS spread. 
lnHP: Natural Logarithm of the House Price Index, across countries. 
Asset Quality: Impaired Loans/Equity, at individual bank-level. 
Liquidity: Liquid Assets to Total Deposits and Short-term funding, at 
individual bank-level. 
Regulatory Capital: Tier 2 Capital = Total Capital – Tier 1 Capital, at 
individual bank-level. 
Leverage: Long-term Debt to Common Equity, at individual bank-level. 
Operations Income Ratio: EBITA (Earnings Before Interest Tax and 
Amortization)/ Average Assets), at individual bank-level. 
Financial Deepening: Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%), at country 
level for the entire banking sector. 
Financial Stability: Bank Z-Score, at country level for the entire banking 
sector. 
Profitability: Overhead costs to total assets (%), at country level the entire 
banking sector. 
Financial Access: Bank branches per 100,000 adults. 
    Bank fixed effect  
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: Time fixed effect  
     : Disturbance term 
 i stands for the Country 
 j stands for the banks 
 t stands for time  
  Having identified our baseline model, the country-level model and the GMM 
model, in the next section, we will discuss the empirical findings.  
                
6.3 Empirical Findings 
6.3.1 Findings from the baseline model 
Our findings from the bank- level analysis are demonstrated in tables 4.2-4.4. 
According to the Hausman test, (Prob>chi2 = 0.0844), auggest that the random 
effect model (RE) is the preferred method of estimation for our baseline model. 
According to our results, which are presented in table 3.3 (RE model), asset quality, 
defined as the ratio of impaired loans to equity, is strongly and positively related to 
the CDS spread. In fact, as securitization activities increased during the credit boom 
of early 2000, banks used financial engineering as a mean to finance more mortgages 
activities and provide more loans to their consumers. Since financial institutions no 
longer had to wait for 20 years (average mortgage life) to receive their money back, 
securitization was a very convenient way to expend their investment activities. This 
resulted in banks becoming more reckless with the way they accessed the credit 
worthiness of their borrowers. In fact, most loans and mortgages were granted low-
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income consumers. That also implied that the mortgage backed securities primarily 
consisted of highly risky debt. As a result of the enhanced credit ratings granted by 
the rating agencies, the structured derivative products did not reflect the real risks 
that were embedded in them, until the beginning of the housing bubble.  
 
In summer 2007, the most severe financial crisis since the great depression of 
1929 began and the toxic nature of the assets that was embedded in the structured 
products came into light and subsequently negatively affected the investors’ that 
were exposed to it. Our results in table 3.3 are consistent with these events. In fact, 
after conducting the random effect (RE) regression analysis, asset quality proved to 
be significant and positively related to the CDS spread. This implies that as banks’ 
asset quality deteriorates, the credit risk increases, which gets reflected in higher 
CDS spread. Our finding is consisted with a research conducted by Chiaramonte and 
Casu (2013) who also found that asset quality is a stronge driver of the CDS spread.  
This is in also line with a research conducted by Ötker-Robe and Podpiera (2010) 
who reached the same conclusion by analyzing the CDS spread of large and complex 
financial institutions in the EU area. 
 
In addition, our findings from table 3.3 show that liquidity expressed as the 
ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Deposits and Borrowings  also has a strong impact on 
the CDS spread, being negatively related. As such, high levels of liquidity, decreases 
credit risk and improve banks’ ability to withstand a financial crisis. In addition, 
higher liquidity also reduces the risk of bank-run and allows financial institutions to 
meet depositors’ demand for cash. This result is in line with the previous literature. 
More specifically our findings are in line with researches conducted by Chen et al. 
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(2007), Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), Das et al. (2009), Annaert et al. (2013) and 
Fabozzi et al. (2007) who confirmed the importance of liquidity as a CDS spread 
determinant. 
 
Our third finding from the baseline model is that the house price index is 
negatively related to the CDS spread over the period of 2004-2011 (demonstrated in 
table 3.3). This follows the economic logic given that before the recent financial 
crisis, as house price were continuously appreciating, credit risk was low. However, 
when the housing bubble bursted the numbers of defaults increased; thus pushing up 
the CDS spread. 
 
Having identified the most important drivers of the CDS at bank -level, in the 
next section we will discuss the findings obtained from the analysis that incorporated 
both bank and country-level, across 58 banks and 15 countries, as drivers the CDS 
spread. 
 
6.3.2 Findings from Country-level analysis 
Our findings are illustrated in tables 3.4-3.6. The preferred method of 
estimation if the FE method given that according to the Hausman test (Prob>chi2 = 
0.000), we therefore focus on the results illustrated in table 3.5. Our first finding 
indicates that the Bank Z-Score (Financial Stability 1) comes as significant and 
negatively related to the CDS spread. The Bank Z-score captures the probability of 
default of a country's banking system. As such, the Z-score compares the buffer of a 
country's banking system (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of those 
returns. Our finding exhibits a negative relationship, implying that as the volatility of 
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returns increase, the CDS spread should also go up, reflecting the higher level of 
credit risk. Since, the Bank Z score is found to be highly significant, this reflects the 
lack of financial stability over the period of 2004-2011.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter uncovers another important finding. By 
incorporating the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP (%) (Financial 
Deepening 1), our results show that higher degree of financial deepening results in a 
wider CDS spread. In fact, Financial Deepening 1 reflects the general size of the 
banking sector with respect to the economy of the country. There is evidence that 
faster growing countries experience greater levels of growth, and higher CDS 
spreads and credit risk. In the same vein, countries with slower economic growth 
tend to originate fewer loans from their deposits, thus avoiding the high risk of 
default. This in turn reduces their overall credit risk exposure. When we use an 
alternative measure of Financial Deepening, i.e. Financial Deepening 2 (Financial 
system deposits to GDP (%)), which represents an alternative measure of financial 
intermediation in a country, we reach the same conclusion that a more developed 
banking sector and a higher level of financial intermediation leads to stronger 
economic development and the generation of credit. Higher credit supply in turn 
causes the CDS spread to increase; thus pushing up the overall credit risk. Thus, we 
find that it is the credit bubble that caused and fuelled the recent financial crisis. 
 
When incorporating the degree of financial profitability, measured by the 
Overhead costs to total assets % (Financial Profitability 1), we found that it was not 
a significant factor determining the variation in the CDS spread. Moreover, adding 
the degree of financial Access, measured by the number of bank branches per 
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100,000 adults, did not have an impact on changes in the level of CDS spread. Thus, 
the degree of a country’s financial openness does not affect the level of credit risk.  
 
6.3.3 Robustness Check 
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our model which consists of both 
bank- level and country- level determinants of the CDS spread. Therefore, in table 
3.6, we keep our baseline model and for robustness purposes replace: (i) Financial 
Deepening 1 (Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%)) with Financial Deepening 2 
(Financial system deposits to GDP (%)); (ii) Financial Stability 1 (Bank Z Score) 
with Financial Stability 2 (Volatility of stock price index); (iii) Profitability 1 
(Overhead costs to total assets (%)) with Profitability 2 (Return on equity (%)); and 
(iv) we keep Financial Access (Bank branches per 100,000 adults) as an indicator of 
easiness to access the banking sector. 
 
Our findings are illustrated in table 3.6 and show that our previously obtained 
results remain unchanged. In fact, the results indicate that in the baseline model, both 
Asset quality (Impaired Loans / Equity) and Liquidity (Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & 
Bor) are important drivers of the CDS spread. In fact, asset quality proved to be 
positively related to the CDS spread, indicating that when the asset quality 
deteriorates, the CDS spread increases. In addition, liquidity appears to be negatively 
related to the CDS, implying that banks that have more liquidity are better able to 
deal with credit risk and reduce their default risk in a significant manner. This is 
reflected in narrower CDS spread. The results from table 3.6 also indicate that 
leverage (long term debt over equity) is a significant driver of the CDS spread. 
Typically banks that borrow more, find it harder to repay their outstanding debt in 
times of crisis. Thus, higher levels of leverage increase the CDS spread and credit 
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risk. This is consistent with the finding obtained by Annaert et al. (2013).  Also, 
while the operations Income ratio (EBITA / Avg Assets) is not significant in table 3.6, 
it is significant in our GMM analysis (table 3.7), which is considered to be the 
strongest model in our analysis as it addresses the issue of endogeneity. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
 
In terms of the country- level indicators, our results also remain unchanged. 
As such, Financial Deepening 2 (Financial system deposits to GDP (%)) is highly 
significant and positively related to the CDS spread, reasserting our previous 
findings that as the number of deposits increases, the stronger growth of deposits 
relative to the GDP will ultimately lead to an increase the overall CDS spread. In 
fact, Financial Deepening 2 reflects the size of the banking sector. Thus, countries 
with smaller banking sectors are subject to less credit risk and narrower CDS spread. 
From our results (represented in table 3.7), we can also observe that Financial 
Stability 2 (Volatility of stock price index) is highly significant and positively related 
to the CDS spread. This implies that as the volatility of the stock price index 
increases, it is likely to negatively impact on credit risk as it creates more uncertainty 
in the financial market. As a result, this leads to increased financial instability and 
higher CDS spread. In addition, as previously found in table 3.5, both Profitability 2 
(Return on equity (%)) and Financial Access (Bank branches per 100,000 adults) 
remain insignificant. However, it is important to recognize that there might be an 
issue with endogeneity in our results. Therefore, in the next section, we will conduct 
GMM analysis.  
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6.3.4 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) analysis 
Table 3.7 below illustrates the outcome from the Arellano-Bond (1991) test 
of autocorrelation. As such, according to the Arellano-Bond test, there is no evidence 
of second order autocorrelation; therefore our model is correctly specified (AR2 p-
value = 0.9147). The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, one 
period of the dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged 
one period. 
 
Moreover, we report Sargan-Hansen test that follows the Chi-squared 
distribution with (L-K) degrees of freedom. The statistic values test the validity of 
instruments. As such, the outcome of the Sargan test is conducted in order to test 
whether our equation is correctly identified. Under the null hypothesis, the equation 
is adequately and correctly identified. The alternative hypothesis states that our 
model is over- identified (i.e. the number of instruments is more than the number of 
endogenous variables). According to our findings, from table 3.7, the p-values for 
the Sargan test for over- identifying restrictions, where the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, confirm that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residuals and they are valid instruments (Sargan  Prob > chi2 = 
0.1294). Furthermore, we are satisfying the condition whereby our number of 
instruments is 23 and is less than the number of groups, which is equivalent to 26 
groups. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant reflecting a high 
degree of persistence in the variables.  
 
Table 3.7 below reports the results from the GMM analysis. The results are 
consistent with the findings obtained from both the benchmark model and the model 
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which considered both the bank- level and the country- level determinants of the CDS 
spread (FE and RE estimations). As such, we observe a positive relationship between 
asset quality and the CDS spread. This finding is in line with our previous results 
from the baseline model and the model which consisted of both bank- level and 
country- level indicators (tables 3.3 and 3.5 and 3.6). In fact, banks with higher ratio 
bad loans (impaired loans/ equity) have a worse quality of assets and therefore 
experience more credit risk and higher CDS spread.  
 
Furthermore, the findings table 3.7 also illustrates the negative relationship 
between bank liquidity (liquid assets/ total deposits and borrowings) and the CDS 
spread. This is consistent with our previous findings (table 3.3). As such, higher 
levels of liquidity helped financial institutions to sustain a negative credit event and 
not solely rely on borrowing from the frozen capital markets. In addition, higher 
liquidity insures that financial institutions are able to provide the necessary cash to 
its customers upon demand and avoid bank-runs, thus decreasing the credit risk and 
narrowing the CDS spread. In a similar vein, table 3.7 indicates the presence of a 
negative relationship between the banks’ operations Income ratio (EBITA / Average 
Assets) and the CDS spread. Therefore, banks that achieve higher level of operations 
are considered to be safer and subject to less credit risk. Also, according to our 
GMM estimations, the remaining bank-level bank indicators, namely: regulatory 
capital and leverage proved to be insignificant drivers of the CDS spread in the 
sample period. Although leverage was significant in the static fixed effect analysis 
and in the random effect analysis (table 3.3 and 3.6), it turns out to be insignificant in 
the GMM analysis partly because of the limited variability in the data in a dynamic 
setting. One of the reasons that explain the non-significance of the regulatory capital 
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is related to the fact that banks held capital buffers which did not reflect their real 
risk intakes. In fact, the regulatory cushion and the ability to absorb losses did not 
reflect the off-balances-sheet securitization activities and the increased level of 
financial engineering banks were conducting. 
 
On a country- level, our results reassert our previous findings that financial 
deepening is an important determinant of the CDS spread over the period of 2004-
2011. Among the country- level indicators, our results show that there is a positive 
relationship between financial deepening, which reflects the level of credit in the 
financial system, and the CDS spread. We find that as banks were excessively 
lending, the easy credit provision to low-income consumers, lead to an increase in 
the level of credit risk. According to the GMM estimation, financial stability was 
insignificant reflecting the fragility of the financial system, while profitability and 
financial access were less important factors determining credit risk as compared to 
financial deepening which was significant across both GMM and FE estimations 
(tables 3.5-3.7). 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In the light of the recent financial crisis, there has been an imminent need to 
identify the drivers of the CDS spread, as an indicator of credit risk, in order to 
ensure a systemic stability and avoid another financial crisis. The sixth chapter of 
this dissertation investigates both bank-level and country- level drivers of the CDS 
spread across 15 countries and 58 banks, over the period of 2004-2011. It is the first 
research to our knowledge that considers both bank and country- level drivers of bank 
CDS spread, before, during and after the financial crisis.  
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The findings of this chapter show that the strongest bank-level drivers of the 
CDS spread are asset quality, liquidity and the operations income ratio. In fact, our 
results show that banks with stronger liquidity levels experienced a reduced exposure 
to credit risk and had therefore a narrower CDS spread. Similarly, banks with better 
asset quality were better able to sustain themselves as they had less toxic asset and 
experienced lower level of defaults. Leverage and regulatory capital however did not 
turn out to be significant, partly due to the limited variability in the data over the 
sample period. 
 
Country- level analysis unveils an important finding which directly relates the 
credit bubble to the CDS spread. In fact, our results show that there is a positive 
relationship between financial deepening, which reflects the level of credit in the 
financial system, and the CDS spread. We find that as banks were excessively 
lending, the easy credit provision to low-income consumers, lead to an increase in 
the level of credit risk. Therefore, countries that were excessively lending 
experienced exceptionally high CDS spreads and their banks were more prone to 
default. In addition, we show evidence that the recent financial crisis caused a 
systemic instability, which further fragilized financia l markets. Furthermore, we find 
that at country- level, profitability and the degree of financial access to banks does 
not affect the CDS spread.   
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Figure 3.1: Country-level CDS spread Determinants 
 
    CDS and Bank Z Score                                                      CDS and Deposit Money Bank Assets/ GDP (%) 
 
 
 
CDS and Bank branches per 100,000 adults                        CDS and Net Interest Margin 
 
  
Fig. 4.1a & b. Graphical illustration of the relationship between bank CDS spread and country level indicators (Bank Z score, Deposit Money Bank Assets 
to GDP (%), and Bank branches per 100,000 adults, Net Interest Margin). 
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Figure 3.2: Bank CDS spread in Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Fig4.2: Graphical illustration of bank CDS spread fluctuation of selected banks, across developed and 
emerging countries, extracted from the panel sample, over the period of 2004 to 2011: Dexia 
(Belgium), DZ Bank (Germany), Bank of America Corporation (US), BNP Paribas (France), Northern  
Rock (UK), Bank of China (China). The Bank CDS spread is expressed in basis points. 
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Figure 3.3: The transmission of the credit bubble that caused the dramatic 
increase in the CDS spread and credit risk 
 
 
 
  
208 
 
Table 3.1: Fisher Unit Root Test for ln(BankCDS) and  ln(HousePriceIndex) 
and are non-stationary spreads and credit risk. 
Notes: From the p-values, we can safely reject the null-hypothesis and conclude that both ln(BankCDS) and 
ln(HousePriceIndex) are stationary. 
  
  
ln(BankCDS) 
  
ln(HousePriceIndex)  
 
  
Statistics 
 
p-
value 
 
Statistics 
 
p-
value 
Inverse chi-squared(110) and (98)    
P 
155.8253 0.0027 326.2547 0.0000 
Inverse normal    Z -4.4617 0.0000 -11.2148 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(279) and  (249)      
L* 
-4.2266 0.0000 -11.8235 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared    Pm 3.0895 0.0010 16.3039 0.0000 
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Table 3.2: Bank Level Determinants of the CDS spread – OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln (House Price Index) -0.00599 -0.145** -0.204** -0.224** -0.210** -0.224** 
 (0.0484) (0.0619) (0.0921) (0.103) (0.106) (0.105) 
       
Asset Quality  0.00431*** 0.00447*** 0.00488*** 0.00769*** 0.00760*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity)  (0.00111) (0.00129) (0.00145) (0.00261) (0.00258) 
       
Liquidity   -0.0105*** -0.0130*** -0.00956* -0.00785 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor)   (0.00391) (0.00466) (0.00510) (0.00526) 
       
Regulatory Capital    -0.0355 -0.0280 -0.0309 
(Tier 2 Capital)    (0.0287) (0.0493) (0.0491) 
       
Leverage     0.0275* 0.0317* 
(Long term debt to Common 
Equity) 
    (0.0161) (0.0167) 
       
Operations Income Ratio      0.0743 
(EBITA / Avg Assets)      (0.0948) 
       
_cons 2.975*** 3.607*** 4.155*** 4.494*** 4.209*** 4.089*** 
 (0.267) (0.346) (0.496) (0.569) (0.589) (0.583) 
N 326 262 255 234 130 130 
adj. R2 0.700 0.711     
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. All estimation are controlled for time-effect. 
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Table 3.3: Bank Level Determinants of the CDS spread - RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(House Price Index) -0.0257 -0.171* -0.161* -0.197** -0.218** -0.212** 
 (0.0710) (0.0961) (0.0974) (0.0930) (0.105) (0.107) 
       
Asset Quality  0.00456*** 0.00430*** 0.00427*** 0.00474*** 0.00785*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity)  (0.00132) (0.00134) (0.00131) (0.00146) (0.00265) 
       
Operations Income Ratio   -0.0586 -0.0459 -0.0641 0.0137 
(EBITA / Avg Assets)   (0.0435) (0.0425) (0.0440) (0.0595) 
       
Liquidity    -0.0104*** -0.0126*** -0.00975* 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor)    (0.00392) (0.00470) (0.00518) 
       
Regulatory Capital     -0.0355 -0.0317 
(Tier 2 Capital)     (0.0287) (0.0515) 
       
Leverage      0.0289* 
(Long term debt to Common 
Equity) 
     (0.0176) 
       
_cons 3.093*** 3.766*** 3.795*** 4.178*** 4.539*** 4.210*** 
 (0.371) (0.502) (0.507) (0.500) (0.578) (0.598) 
N 326 262 262 255 234 130 
adj. R2 0.7068 0.7206 0.7155 0.7295 0.7173   0.7893   
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. According to the Hausman test, the RE model is the preferred method of 
estimation, Prob>chi2 =      0.0844. All estimation are controlled for time-effect. 
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Table 3.4: Bank Level Determinants of the CDS spread - FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(House Price Index) -0.926 -1.577** -1.265* -1.304* -0.501 -0.0554 
 (0.588) (0.710) (0.723) (0.716) (0.815) (0.973) 
       
Asset Quality  0.00481*** 0.00508*** 0.00557*** 0.00669*** 0.0187*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity)  (0.00164) (0.00163) (0.00165) (0.00178) (0.00421) 
       
Operations Income Ratio   -0.113* -0.113* -0.143** -0.208** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets)   (0.0580) (0.0579) (0.0599) (0.0820) 
       
Liquidity    -0.00762 -0.0120* -0.0128 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor)    (0.00573) (0.00697) (0.00934) 
       
Regulatory Capital     -0.0653** -0.0451 
(Tier 2 Capital)     (0.0322) (0.0684) 
       
Leverage      0.0109 
(Long term debt to Common 
Equity) 
     (0.0246) 
       
_cons 7.603** 10.67*** 9.256*** 9.566*** 6.051 3.496 
 (2.941) (3.499) (3.550) (3.507) (3.983) (4.828) 
N 326 262 262 255 234 130 
adj. R2 0.750 0.754 0.757 0.761 0.756 0.779 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. All estimations are controlled for time-effect. According to the Hausman test, the RE 
model is the preferred method of estimation. 
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Table 3.5: Regulatory Structure and Financial System - FE 
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. All estimations are controlled for time-effect. According to the Hausman test, FE is the preferred 
method of estimation as the Prob>chi2 =      0.0000. 
FE Preferred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Asset Quality 0.0300*** 0.0235*** 0.00527*** 0.00521*** 0.00377** 0.00330* 0.00309* 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.00545) (0.00564) (0.00196) (0.00195) (0.00189) (0.00173) (0.00169) 
Operations Income Ratio -0.360*** -0.256*** -0.136** -0.135** -0.0860 -0.0858 -0.0892* 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.0790) (0.0890) (0.0597) (0.0594) (0.0539) (0.0521) (0.0520) 
Financial Deepening 1 -0.0121 -0.00613 0.00541 0.00497 0.00994*** 0.0115*** 0.0112*** 
(Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%))) (0.00748) (0.00621) (0.00375) (0.00360) (0.00348) (0.00316) (0.00316) 
Financial Stability 1 -0.0632** -0.0155 -0.0320* -0.0310* -0.0323* -0.0309* -0.0350** 
(Bank Z Score) (0.0270) (0.0244) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0167) (0.0167) 
Liquidity -0.000823 -0.0118 -0.0100 -0.00995 -0.00763 -0.00420  
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor) (0.00996) (0.00957) (0.00695) (0.00693) (0.00659) (0.00520)  
Regulatory Capital -0.0934 -0.0706 -0.0643* -0.0650** -0.0134   
(Tier 2 Capital) (0.0688) (0.0768) (0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0277)   
ln(House Price Index) -1.529 0.419 -0.620 -0.639    
 (1.366) (1.022) (0.817) (0.813)    
Profitability 1 0.159 0.178 0.0536     
(Overhead costs to total assets (%)) (0.193) (0.185) (0.125)     
Leverage -0.0259 -0.00677      
(Long term debt to Common Equity) (0.0252) (0.0274)      
Financial Access -0.00405       
(Bank branches per 100,000 adults) (0.0131)       
_cons 12.39* 1.777 6.455 6.679* 3.141*** 2.741*** 2.744*** 
 (6.733) (4.932) (3.983) (3.939) (0.572) (0.487) (0.481) 
N 83 130 234 234 267 290 297 
adj. R2 0.865 0.779 0.761 0.762 0.730 0.744 0.744 
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Table 3.6: Robustness Check, Regulatory Structure and Financial System, - FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Asset Quality 0.0222*** 0.00571 0.00558 0.00594* 0.00618* 0.00607* 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.00591) (0.00470) (0.00390) (0.00353) (0.00349) (0.00345) 
Liquidity -0.000886 -0.0232** -0.0171** -0.0118* -0.0125** -0.0127** 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor) (0.0105) (0.00949) (0.00796) (0.00614) (0.00600) (0.00592) 
       
Leverage -0.0228 0.0678** 0.0674*** 0.0602*** 0.0647*** 0.0663*** 
(Long term debt to Common 
Equity) 
(0.0294) (0.0276) (0.0237) (0.0224) (0.0204) (0.0193) 
Financial Deepening 2 -0.0153 0.0177** 0.0159*** 0.0137** 0.0135** 0.0137** 
(Financial system deposits to 
GDP (%) 
(0.00919) (0.00845) (0.00592) (0.00546) (0.00543) (0.00538) 
Financial Stability 2 0.0500** 0.0611*** 0.0538*** 0.0510*** 0.0517*** 0.0519*** 
(Volatility of stock price index) (0.0214) (0.0147) (0.0122) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
Operations Income Ratio -0.327*** -0.0446 -0.0356 -0.0126 -0.0131  
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.0784) (0.0672) (0.0578) (0.0531) (0.0529)  
Profitability 2 -0.00395 0.00435 0.00224 -0.00307   
(Return on equity (%)) (0.00772) (0.00833) (0.00678) (0.00606)   
Regulatory Capital -0.134** 0.0122 0.0202    
(Tier 2 Capital) (0.0640) (0.0396) (0.0351)    
Financial Access -0.00661 -0.00978     
(Bank branches per 100,000 
adults) 
(0.0128) (0.0140)     
Ln(House Price Index) 0.432      
 (1.527)      
_cons 1.421 1.861** 1.532*** 1.701*** 1.652*** 1.623*** 
 (7.677) (0.893) (0.499) (0.445) (0.433) (0.415) 
N 82 109 141 150 150 150 
adj. R2 0.871 0.779 0.817 0.829 0.831 0.832 
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. All estimations are controlled for time-effect. According to the Hausman test, FE is the preferred 
method of estimation as the Prob>chi2 =      0.0000.
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Table 3.7: GMM  
VARIABLES Z 
                 0.202*** 
 
[0.063] 
ln(House Price Index) -0.408 
 
[0.360] 
Regulatory Capital -0.051 
(Tier 2 Capital) [0.104] 
Leverage 0.022 
(Long term debt to Common Equity) [0.019] 
Liquidity -0.054*** 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & Bor) [0.009] 
Asset Quality 0.008*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) [0.003] 
Operations Income Ratio -0.151*** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) [0.047] 
Financial Deepening 0.026*** 
(Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%)) [0.007] 
Financial Stability -0.012 
(Bank Z Score) [0.018] 
Profitability 0.182 
(Overhead costs to total assets (%)) [0.124] 
Constant 3.449* 
 
[1.819] 
Observations 121 
Number of id 26 
Number of Instruments 23 
Number of groups 26 
chi2 3573 
ar1 (p value) 0.0056 
ar2 (p value) 0.9147 
Sargan Chi2 17.57061 
Sargan  Prob > chi2 0.1294 
Notes : Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, signi ficant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels , 
respectively. According to the Arellano-Bond test, the value of the test for second-order autocorrelation 
presents  no evidence of model  misspecification. The di fference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels , 
one period of the dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. The GMM-
type instruments  consis ted of one lag of ln(Bank CDS). The Standard instruments were: Δ            ), 
Δln(HousePriceIndex), ΔAssetQuali ty, ΔLiquidi ty,  ΔRegulatoryCapital, ΔLeverage, ΔOperations  Income Ratio, 
ΔFinancialDeepening, ΔFinancial Stability and ΔProfi tability. The instruments  for level equation consisted of the 
GMM-type instruments , namely: Δln(BankCDS). The p values for the Sargan test for over-identi fying restrictions , 
where the null hypothesis is that the instruments  are uncorrelated with the residuals, confi rm that the 
instruments are not correlated with the residuals and they are valid instruments . The lagged dependent 
variable is statis tically signi ficant reflecting a high degree o f persistence in the variables. The number of 
instruments is 23 and is less than the number of groups, which is equal to 26. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
7.1 Summary of findings 
The recent financial crisis has underlined the importance of identifying the 
factors driving credit risk and CDS spreads. Given the high interconnectedness of the 
financial system, defaults in one sector get easily transmitted to other sectors, 
ultimately causing contagion in the overall financial system and resulting in crisis 
across countries. Therefore, it is of a paramount importance to identify the factors 
that contributed to the recent financial crisis in order to limit future defaults and 
prevent another crisis from occurring in the future.  
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on credit risk in a number of 
ways. I first start by focusing on the CDS spread in the UK banking sector. Thus, in 
the fourth chapter, I uncover the crucial linkage existing between the housing 
market, the stock market, the money market and the credit market. I consider both 
the long-term (using the Johansen’s Cointegration) and the short-term analysis 
(using the Structural VAR) of the drivers of CDS spread, over the period of 2004-
2011. I establish from my empirical findings that the housing market has been the 
key driver of credit risk in the UK. Thus, before the crisis, as house prices were high, 
banks confidently boosted their mortgage activities through the process of 
securitization, not granting enough importance to the quality of borrowers and 
keeping very little capital aside for the possibility of a negative credit event. 
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Eventually, the credit boom era came to an end as house prices plummeted and 
investors started heavily defaulting. This in turn pushed-up the CDS spread and 
credit risk; thus causing one of the worse financial crisis that economists often 
compare to the great depression of 1929.  
 
In addition, I also find that the high performance of the stock market prior to 
the financial crisis enabled financial institutions to expand their borrowings, thus 
generating lucrative, high return, but also very risky investments. Similarly, I show 
that liquidity was another pivotal factor that enabled banks to grant subprime loans 
to sub-prime borrowers. When considering the yield spread, I find that it is 
negatively related to the CDS spread and credit risk. This is in line with the 
consumers’ risk aversion during the recent financial crisis.   
 
I employ the Structural VAR analysis in order to uncover the short-run 
impact of the different shocks explaining CDS spread. I imposed short-run 
restrictions to identify the five shocks namely: the CDS spread, the house price 
index, the yield spread, the TED spread, and the FTSE100.  The SVAR findings 
indicate that a positive shock to house prices significantly increases the CDS spread 
in the medium-term, in the UK banking sector. In addition, apart from its own shock, 
the house price shock explains a big part of the variance (nearly 20%) in CDS 
spread. These results remained robust even after changing the ordering of the 
variables in the Structural VAR.  
 
Beside the macro-level factors affecting the CDS spread and credit risk, there 
were other bank- level factors that also contributed to increased level of defaults. As 
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such, in the fifth chapter of this thesis, using three different methodologies: fixed 
effect (FE), random effect (RE) and GMM analysis, I show evidence that across 30 
countries and 115 banks, over the period of 2004-2011, banks with low liquidity 
levels, low level of operations and bad asset quality were subject to wider CDS 
spreads and historically high credit risk levels. In summer 2007, as financial markets 
froze and consumers lost confidence in the global financial system, the only banks 
that were able to sustain themselves were the ones with high liquidity reserves and 
good asset quality. The rest of financial institutions either went bankrupt or were 
subject to mergers and takeovers. In addition, I show that the too-big-to-fail 
phenomenon that was so popular before the beginning of the financial crisis was 
very illusive. In fact, most of the big banks that grew beyond their optimal size 
before the crisis went bankrupt. The very few financial institutions that survived the 
crisis were the ones that were closely connected with the public sector and which the 
government saved through bailouts, using tax payers’ money. In my analysis, I 
conduct the U-test and prove that there exists a U-shape relationship linking bank 
CDS spread and bank size. I derive the optimal bank size which shows that any bank 
growing beyond that threshold faced high credit risk and wider CDS spreads. Given 
that smaller banks were more prudent in conducting their business, they were 
considered to be stronger, since their investments were smaller in scale and less 
complex in nature.  
 
In addition, I further expand my research in the sixth chapter of this thesis as 
I conduct both bank and country- level analysis on the drivers of the CDS spread and 
credit risk, across banks and countries. The panel regression analyses focus on the 
period of 2004-2011. As such, I investigate the factors that make banks in certain 
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countries risker/safer relative to others. Beside the significance of asset quality, 
liquidity and operations income, at bank- level, in affecting credit risk, my empirical 
results suggest that excessive credit lending had a double-sided effect on banks’ 
credit risk profiles. While before the financial crisis the easy availability of credit 
helped banks to achieve higher profits, get easier access to funding and boost 
borrowing activities, with the beginning of the financial crisis, excessive credit 
creation directly contributed to the credit boom as banks that had easy access credit 
were unable to repay their debts and started heavily defaulting, driving CDS spreads 
to record high levels. 
 
7.2 Policy implications 
A number of policy implications can be derived from the research conducted 
in this thesis. The fourth chapter sheds light on the close linkage between the 
housing market, the money market, the stock market and the credit risk. Therefore, a 
common consensus should be reached between the central bank, financial 
institutions, building societies and regulators on how to ensure systemic stability and 
avoid any contagion or spill-over effects. A policy of low interest rates would 
typically lead to increased borrowing which will have to be matched by increased 
housing supply in order to keep house prices stable. If any element in the chain is not 
satisfied, this may give rise to major misbalances that may result into a housing 
bubble, which in turn can cause another crisis. Therefore, close supervision of the 
housing market is crucial in order to ensure systemic stability. 
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My finding from the fifth chapter indicates that bigger banks were more 
prone to credit risk as compared to smaller banks. Before the financial crisis, small 
banks were given the wrong incentives to grow beyond their optimal size as there 
was a belief that the bigger the bank and more certainty that the government will 
always intervene in case of default. The recent financial crisis served as a great 
lesson as it showed that smaller scale and more concentrated type of investments 
lead to a more stable financial system. Therefore, given the high risk that big banks 
pose on financial and systemic stability, financial regulators should impose on them 
stricter liquidity and asset quality regulation and ensure that there is more control. 
 
The next recommendation related to the credit provision. My results from the 
sixth chapter indicate that easy borrowing conditions have led to excessive credit 
creations which in turn triggered the recent financial crisis and resulted in excessive 
credit risk and wide CDS spreads. In fact, I find that higher level of financial 
deepening is directly linked with increased levels of defaults. Thus, excessive credit 
creation has caused a credit bubble, which transformed into a global financial crisis. 
Therefore, there is a crucial need for the central bank to tighten the availability of 
credit through tougher interest rate policy, and to increase regulatory capital 
requirements at bank- level. My finding is in line with the research conducted by 
Mallick and Sousa (2013) for the Euro area where the authors show that monetary 
policy should react to a credit bubble with a higher interest rate that can make loans 
more expensive although identification of a threshold level of credit (as a per cent of 
GDP) can be a challenging task for policy makers.  
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In addition, although the move from traditional to universal banking brought 
banks and consumers closer, this transition was also associated with higher credit 
risk and default levels. In fact, banks, building societies and insurance companies 
started conducting activities in which they have little expertise. Before the recent 
crisis, banks traded CDS contracts for speculative purposes rather than for hedging. 
This resulted in an issue of incentives as buyers and sellers of CDS contracts were 
well aware of the performance of the underlying entity. Thus, knowing that the 
underlying entity was about to default, consumers purchased CDS contracts hoping 
the instrument would default in order to get repayment.  This leads us to the next 
recommendation where by a move back to more conservative banking would reduce 
credit risk and the issue of moral hazard. 
 
7.3 Limitations of this research 
One of the limitations of this research stems from the lack of availability of 
CDS data prior to 2004. However, since the beginning of the financial crisis, 
regulators and central banks recognized the importance of increasing the 
transparency of the credit derivative market. The mortgage data related to CDS 
contracts now exists in Bloomberg and Datastream and is separate for each bank and 
across many developed and emerging markets. It will be therefore of great interest to 
relate the CDS contracts on MBS products and collect the associated credit ratings in 
order to examine the potential impact it had on the overall credit risk, not only before 
and during, but also after the recent financial crisis.   
 
In addition, I would like improve my research in the fifth and sixth chapter of 
this thesis by conducting a comparative analysis between developed and emerging 
221 
 
markets. The main challenge relates the lack of availability of data in emerging 
countries as a result of the lack of disclosures. Therefore, my aim is to collect more 
data on banks in emerging markets in order to perform a comparative analysis 
between developed and emerging markets. 
 
In this thesis, I consider the period over 2004-2011. My aim is to include the 
CDS data after 2011 and investigate whether the factors that affected the CDS spread 
before and during the crisis, remained significant in the post crisis period, or whether 
there are now new factors that affect the CDS spread. 
 
Furthermore, my future research plan is to collect the CDS spread data in 
various sectors and industries. Since I already have data on sovereign CDS spreads, 
my aim is to link it to bank CDSs and analyze whether there were common factors 
across the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) countries that contributed to 
the Sovereign crisis of 2010. 
 
Moreover, for bank- level analysis, my aim is to collect additional data on 
diversification, more specifically interest-income and non- interest income data, and 
conduct cross-bank and cross-country analysis in order to investigate whether 
diversification had any impact on the variations of CDS spreads and credit risk 
across small and big banks.  
 
On the regulatory side, Basel 3 has been recently introduced as regulators 
recognized the imminent need to change the way banks complied with regulation. 
There is great scope to expand the research I conducted in the 5 th  and 6th chapter of 
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this thesis by collecting additional data that reflects the improvements of regulatory 
capital introduced in Basel 3 and compare its effect on CDS spreads using the 
previous capital implementation from the Basel 1 and Basel 2 Capital Accords. 
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